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Abstract
Leasing provides a significant source of finance across UK firms. Historically, its
use has been attributed to favourable tax treatment and 'off-balance sheet'
accounting, both of which have been eroded over time. The present day
determinants of leasing have received limited investigation, and prior research has
focused on the use of finance leases in isolation from overall corporate financing
decisions. This seems inappropriate given the predominant and prolific use of
operating leases (Beattie, Edwards and Goodacre, 1998), and evidence to suggest
that lease and debt finance appear to be at least partial substitutes (Beattie,
Goodacre and Thomson, 2000). Further, proposals issued by the Accounting
Standards Board in late 1999 look set to essentially remove the current 'off-balance
sheet' accounting treatment of operating leases. If accounting treatment is in any
way responsible for the current use of operating leases, these proposals are likely to
have a significant impact on the future role of leasing.
In response, the present study. investigated both the current role of leasing in the
wider context of corporate financing decisions, and its future role in light of the new
proposals for lease accounting. Two separate surveys of UK quoted industrial
companies were undertaken to investigate corporate financing and leasing decisions
and views and opinions on lease accounting reform. Findings are based on a
response of 23% (198 completed questionnaires) and 19% (91 completed
questionnaires) respectively. OLS regression analysis was also employed for a
sample of 159 UK quoted industrial companies, to establish the existence of an 'off-
balance sheet' advantage to operating leases from a market perspective.
Findings suggest that UK firms appear more likely to follow Myers' (1984)
suggestion of a modified pecking order of capital structure when determining their
debt, including leasing, levels. Investment nd dividend payout dictate the need for
external finance, and debt including leasing is internally rather than externally
constrained. On average, internal reserves followed by straight debt appear
preferable to leasing. However, the benefits and costs associated with all sources of
finance are likely to be considered when additional finance is required. Although tax
and 'off-balance sheet' advantages to leasing remain, they do not appear to
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dominate the leasing decision in the current climate. Avoiding large capital outlay
and cash flow considerations appear of paramount importance in the decision to
lease all asset types.
Findings suggest that the preference for leasing over other forms of debt is not
anticipated to change in response to the new proposals for lease accounting.
However, the new approach may not be without consequence. Where possible,
financial statement preparers are likely to take reactionary steps to minimise balance
sheet obligations. At the very least, this could involve exercising any opportunity to
manipulate the new accounting treatment. It may extend to reduced investment and
a decline in levels of debt financing, including leasing. Although operating lease
obligations appear to be currently taken into account in the UK market's assessment
of equity risk, the accuracy with which they are taken into account remains unclear.
Therefore, the revaluation of securities in the wake of the new proposals becoming
mandatory is not beyond the realms of possibility.
The present study provides a holistic analysis of corporate financing and leasing
decisions in UK firms. It provides a valuable contribution to the capital structure
debate. It would seem inappropriate for future capital structure research to focus on
proving alternative static trade-off and pecking order theories. Future research
would benefit from a reconciliation of the two. The present study highlights the
difficulties in analysing corporate financing and leasing decisions, by establishing
that they are complex, multidimensional and essentially situation-specific. The
present study also has important implications for policy makers. In addition to the
potential economic consequences, findings appear to suggest that certain features of
the new proposals fall short of developing into a high quality lease accounting
standard. Further consideration by policy makers from alternative perspectives
appears necessary.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Leasing is currently used to finance a significant proportion of UK investment in
equipment; 15.3% in 1999 according to the Finance and Leasing Association. It is
not a new source of finance, although the substantial growth in its use can be dated
back to the 1970's and early 1980's. However, this growth has been attributed to the
favourable tax treatment and 'off-balance sheet' nature of leasing, both of which
have been eroded over time. The present day determinants of leasing have received
limited investigation by researchers, and the focus has been on the use of finance
leases, in isolation from overall corporate financing decisions. This is inappropriate
in light of recent evidence to suggest that the use of finance leases is insignificant in
relation to operating leases (Beattie, Edwards and Goodacre, 1998), and that lease
and debt finance appear to be at least partial substitutes (Beattie, Goodacre and
Thomson, 2000). In response, the present study investigates the role of leasing, at
the beginning of the 2l century, in the wider context of corporate financing
decisions.
The present study is especially timely given that lease accounting regulation is in
the throes of change. Proposals issued by the Accounting Standards Board in late
1999 essentially require the capitalisation of operating leases. If the provision of
off-balance sheet finance is in anyway responsible for the current use of operating
leases, then the new proposals are likely to have a significant impact. An indication
of the potential impact on the future role of leasing, if these proposals become
mandatory, is also investigated in the present study. This is addressed in the
following ways. Firstly, by establishing if the current lease accounting treatment
appears to feature as a major determinant of leasing. Secondly, by investigating the
views of account preparers on lease accounting reform. Thirdly, by determining if
the off-balance sheet nature of operating leases really is an advantage, by
investigating if operating lease disclosures are currently taken into account in the
JfK market's assessment of equity risk. The background surrounding these issues,
leading to an outline of the present study's intentions and structure, is provided in
this chapter.
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1.1 Background and motivation to the present study
A lease agreement conveys a right to the use of a specific asset for an agreed period
of time to a lessee, in exchange for the payment of specified rentals to a lessor who
retains legal ownership. Leasing thus provides the option of employing business
assets without acquiring ownership by financing their purchase.
Leasing originates from the 19t1 century when it was used to provide capital for the
railways. However it was during the 1970's and early 1980's when the use of
leasing in the UK grew substantially. This growth has been primarily attributed to
both the off-balance sheet accounting treatment of leased assets and corresponding
obligations, and favourable tax treatment. Prior to 1984, lease rental payments were
generally expensed in the profit and loss account, with neither leased asset nor
liability being recorded on the balance sheet. Consequently, performance measures
and borrowing powers were unaffected.
Leasing is unique in comparison to other sources of finance in relation to the claim
on capital tax allowances. In a lease agreement, the lessee acquires the right to use
the leased asset, rather than the finance to acquire ownership. Consequently, the
lessee surrenders the right to claim capital tax allowances to the lessor, who retains
the legal ownership. Prior to 1970, capital tax allowances were at low levels,
creating indifference in terms of tax advantages between leasing and financing to
purchase. However in 1970, a first year allowance permitting 60% of a qualifying
asset's cost to be immediately written off against taxable profit, was introduced.
This allowance was further increased to 80% in July 1971 and finally 100% in
March 1972. As a result, a large number of companies investing in significant asset
expansion programmes became tax-exhausted. The capital tax allowances available
were in excess of taxable profits. At the same time, finance and service companies
were subject to significant amounts of corporation tax. These companies reported
substantial profits owing to the high interest rates of the time, with little allowable
capital expenditure to offset. Leasing provided the opportunity for these companies
to reduce their tax burden by claiming first year allowances on leased assets. Tax-
exhausted companies were given the incentive to lease by the offer of lower rental
payments, and the fact additional first year allowances were of no immediate use.
Prior research investigating the use of leasing in the UK during this time period is
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essentially survey based. Findings confirm the apparent importance of capital tax
advantages of leasing to large firms (Sykes, 1976). However, leasing appeared less
significant to small firms at that time (Tomkins, Lowe and Morgan, 1979).
In 1984, both the off-balance sheet and tax advantages to leasing diminished. First
year capital tax allowances were phased out by the 1984 budget. Allowable
expenditure incurred since March 1986 has generally qualified for a 25% writing
down allowance. The reduction of corporation tax rates in 1986 and subsequent
years also reduced the advantage to be obtained from the lessee passing on capital
tax allowances to the lessor. Also in 1984, the Accounting Standards Committee
introduced SSAP 21 'Accounting for leases and hire purchase contracts', stipulating
the lease accounting treatment that remains in force today. SSAP 21 classifies lease
agreements into two types: finance leases and operating leases. Finance leases in
which substantially all the risks and rewards of ownership of an asset are transferred
to the lessee, are recognised on the lessee's balance sheet. Next year's operating
lease obligations are disclosed in the notes to the accounts. The transfer of risks and
rewards is presumed to occur if, at the inception of the lease, the present value of
the minimum lease payments amounts to 90% or more of the fair value of the leased
asset. It was intended that operating leases amount to nothing more than a
cancellable periodic expense, and leasing no longer provided the opportunity for
off-balance sheet financing.
The removal of first year capital tax allowances, and the introduction of specific
lease accounting regulation might have been expected to cause a decline in the use
of leasing. However, this does not appear to have been the case. During the mid to
late 1980's, leasing averaged 18.1% of UK investment in plant and equipment
(ACCA, 2000). This level of investment has generally remained throughout the
1990's. According to the Finance and Leasing Association, during the period 1992
to 1999, leasing averaged approximately 17.1% of new investment in equipment
and vehicles. It is suggested that leasing may still be favoured for actual tax saving
reasons, or for the timing of tax savings, either through the lessor's claim on capital
allowances (Day, 2000), or because the total amount of lease rentals payable on
non-qualifying assets, are tax deductible. Further, a significant off-balance sheet
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advantage appears to remain with the operating lease accounting treatment required
under SSAP 21.
Although SSAP 21 provides the 90% present value test, it was not intended as a
strict mathematical definition of a finance lease. Technical release 664 issued in
1987 emphasises that all of the terms and conditions of a lease agreement should be
considered when determining if substantially all risks and rewards of ownership
have been transferred. However, qualitative tests are not provided to establish if this
is the case for a lease failing to meet the 90% test. In this situation, lease
classification becomes a matter ofjudgement. Operating lease classification and off-
balance sheet disclosure thus appears possible for any agreement when the 90% test
can be circumvented. Further, evidence exists of company managements'
unwillingness to disclose methods used in lease classification (Loveday, 1994), and
of restructuring to avoid finance lease capitalisation (Taylor and Turley, 1985;
Drury and Braund, 1990).
frrespective of accounting treatment, it is suggested that leasing might be used to
extend a firm's capacity for borrowing, if it is perceived that leasing obligations
consume less debt capacity than non-leasing debt alternatives, or if lease agreements
contain less restrictive covenants (Schallheim, 1994; Day, 2000). Lease agreements
permit flexibility when sharing the risks and rewards of ownership between lessor
and lessee. It is also suggested that leasing may be beneficial in response to cash
flow fluctuations (Schaliheim, 1994; Day, 2000), and for more practical
considerations such as the provision of service and maintenance (Belkaoui, 1998;
Day, 2000).
Prior research investigating reasons for the continued popularity of leasing, in both
the UK and the US, have adopted either a direct survey approach 1 , or used
accounting/company' data to observe leasing decisions and infer reasons. 2
 There is a
body of evidence to suggest that tax reasons and off-balance sheet advantage
'UK: Mayes and Nicholas (1988), Drury and Braund (1990); US: O'Brien and Nunnally (1983),
Mukherjee (1991), Bathala and Mukherjee (1995).
2 UK: Adedeji and Stapleton (1996), Lasfer and Levis (1998), Beattie, Goodacre and Thomson
(2000); US: Ang and Peterson (1984), Kare and Herbst (1990), Krishnan and Moyer (1994), Bathala
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continue to influence the leasing decision. Cash flow considerations feature, and US
evidence suggests that lease covenants are less restrictive. There appears to be a
distinct lack of investigation into the use of leasing for certain practical
considerations, for example the convenience with which leasing can be obtained.
However, the majority of prior studies are based on analysing accounting/company
data. Although this approach highlights the existence of relationships between
leasing and other firm characteristics, by nature it fails to capture the more practical
aspects. The survey method has the potential to consider a full spectrum of
quantitative and qualitative reasons for leasing. Unfortunately survey evidence post
the introduction of tax changes and lease accounting regulation is fairly limited.
Further, the most recent UK survey (Drury and Braund, 1990) was conducted over a
decade ago. The business environment of the late 1980's bears little resemblance to
the global, technological business environment at the beginning of the 2l century.
Therefore, although leasing has retained a fairly constant level of popularity, the
reasons for its use at the beginning of the last decade compared to the beginning of
the 2l century may be far from constant.
The nature of lease agreements has changed over time. Finance leasing appears to
be slowly in decline (FLA, 2000), whereas the use of operating leases appears to
have grown dramatically over time. For example, in 1981 the average operating
lease payments due within one year, for a sample of 297 UK quoted companies,
amounted to approximately £0.2million 3. By 1994, this had increased to
approximately £8.2million (Goodacre and Beattie, 1999). The apparent switch from
the use of finance leases to operating leases might be partly attributable to the
removal of the off-balance sheet advantage to finance leases under SSAP 21.
However, the use of operating leases may reflect changing business needs and
subsequently the reasons for leasing.
The existence of both somewhat limited and outdated evidence, and the significance
of operating leases as a source of company finance, provides sufficient incentive to
investigate the role of leasing in the present business environment. However, there
and Mukherjee (1995), Sharpe and Nguyen (1995), Graham, Lemmon and Schaliheim (1998),
Mehran, Taggart and Yermack (1999), Duke, Franz, Hunt and Toy (1999)
Expressed in 1994 prices to account for inflation
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is further motivation behind such an undertaking. The focus of prior research is,
generally, to establish why leasing might be considered preferable to non-leasing
debt alternatives. Recent evidence in the UK and the US suggests, from a company
management perspective, that leasing and debt appear to be at least partial
substitutes (Marston and Harris, 1988; Beattie, Goodacre and Thomson, 2000).
Thus, when a company enters a lease agreement, the potential to take on future non-
leasing debt is reduced. If leasing is a form of debt, and consumes capacity for debt,
then the decision to lease is not independent from the decision to determine the
overall level of debt finance. The majority of prior research, which generally
considers the leasing decision in isolation from overall corporate financing
decisions, therefore appears inappropriate.
Extensive research has been undertaken to establish how firms determine their
levels of debt and equity. However, the theory and empirical evidence spanning
over half a century is vast, but by no means conclusive. An element of this prior
research could be considered somewhat outdated in relation to the present business
environment. In the UK, evidence is almost entirely based on the analysis of
accounting data to determine capital structure choices 4. This approach does not
appear to provide the opportunity for a comprehensive assessment of the situation.
The survey method has been recently adopted in the US context (Graham and
Harvey, 2001) to extend the scope of capital structure investigation, and to establish
the relative importance of competing theoretical issues. A survey investigation of
present day corporate financing decisions in the UK appears to be unexplored
territory. An investigation of both present day capital structure and leasing decisions
in UK firms, would not only place the leasing decision in context, but also provide a
valuable contribution to the overall capital structure debate. The aim of the present
study is to do just that.
An investigation of the role of leasing in corporate financing decisions should
provide an indication of whether the current accounting treatment of operating
leases significantly contributes to their use. This appears necessary in relation to
future use, given that the current accounting treatment looks set to change. In late
Bennett and Donnelly (1993); Lasfer (1995); Adedeji (1998); Jordan, Lowe and Taylor (1998);
Ozkan (2001); Bevan and Danbolt (2002)
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1999, the Accounting Standards Board published the discussion paper 'Leases:
Implementation of a New Approach'. In this document, it is proposed that the
distinction between finance and operating leases be removed, with the rights and
obligations under all material lease agreements capitalised on the lessee's balance
sheet. As a result, many lease agreements currently disclosed off-balance sheet
would be recognised on balance sheet. Evidence shows that reported measures of
performance could be significantly affected by the capitalisation of operating lease
obligations (Imhoff et al., 1991; Beattie, Edwards and Goodacre, 1998). The
proposed changes in accounting treatment thus have the potential to alter the
decision-making of lessees, in terms of the future use of leasing, in anticipation of
the reaction of users of their financial statements.
The impact on decision-making depends on the perceptions of lessees in relation to
the full appreciation of operating lease obligations from footnote disclosures. Also,
it depends on whether operating lease obligations can be, and whether they actually
are, fully appreciated from current disclosures by users. An indication of lessees'
perceptions might be inferred from the importance attached to an off-balance sheet
advantage in the leasing decision. However, knowledge of the views and opinions
of lessees/potential lessees in specific relation to lease accounting treatment could
prove insightful. Therefore, the present study also includes a comprehensive
investigation of views and opinions in relation to SSAP 21, the proposed new
treatment and potential consequences. Although views and opinions do not
necessarily translate into the future behaviour of lessees, they might at least be
expected to influence it. Evidence in relation to the steps lessees might take in
response to lease accounting reform is thus provided.
The Accounting Standards Board requested the views of interested parties on the
new proposals for lease accounting as part of their consultation process. However,
full awareness of the exact details of the new approach, and the highly technical
nature of the proposals, may have restricted the response received from individual
lessees. As a by-product, the present study, by specifically obtaining individual
views and opinions, further assists in the consultation process.
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The role of leasing is less likely to be affected by a change in accounting treatment
if operating lease obligations are currently appreciated from footnote disclosures.
The impact of operating lease capitalisation would be irrelevant if users of financial
statements themselves adjust performance measures to take operating lease
disclosures into account. Evidence from outside the UK in relation to individual
users being influenced by alternative lease accounting treatment is mixed (Wilkins
and Zimmer, 1983a, 1983b; Munter and Radcliffe, 1983; Wilkins, 1984;
Gopalakrishnan and Parkash, 1996). There is fairly convincing evidence to suggest
operating leases are recognised by users in aggregate in the US markets' assessment
of equity risk (Imhoff et al., 1993; Ely, 1995). However, these findings were not
supported in an investigation of the Australian market (Imhoff and Gallery, 1998).
There appears to be a distinct lack of investigation in relation to both individual and
users in aggregate in the UK context. There are tentative suggestions (Day, 1986)
that off-balance sheet financing is of interest to UK investment analysts. However,
there is also evidence to suggest that UK investors/analysts may be less
sophisticated than their US counterparts (Arnold, Moizer and Noreen, 1984;
Anderson and Epstein, 1996). Therefore, using US evidence to make inferences
about operating lease recognition by aggregate UK users may not be valid. Evidence
specifically in relation to the UK situation is therefore essential. The present study
provides such evidence through an investigation of the recognition of operating
leases by aggregate users in the UK market's assessment of equity risk.
1.2 Research Questions, approaches taken and thesis organisation
The present study comprises three individual studies, which are linked in terms of
the present and future role of leasing in UK corporate financing decisions.
The first study addresses two broad research questions in relation to the present role
of leasing - 'What are the determinants of capital structure?' and 'What determines
corporate leasing policy?' Investigating the determinants of capital structure
involves establishing how firms decide on their levels of debt and equity. This
appears to rest on two main issues. Firstly, according to whether debt levels are
optimised by balancing related costs and benefits or whether they reflect investment
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and dividend needs. Secondly, how the characteristics and circumstances of a firm
relate to the individual benefits and costs from issuing debt. Determining the role of
leasing appears to involve establishing how leasing relates to other forms of non-
leasing debt, the potential drawbacks and additional advantages. These research
questions could potentially be addressed in several ways. Prior researchers have
adopted either a survey approach, or used accounting/company data to observe
capital structure and leasing choices. The leasing and corporate financing decisions
of individual firms could be investigated by case study. Alternatively, an
experimental approach could be used to observe fmancing choices.
A questionnaire survey is employed in the present study in order to obtain a wide
range of information in relation to both the corporate financing and leasing
decisions of UK quoted industrial companies. As leasing is widely used across
firms, a survey investigation provides the potential to obtain information from a
wide range of firms. On this basis, the case study and experimental approach are
deemed inappropriate at this stage. They would be situation specific and limited in
scope. The use of accounting data would permit the financing choices of a wide
range of firms to be observed. However, the nature of such a study prohibits a
comprehensive assessment of decision-making, and excludes practical
considerations such as the provision of service and maintenance. Further, the
majority of prior studies use regression analysis to establish relationships between
leasing/debt and other firm characteristics. Using a survey approach allows
triangulation (Jick, 1979). In regression analysis, relationships are established using
accounting/company data over a period of time. However, the reasons for leasing
may not have remained constant over time, given the rapidly changing business
environment. Therefore, an indication of financing choices using historical data may
not necessarily reflect decision-making at the beginning of the 2ls century. A
survey approach is not without problems. However, established tecimiques can be
employed in order to achieve an acceptable response rate, and to ensure responses
received are both reliable and provided in context. The survey investigation of
corporate financing and leasing decisions in the present study forms Part I of this
thesis, Chapter 2 through to Chapter 6.
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The second and third studies relate to the future role of leasing, given the proposed
changes in lease accounting regulation. The second study addresses the following
research question: 'What are the views and opinions of financial statement preparers
(lessees/potential lessees) in relation to lease accounting reform'. This involves
establishing views and opinions in relation to the current lease accounting treatment,
proposed changes and potential consequences. A questionnaire survey is used to
obtain the views and opinions of a wide range of preparers. Although more detailed
views and opinions could have been extracted by interviews, the range of views and
opinions would have been limited. The survey investigation of lease accounting
reform forms Part 2 of this thesis, Chapter 7 through to Chapter 11.
The third study addresses the research question: 'Do UK investors recognise
operating lease obligations from footnote disclosures in their assessment of equity
risk?' The aim is to establish whether operating leases really carry an off-balance
sheet advantage. A market perspective is adopted to investigate if users in aggregate
currently appreciate operating leases from footnote disclosures. Other off-balance
sheet advantages of operating leases may arise if operating lease obligations are
currently excluded by lenders when imposing restrictive covenants, or ignored by
other account user groups. These other possible off-balance sheet advantages are,
however, beyond the scope of the present study. Although the present study
addresses the question of off-balance sheet market advantage, establishing the
degree of advantage is also beyond the scope of the present study. A comparison
between operating lease estimates made by investors/analysts and actual valuations
from lease contracts would be required to assess the accuracy of appreciation of
operating lease disclosures. The present study involves an indirect test, to determine
whether there is an association between equity risk and an operating lease
adjustment to financial risk. Regression analysis is employed using
accounting/company data for a sample of UK quoted industrial companies.
Operating lease obligations from footnote disclosures are used in a process of
constructive capitalisation. This market risk study forms Part 3 of this thesis,
Chapter 12 through to Chapter 16.
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1.3 Contribution of the present study to existing knowledge
The present study provides empirical evidence in relation to the role of leasing in
UK corporate financing decision-making. By employing a survey approach, a
holistic analysis of the situation is possible. Prior UK survey evidence of leasing
decisions is outdated in relation to the present business environment, and is
somewhat inappropriate when the leasing decision is considered in isolation. The
present study rectifies this situation. The present study contributes to the overall
capital structure debate. It provides comprehensive empirical evidence of capital
structure decisions by UK firms. It responds to limited UK evidence and evidence
from elsewhere which is conflicting and somewhat outdated. The survey
investigation in the present study is arguably the most rigorous and extensive
investigation of corporate financing and leasing decisions in the UK to date.
The present study, by documenting the role of leasing under current lease
accounting regulation, assists in predicting the future role in light of proposed
changes. The present study contributes the views and opinions of account preparers
on lease accounting reform. Evidence in relation to lessees' perceptions of operating
lease appreciation from footnote disclosure is obtained. An indication of the
reactionary steps lessees might take in response to lease accounting reform is also
provided. The present study, by obtaining the views and opinions of individual
preparers, assists in the Accounting Standards Board's consultation process. The
present study provides evidence in relation to UK market recognition of operating
lease obligations from current footnote disclosures. Prior UK evidence in relation to
the recognition versus disclosure of operating lease obligations does not appear to
exist. An indication of the current recognition of operating lease obligations from
footnote disclosures assists in the prediction of market reaction, if the proposals for
lease accounting reform become mandatory.
The present study thus contributes extensively in relation to knowledge of the
present and anticipated future role of leasing in the UK. An overall summary,
conclusions and opportunities for further research are provided in Chapter 17 of this
thesis.
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Part 1:
Corporate financing and leasing
decisions
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Chapter 2: Introduction—Corporate financing and leasing decisions
The two broad research questions addressed in the first part to this thesis are 'what
are the determinants of corporate capital structure?' and 'what determines corporate
leasing policy?'
The motivation behind both questions is several-fold. Although the use of lease
finance by UK firms is both extensive and widespread (Beattie et al., 1998), present
day determinants of leasing have received limited investigation. The nature of lease
agreements has altered over time. Finance leases which provide the focus for the
majority of prior research are in decline, whilst operating leases appear to be a
growth market (Finance and Leasing Association, 2000). The majority of prior
research considers the leasing decision in isolation. This is inappropriate in light of
evidence to suggest that lease and debt finance appear to be at least partial
substitutes (Marston and Harris, 1988; Beattie et al., 2000). If leasing is a form of
debt, and thus consumes a firm's capacity for debt, then the decision to lease is not
independent from the decision to determine the overall level of debt finance. How
firms determine their levels of debt and equity has confounded researchers for over
half a century. The theory and empirical evidence in existence is by no means
conclusive.
In response, the present study offers a comprehensive survey investigation of
corporate financing and leasing decisions in UK firms. The aim of this chapter is to
introduce the situation in respect of the above research questions in terms of pre-
existing theory and evidence. The approach taken in the present study is
highlighted, along with an explanation of how the remaining chapters to this part of
the thesis are organised.
Present day capital structure theory comprises several elements. At the outset, firms
appear to either adopt a level of optimum finance which subsequently dictates
dividend pay-out and investment levels (static trade-off theory) or they adopt a level
of dividend pay-out and investment which dictates the level of finance (pecking
order theory). In the static trade-off theory, the various costs and benefits of issuing
debt are balanced to derive an optimum level. These benefits include the interest tax
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shield of debt (Modigliani and Miller, 1958; Miller, 1977), and agency benefits such
as the mitigation of conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers (Jensen
and Meckling, 1976; Grossman and Hart, 1982). The costs include the financial
distress potential to debt. Both direct and indirect costs, which arise as a result of
the increased risk of not meeting interest payments and subsequent liquidation or
bankruptcy. Agency costs also arise as a result of debt holders making provisions,
such as the inclusion of restrictive covenants, to protect their interests against those
of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
In the pecking order theory, firms follow a hierarchy or pecking order of financial
sources. Firms prefer internal funds, and equity issues are avoided by issuing debt to
meet external financing requirements for as long as possible (Donaldson, 1961).
The reluctance to issue equity arises from the existence of asymmetrical information
(Myers, 1984). Firms avoid issuing equity to prevent the signalling of information
to investors resulting in a decrease in firm value. However, it is not clear at which
point the issue of equity is considered unavoidable. Unless debt holders ultimately
restrict a firm's access to debt finance, equity appears only to be issued when
issuing debt would result in a greater decrease in firm value. To arrive at this
decision, balancing the benefits and costs of issuing additional debt appears to be
necessary. In this respect, the static trade-off and the pecking order theories do not
appear to be entirely mutually exclusive. The main distinction lies in the initial
focus of whether the level of debt is primarily (static trade-oft) or residually
determined (pecking order).
The mix of debt and equity has control implications as equity carries voting rights
and debt does not. It is suggested that the level of debt adopted by firms may be
affected, albeit in the short-term, in response to imminent take-over bids (Harris and
Raviv, 1991). In the stakeholder theory of capital structure (Titman and Wessels,
1988) it is suggested that the behaviour of various firm stakeholders is affected by
the financial distress potential of debt. Certain firm characteristics, such as low
profitability, non-standardised assets and specialised products, employees and
suppliers, are said to accentuate financial distress potential. Further, it is suggested
that the strategy adopted in terms of competition and growth or expansion
influences a firm's financial distress potential (Jordon, Lowe and Taylor, 1998;
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Belkaoui, 1999). The management! control strategy is also said to impact on agency
costs (Belkaoui, 1999). Tn contrast to the static trade-off and pecking order theories,
the corporate control, stakeholder and strategy theories do not appear to offer an
explanation of the process by which the level of debt is chosen. Rather, they appear
to highlight situations in which the benefits and costs of debt are enhanced or
mitigated, and thus in which high or low levels of debt might be expected.
Determining corporate capital structure appears, therefore, to rest on two main
issues. Firstly, according to whether debt levels are optimised by balancing costs
and benefits, or whether they are the products of investment and dividend needs.
Secondly, how the characteristics and circumstances of a firm relate to the
individual benefits and costs derived from issuing debt.
Many of the benefits/costs of issuing debt are equally applicable to leasing.
However, additional benefits have been identified which suggest why leasing might
be considered preferable to non-leasing debt alternatives. Leasing might be favoured
for actual tax savings, or for the timing of tax savings, either through the lessor's
claim on capital allowances (Day, 2000), or because the total amount of lease
rentals paid on non-qualifying assets are tax deductible. It is suggested that leasing
might be used to extend a firm's capacity for borrowing, if it is perceived that
leasing obligations consume less debt capacity than non-leasing debt alternatives, or
if lease agreements contain less restrictive covenants (Schallheim, 1994; Day,
2000). Leasing is equally available to finance individual assets or large-scale
acquisitions (Schaliheim, 1994; Belkaoui, 1998). It also brings cash flow benefits in
terms of 100% financing and flexible repayment (Schaliheim, 1994; Day, 2000).
Leasing is said to provide flexibility by sharing the risks and rewards of ownership,
in terms of obsolescence, acquisition and disposal, between parties to the agreement
in a cost-effective way (Smith and Wakernan, 1985; Schaliheim, 1994; Belkaoui,
1998; Day, 2000). Operating leases may be favoured for reasons of 'off-balance
sheet' financing (Smith and Wakeman, 1985). It is also suggested that leasing may
be more advantageous in terms of application, availability and the provision of
service and maintenance packages (Day, 2000; Belkaoui, 1998). Leasing thus
appears to be favoured for mitigating the costs and enhancing the benefits
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associated with the issue of non-leasing debt, in addition to more practical
considerations.
Prior researchers have adopted two main approaches when investigating the
determinants of corporate capital structure and leasing policy. The majority of prior
studies use accounting / company data to observe capital structure and leasing
choices. The intentions and perceptions of corporate managers have also been
investigated by survey. The analysis of accounting data has involved the
examination of cross-sectional relationships between debt ratios and lease ratios and
other firm characteristics, as well as the examination of firm's previous decisions to
issue debt and equity. Although an alternative case study or experimental approach
could potentially be applied to such an investigation, it would be situation specific
and limited in scope.
The relationships between debt ratios and other firm characteristics have been
extensively examined in numerous UK, US and International studies. There is fairly
convincing evidence to suggest that the level of debt adopted by firms appears to be
related to industry classification1 , profitability2, investment in research and
development3 , dividend payout4 and investment opportunities 5 . However, in relation
to other firm characteristics, findings appear to be either conflicting or have not as
yet been widely tested. There is difficulty in interpreting precisely the relationship
that some of the explanatory variables in these studies are capturing, given that
alternative proxies have been employed. Previous researchers have not found it
possible to capture all relationships in one model, resulting in the undertaking of so
many studies, each adopting a slightly different focus. The absence of rigorous
diagnostic testing in the majority of previous studies is a problem, given that
relationships are likely to exist not only between debt ratios and other firm
Fern and Jones, 1979;Kester, 1986; Titman and Wessels, 1988; Graham et al., 1988; Bennett &
Donnelly, 1993.
2 Toy et al., 1974; Kester, 1986; Titman and Wessels, 1988; Baskin, 1989; Chang and Rhee, 1990;
Bennett and Donnelly, 1993; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Adedji, 1996; Mehran et al., 1999; Wald,
1999; Bevan and Danbolt, 2002; Ozkan 2001.
Bradley et al., 1984; Titman and Wessels, 1988; Balakrislman and Fox, 1993; Graham et al., 1998;
Wald, 1999; Adedeji 1996)
Baskin, 1989; Mehran et al., 1999; Adedeji, 1998.
Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Lasfer, 1995; Graham et al., 1998; Mehran et al., 1999; Belkaoui, 1999;
Bevan and Danbolt, 2002; Ozkan, 2001.
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characteristics, but also between the firm characteristics themselves. Although
previous researchers have attempted to model the process of how firms determine
their levels of debt and equity in terms of the static trade-off versus the pecking
order models (Fama and French, 1999; Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999; Frank and
Goyal, 2000), the evidence is not conclusive.
There is a degree of evidence, from the examination of previous decisions to issue
debt and equity, to suggest that both UK and US firms operate with target debt
ratios (Taggart, 1977; Javiland and Harris, 1984; Opler and Titman, 1996; Marsh,
1982). Firms also appear not to be deterred from issuing equity in response to
favourable market conditions (Javiland and Harris, 1984; Marsh, 1982). In the UK,
there is some evidence to suggest that agency costs and tax benefits to debt are both
given consideration in the decision to issue new finance (Walsh and Ryan, 1997).
These findings appear conducive to the static trade-off theory of capital structure,
rather than the pecking order suggestion of equity being issued only as a last resort.
In contrast, the pecking order theory appears to gain more support among
researchers adopting a survey approach (Donaldson, 1961; Pinegar and Wilbricht,
1989; Graham and Harvey, 2001; Allen 1991a, 1991b). However, although
maintaining spare debt capacity and financial flexibility appears to be of major
concern, the use of target debt ratios and tax implications does not appear to be
irrelevant. These findings are reflected in the Graham and Harvey (2001) survey of
US firms. The vast majority of survey research in relation to capital structure is US
based. The Graham and Harvey study is relevant, on the basis of timing, to the
current business environment. However, prior studies appear to be limited to certain
issues, and thus extremely partial, making it difficult to draw robust conclusions.
There appears to be a definite lack of survey evidence from the UK both past and
present. It appears to be restricted to a limited and somewhat dated study by
Fawthrop and Terry (1975), and a comparison of a relatively small number of UK
firms with Australian and Japanese counterparts (Allen, 1991b).
Taken as a whole, there appears to be a mixture of both supporting and
contradicting evidence in relation to the suggested theoretical outcomes of issuing
debt. Moreover, the process of determining capital structure appears to be a grey
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area, rather than a straight black or white choice between the static trade-off and
pecking order theories. However, UK evidence is fairly limited, and an element of
prior empirical evidence obtained in the US, UK and elsewhere could be considered
somewhat outdated in relation to the present business environment at the beginning
of the 21st century. UK evidence is also almost entirely based on the use of
accounting data. It comprises different studies which have focused on different
aspects of capital structure, and which by their nature prohibit a comprehensive
assessment of the situation. The survey method provides the opportunity to extend
the scope of an investigation and provides the opportunity to establish the relative
importance of all theoretical issues. A survey of capital structure determinants in the
UK thus appears to be an essential and long over due requirement to the overall
debate.
The approaches taken to investigate corporate financing decisions have been equally
applied to leasing. In contrast to capital structure surveys, the majority of survey
research on the determinants of leasing is UK based. However, it is mainly
conducted prior to the introduction of lease accounting regulation and the current
tax status. The evidence from the most recent leasing survey in the UK (Drury and
Braund, 1990) appears to stress the importance attached to cost and tax
implications. In addition, other qualitative factors to leasing appear important,
especially in relation to small firms. However, this evidence is focused on the use of
finance leases, whereas operating leases are predominant and prolific in the present
climate. Further, the evidence is based on the business environment of the late
1980's, which bears little resemblance to the global business environment of today.
The analysis of accounting/company data has been used to compare the
characteristics of leasing and non-leasing firms, and to identify characteristics that
appear to promote highllow levels of leasing. However, the majority of studies have
focused on capitalied finance lease obligations. There is evidence to suggest that
firms using finance leases appear to have higher levels of financial gearing 6, higher
growth in assets 7
 and lower ability to service debt8
 in comparison to firms which
Kare and Herbst, 1990; Krishnan and Moyer, 1994; Lasfer and Levis, 1998
' Krishnan and Moyer, 1994, Lasfer and Levis, 1998
Krishnan and Moyer, 1994
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don't. The nature of relationships between the degree of leasing and certain firm
characteristics remains unclear, owing to the conflicting evidence provided across
UK and US studies. In the UK, leasing appears to be negatively related to gearing
and liquidity, and is influenced by the industry in which a firm operates (Beattie et
al., 2000). Firm size also appears influential, but any evidence in respect of a linear
relationship between firm size and the level of leasing is absent. Relationships
between leasing and other firm characteristics do not appear to be statistically
significant. The differences existing between relationships found in UK and US
firms may partly be due to the time periods in which previous studies were
conducted, as well as differences in the proxies used. The UK evidence is also fairly
limited. Also, the use of accounting/company data to determine leasing policy does
not capture the more practical considerations for leasing - again, the survey method
provides the potential to extend the enquiry.
The present study was thus conducted against a backdrop of somewhat conflicting,
limited and dated evidence of capital structure and leasing policy in the UK. A
questionnaire survey was employed to obtain a wide range of information in relation
to both the corporate financing and leasing decisions of UK quoted industrial
companies. The information sought was the product of a comprehensive review and
analysis of existing theory and prior evidence. The aim was to establish how levels
of finance are determined, and to assess the relative importance of financial and
non-financial factors in the decision to issue debt, equity and leasing. Established
survey techniques were rigorously employed to achieve an acceptable response rate,
and to ensure that the responses received were both reliable and provided in context.
The result is arguably the most rigorous and extensive investigation of corporate
financing and leasing decisions in the UK to date.
The remainder of this part of the thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 3 provides
extensive literature ãoverage of capital structure, leasing policy and the relationship
between lease and debt finance. Chapter 4 describes the method employed,
including the selection of research method, sample selection and the development
and administration of the survey instrument. Chapter 5 documents and provides an
analysis of the results, and Chapter 6 offers a summary and conclusions.
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Chapter 3: Corporate financing and leasing decisions: theory and
prior evidence
The purpose of this chapter is to review the existing literature in relation to capital
structure and leasing decisions. To provide a logical and coherent summary, both
theory and prior evidence will be segregated into three main areas: capital structure
(sections 3.1 to 3.4), leasing policy (sections 3.5 to 3.8) and the relationship
between lease and debt finance (sections 3.9 to 3.12).
Capital structure
3.1: Capital structure theory
How firms determine their mix of debt and equity capital has confounded
researchers for nearly half a century. Modigliani and Miller (1958) ignited the
debate when they demonstrated that firm valuation is independent from financing
choice under a set of perfect market assumptions' (proposition 1).
Investment opportunities designed to increase firm value should be evaluated using
the weighted average cost of capital, i.e. the proportion of debt multiplied by the
expected return on debt plus the proportion of equity multiplied by its expected
return. A reduction in weighted average cost of capital would result in the
acceptance of more investment opportunities and consequently lead to an increase in
firm value. Equity shareholders demand a higher expected rate of return compared
to debt holders since debt holders enjoy a prior claim. However, according to
Modigliani and Miller, the weighted average cost of capital cannot simply be
reduced by borrowing more and increasing the proportion of debt, because extra
borrowing leads shareholders to demand a still higher expected rate of return
(proposition 2). Consequently, the cost of equity capital increases by just enough to
maintain the overall weighted average cost of capital.
Perfect market assumptions:
1 :Firms with the same degree of business risk are in homogenous risk class
2:Investors have homogenous expectations about future corporate earnings and their levels of
riskiness
3:Securities are traded in perfect capital markets
4:Interest rate on debt is the risk-free rate
5:A1I cash flows are perpetuities
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This is by no means the only view. Traditionalists propose that a moderate increase
in debt finance will not increase the expected return of shareholders to the same
degree. However, firms that borrow excessively will find that the expected return on
equity increases faster than Modigliani and Ivliller predict. Consequently, the
weighted average cost of capital declines at first with an increase in debt, then rises,
the minimum point being the point of optimal capital structure (Brealey and Myers,
1996). There are two suggested reasons why moderate issues of debt may initially
reduce the weighted average cost of capital. Firstly, shareholders don't notice or
appreciate the financial risk created by moderate borrowing and initially accept a
rate of return lower than they should. They eventually 'wake up' when borrowings
become excessive. Secondly, imperfections may allow firms to borrow to provide a
valuabl service for shareholders, for example, firms may be able to borrow at lower
interest rates. Firms require an unsatisfied clientele who are willing to accept an
expected rate of return that does not fully compensate them for the business and
financial risks they bear. However, according to Brealey and Myers (p463-464,
1996) and references therein "finding unsatisfied clienteles and designing exotic
securities to meet their needs is a game that's fun to play but hard to win".
Despite this traditionalist point of view, the breadth of modern capital structure
theory appears to derive from Modigliani and Miller's original proposition of
capital structure irrelevance. In a perfect world, the value of an all equity firm
would be the same as the value of an all debt firm:
Value of all equity firm = Value of an all debt firm
However, the world is not perfect as Modigliani and Miller were quick to realise
when they modified their initial proposition to account for corporate taxes.
3.1.1 Interest tax shitld of debt
Returns to debt holders, in the form of interest, are deducted from earnings before
computing corporate tax liabilities. Returns to shareholders, in the form of
dividends, are appropriated from earnings after corporate taxes have been paid.
Therefore, the interest tax shield provides debt finance with a comparative
advantage. A reduction in taxable income increases the return on equity to
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shareholders. The interest tax shield reduces the cost of debt, so a greater return is
available from the investments debt is used to finance. Modigliani and Miller thus
proposed that the value of a firm using debt finance is equivalent to the firm value if
all equity financed plus the present value of the interest tax shield.
Value of firm = Value of an all equity firm + PV of interest tax shield
At the extreme, Modigliani and Miller suggest a firm should be all debt financed to
maximise the benefit derived from the interest tax shield. However, in the real
world, the interest tax shield is only of benefit if a firm has income available to
shield. As the magnitude of firms' taxable income varies so does the benefit
derived from the interest tax shield on debt. It follows that firms with large amounts
of taxable income and thus high marginal tax rates might be expected to benefit to a
greater extent than firms with little taxable income or low marginal tax rates arising
from taxable losses or other non-debt tax shields (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980).
Miller (1977) further suggested that the tax benefit derived from debt depended not
only on corporate taxes, but also on the personal taxes facing investors. He argued
that the net tax saving from borrowing could be zero if personal taxes are
considered. For investors, interest income is taxed at the personal level rather than
at the corporate level. Equity income is taxed at the corporate level and may escape
personal taxes if it is in the form of capital gains. Therefore, the effective personal
tax rate on equity is usually less than the tax rate applying to interest income, thus
reducing the relative tax advantage of debt. According to Miller, the use of debt
should increase as long as the corporate tax rate exceeds the personal tax rate of
investors. The optimal amount of debt is the point at which corporate and personal
tax rates are equal. In reality, personal taxes vary across different types of investors,
and this optimal amount of debt could be difficult to determine. However, firms
may seek to attract certain types of investor, with an optimum amount of debt and
thus level of taxation, designed to satisfy the needs of a particular shareholder base.
For example, the fact interest on debt is taxed at the personal level would be
irrelevant to non-tax paying investors such as pension funds.
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3.1.2 Financial distress potential of debt
The theory discussed so far has ignored the financial distress potential of debt.
Returns to debt holders, in the form of interest, are fixed payments made from
income, in comparison with returns to shareholders, which are at corporate
management's discretion. If fixed interest payments are not made, debt holders
might exercise their option to force liquidation and a firm could experience
bankruptcy. In this event, a firm could be faced not only with the direct cost of legal
and court fees, but also indirect costs reflecting the difficulty of managing firm
reorganisation. Even if interest payments are met and liquidation is kept at bay, the
increase in the likelihood of finance distress can be expected to incur costs.
In the stakeholder theory of capital structure, Titman and Wessels (1988) suggest
that the behaviour of various firm stakeholders is affected by financial distress
potential, and certain firm-specific characteristics accentuate financial distress:
• Highly profitable firms are more likely to be able to meet interest payments
when business fluctuates, compared to firms with low profitability.
• Firms with diverse business operations are more likely to withstand fluctuations
in certain areas of business activity.
• Debt-holders are more likely to recover their investments in firms with
standardised tangible assets that are easily liquidated.
• Firms providing quality products or products of a certain nature which require
an element of after-sales service, are more likely to lose custom in the face of
possible bankruptcy. If customers recognise that 'come-back' could be limited,
they will be reluctant to pay high prices or even do business.
• Firms that are heavily reliant on specially trained and experienced employees,
are more likely to succumb to demands for higher wage claims in order to
maintain their workforce by compensating them for job insecurity.
• Firms, which require inputs from specialised suppliers, are more likely to
succumb to increased input prices and decreased credit facilities.
Also, firms that are heavily reliant on debt provide less incentive for shareholders to
contribute new capital as the shareholders would bear the cost of value-increasing
projects while returns would be captured by debt holders (Myers, 1977).
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3.1.3 Static trade-off theory of capital structure
Modigliani and Miller's model is thus expanded further to incorporate the financial
distress costs of debt. In the traditional static trade-off theory of capital structure,
each firm has an optimal debt ratio, at which the value of the interest tax shield from
borrowing is balanced against the associated costs of bankruptcy or financial
distress (Myers, 1984; Belkaoui, 1999).
Value of firm = Value of an all equity firm + PV of interest - PV of costs of
tax shield	 financial distress
The trade-off between the interest tax shield benefit and the costs of financial
distress is illustrated in Figure 3.1. The straight line (AB) shows the value of a
geared firm with increased levels of debt but without the increased costs of financial
distress (i.e. firm value increases in line with debt as a result of interest tax shield).
The curved line (AC) shows the value of the firm also including the costs of
financial distress. Up to the point X , financial distress is immaterial and firm value is
increased with the use of debt by the interest tax shield. After X , the costs of
financial distress arising from increased debt are larger than the increase in benefit
from the interest tax shield. Firm value is thus maximised at X, the optimal debt
ratio.
It follows that the curved line representing firm value with financial distress costs
will vary according to individual financial distress potential. In firms with
characteristics enhancing financial distress, X, the point of optimal capital structure
would be lower. The opposite would be true for firms with characteristics mitigating
financial distress. The degree of benefit derived from interest tax shields could also
alter the shape of the diagonal straight line in Figure 3.1. This explains why optimal
debt ratios would deviate from firm to firm. Moreover, in individual firms the
characteristics determining financial distress and the degree of benefit obtained
from the interest tax shield are unlikely to remain static in a dynamic business
environment. Therefore, individual optimal debt ratios could deviate over time.
This provides one explanation as to why the actual debt ratios observed for a
particular firm might deviate over time. However actual deviations may also reflect
deviations from optimal capital structure as well as in optimal capital structure. In
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Aial distress
financial distress
Figure 3.1: Static trade-off theory of capital structure
Total value of firm
0	 x
	
100%
Optimal level of gearing
Proportion of debt finance
Source: Samuels, J.M., Wilkes, F.M., and Brayshaw, R.E.,'Management of Company Finance'
Fifth Edition, Chapman and Hall, 1990, p453
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the static trade-off theory, a firm is supposed to substitute debt for equity, or equity
for debt, until the value of the firm is maximised. According to Myers (1984), there
must be costs and time lags involved in adjusting to the optimal capital structure
when events cause a firm to deviate. In this case, actual deviations in debt ratios
over time would reflect deviations from optimal capital structure. However, there
does not appear to be any theoretical suggestion that adjustment costs are a major
concern. Consequently, under the static trade-off theory, actual debt ratios are
presumed to be optimal, and therefore actual deviations over time correspond only
to changes in optimal capital structure.
The theory discussed so far is based on the assumption of maximising firm value.
However, the potential for conflicts of interest arises when different parties with
their own vested interest become involved in a firm. Two types of conflict between
the providers of equity finance and managers, and between the providers of equity
finance and debt finance have been identified, and translated into further costs and
benefits of issuing debt.
3.1.4 Conflict between shareholders and managers: Agency benefits to debt
The managers of a firm are in the position to decide how resources should be best
appropriated to maximise firm value/success. However, if managers do not
themselves contribute a significant amount of equity finance (i.e. they consider their
personal share-holding to be immaterial) they may be less concerned with
maximising shareholder wealth, and more interested in appropriating resources to
their own personal benefitlsatisfaction. This could take the form of corporate travel,
plush office space and entertaining on expenses, bonus or salary increases, for
example.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that the larger the fraction of equity provided
by managers, the rfiore efficient with resources they become, and the more they
concentrate their energies on enhancing firm value. They suggest that the use of
debt provides a vehicle for increasing managers' share-holdings. If the absolute
investment by managers is held constant, an increase in the fraction of the firm
financed by debt will increase the managers' share of equity and mitigate the loss
from the conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders. Jensen (1986)
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further suggests that since debt conmiits the firm to payout cash in interest, the
amount of 'free' cash available to managers is reduced, further curtailing the
allocation of resources to private benefit. Grossman and Hart (1982) also indicate
that, as well as causing managers to consume fewer perks, the use of debt creates an
incentive for them to 'work harder and make better investment decisions'. The
reason for this is to reduce the possibility of bankruptcy which could personally cost
managers in terms of their loss of control and reputation.
However, the degree of agency benefit to be derived from issuing debt is far from
certain. Debt is not the only vehicle for mitigating conflicts of interest between
managers and shareholders. The personal stake or share-holding of managers in a
firm can be enhanced through various compensation schemes tailored to maximise
shareholder objectives. Also, proponents of this agency benefit to debt argument
appear to suggest that debt is chosen with curtailing the allocation of resources to
personal benefit specifically in mind. Yet, the level of managers who are most likely
to be in a position to seriously exploit resources are the same managers who take the
decision to issue debt. It is unlikely that they would be issuing debt to control their
own actions. Further, in light of the tendency to flatten organisational structures in
recent years, the resources available to lower levels of management could be
restricted, and then visibly controlled via a budgeting process.
3.1.5 Conflict between shareholders and managers: Agency benefits or costs to
debt?
Conflicts of interest between providers of equity finance and managers have been
identified in the context of operating decisions. Harris and Raviv (1990a) suggest
that because of managers' personal loss of control and reputation, they could be
reluctant to cease operations when liquidation would be preferable to shareholders.
They propose that using debt gives debt providers the option to force liquidation in
the event of default, which would also benefit shareholders if liquidation was the
best strategy. However, they further note that forcing liquidation in itself incurs
costs relating to the production of information necessary for decisions concerning
future prospects. These additional costs would not be of benefit to shareholders.
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In this context, the use of debt appears to provide a benefit if liquidation is the best
option and the costs of liquidation are less than the costs of continued operations.
However, personal agendas aside, the managers of a firm are in the best position to
judge if liquidation really is the best option. As debt providers will be anxious to
recover their investment, the welfare of shareholders is a residual issue.
Furthermore, the use of debt and the commitment to fixed interest payments
enhances the possibility of liquidation in the first instance. Again, it is the managers
who decide to issue debt, whose reputations are primarily on the line. It seems
highly unlikely that they would view issuing debt as providing the benefit of
instigating liquidation when they themselves would decline to do so.
Stulz (1990) also suggests that conflict may arise when managers want to invest all
available funds, and are reluctant to payout cash to investors. The use of debt
reduces free cash flow and prevents over investment, another agency benefit to debt.
However, debt payments may exhaust more than 'free cash', reducing funds
available for profitable investments, implying a cost to using debt.
3.1.6 Conflict between shareholders and debt holders: Agency costs to debt
Jensen and Meckling suggest that the use of debt finance provides managers acting
on behalf of shareholders with an incentive to invest sub-optimally in very risky
projects. If an investment yields large returns, shareholders capture the majority of
the gain as returns to debt holders are fixed. However, if the investment fails, debt
holders bear the consequences, as a result of shareholders' limited liability. If debt
holders anticipate this behaviour and incorporate restrictive covenants in debt
contracts in order to prevent it, the return on investment financed by debt is
decreased. Restrictive covenants can, for example, include interest coverage
requirements or prohibitions against investing in new unrelated lines of business.
However, restrictive covenants would not appear to be an issue if managers are only
interested in pursuing relatively safe projects out of adverse reputational
considerations. Also the conflict of interest depends on managers having the
opportunity to invest in risky projects. This could be the case in firms with growth
opportunities to expand in new directions, but less likely in mature industries
abundant with cash flows. Furthermore, the issue of convertible debt, where debt-
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holders have the option to convert to shareholders, could be used to reduce the need
for restrictive covenants.
In summary, benefits of issuing debt appear to arise mainly from conflicts of
interest between shareholders and managers, although issuing debt may incur costs
when conflict concerns operating decisions. Costs arise when conflicts of interest
between shareholders and debt holders cause debt holders to impose restrictions.
Jensen and Meckling propose that an optimal capital structure can be obtained by
trading-off these agency costs and benefits to debt.
3.1.7 Extended static trade-off theory
Belkaoui (1999) notes that an extended trade-off, therefore, appears to determine
optimal capital structure:
Value of firm =
Value of an all equity + PV of interest - PV of costs of - PV of agency costs
firm	 tax shield	 financial distress (reduced by PV
agency benefits)
In short, the extended static trade-off theory suggests managers should weigh up all
these benefits and costs of issuing debt in the context of their individual firms, and
they should adopt a debt level at which their firm value is maximised. This implies
that they operate with a target debt-to-equity ratio, and maintaining targets is of
paramount importance when financing investments.
Irrespective of any empirical evidence, does the static trade-off theory in itself really
provide all the answers? In order to maximise firm value, managers must firstly be
able to quantify all the benefits and costs, to their individual firm, of issuing debt.
Although the benefit from interest tax shields may be quantifiable, how do
managers formally value some of the far reaching potential costs of financial
distress and how do they quantify the conflicting agency costs and benefits
associated with debt? In order to continue to maximise firm value, managers must
also be able to recognise if and when the benefits and costs of debt change. The
continuous maximisation of firm value appears to suggest the need to review and
revise target debt-to-equity ratios, but the theory provides no indication of the
frequency with which this should occur. The mere reference to a static trade-off
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appears misleading when maximising firm valuation long-term infers more of a
dynamic trade-off. Myers (1984) notes that he finds it hard to understand the
observed diversity of capital structures across firms that seem similar in a static
trade-off framework. However, it is easier to understand if differences arise in how
firms view or quantify the different costs and benefits of issuing debt, and in how
dynamically they respond to changes in them.
3.1.8 Peckin g order theory of capital structure: the role of asymmetric information
Myers (1984) contrasts the static trade-off theory with what he regards as a
competing theory of capital structure based on a hierarchy or pecking order of
financing sources. In the pecking order theory, firms prefer to use internal finance.
They relate profit and growth opportunities to their long-term target dividend
payout ratio, in order to minimise the need for external funds. Investment
opportunities and dividend payout thus dictate the amount of external finance.
When external finance is required, firms issue the safest security first, namely debt.
They would then possibly consider hybrid securities such as convertible debt, with
equity only considered as a last resort. In this situation, a firm's debt-to-equity ratio
merely reflects its cumulative requirement for debt finance at a point in time, and
thus fluctuates with changes in requirements over time.
Although Myers (1984) states his claim on the 'pecking order' term, the basis of the
theory appears to originate from a field survey of financing practices by Donaldson
in 1961. However, Donaldson merely documented what appeared to happen in
financing decisions in the absence of any theoretical foundation of why firms
primarily prefer internal finance and then prefer debt to equity. Myers (1984) notes
that avoiding issue costs, which increase from internal finance to debt to equity,
could provide an element of reasoning. However, he further notes that issue costs
do not significantly feature when balancing the costs and benefits of issuing debt in
the static trade-off theory. He suggests that the pecking order theory becomes more
credible when based on an argument of asymmetric information.
Firm managers are assumed to possess private information about the characteristics
of a firm's return stream or investment opportunities. Capital structure choice is said
to signal this insider information to outside investors. Myers and Majluf (1984)
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show that if investors are less well informed about the value of a firm's assets, then
equity may be mispnced by the market. If equity is under-priced and new equity is
issued to finance new projects, the new investors capture more than the net present
value of the new projects to the detriment of existing shareholders. This situation
may lead managers to reject projects with positive net present value and result in
problems of under-investment. It is suggested that under-investment would be
avoided if the firm can finance new projects using a security that is not so severely
under-valued by the market, namely internal funds or risk-less debt.
If managers pledge their allegiance to existing shareholders, it follows that at times
when equity is over-priced, they would be willing to make new equity issues at a
detriment to potential new investors. However, Myers and Majluf suggest that
potential investors anticipate managers' behaviour and assume it to always be to
their detriment. Consequently, they take an equity issue to signal that shares are
over priced and will rationally adjust the price they are willing to pay accordingly.
The only time when investors would not associate an equity issue with over pricing
would be if they recognised that a firm had issued so much debt that to issue any
more would be too costly. It also follows that issues of debt signal that managers
perceive shares to be under-priced, sending a favourable signal to investors.
Therefore, irrespective of whether managers believe equity to be under- or over-
priced, they will prefer to issue debt for as long as they can. The anticipation of
investors thus appears to force firms to follow the pecking order.
However, investors may be persuaded not to associate an equity issue purely with
over pricing if managers can convey information in an alternative way. Korajczyk et
al. (1990) argue that the problem is less severe after information releases such as
annual reports and earning announcements when equity should be more accurately
priced. Also, the problem of under-investment would be less severe for firms
experiencing fewer growth opportunities.
It is further suggested that issues of debt and equity are not the only means by which
inside information is signalled to outside investors. Baskin (1989) notes that
dividend payout plays a signalling role. This provides an additional incentive for
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firms to relate their need for finance to maintaining dividend payout to avoid
unfavourable market reaction.
In the pecking order theory, the question still arises at which point is debt no longer
an option? Myers (1984) appears to suggest that in the original pecking order
theory, debt is constrained externally. Does this mean that firms only issue equity
when debt holders say they have had enough? Perhaps additional debt is available
but the cost in the form of interest would far exceed any return on investments the
debt was used to finance? Perhaps firms themselves decide when enough is enough?
In his reconciliation of theory and evidence Myers suggests a modified pecking
order theory in which firms restrain their use of debt to avoid financial distress and
maintain reserve borrowing power. The maintenance of reserve borrowing power
doesn't appear to coincide with the static trade-off suggestion that firms operate at
their optimal debt levels; whereas the avoidance of financial distress is all too
familiar. However, it is helpful to review the empirical evidence in order to fully
evaluate the extent to which these two strands of theory might be entangled.
3.1.9 Corporate control considerations
The mix of debt and equity has corporate control implications when equity carries
voting rights and debt does not. Corporate control considerations became associated
with capital structure theory in response to the growth in take-over activity in the
late 1980's.
The value of a firm is dependent on the outcome of a take-over contest when
existing management and a rival are assumed to have different abilities. However, it
is not only superior ability that decides the outcome, it is influenced by the
individual share-holding of both parties. If the management's share in the firm is
very low, a rival may succeed irrespective of ability. If the management's share is
very high, they may remain in control irrespective of ability. Both outcomes
potentially could adversely affect firm value if the party with lower managerial
ability succeeds. However, if the share held by both parties is, in itself, insufficient
to determine the outcome, then the actual outcome must be down to ability, in
which case firm value is either maintained or increased.
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Hams and Raviv (1988) propose that debt can be used to repurchase equity from
passive investors in order to change the fraction of equity owned by existing
management. Also, by issuing debt, the risk to shareholders increases and the price
of equity declines, allowing management, to afford a larger fraction of the equity.
They propose that, in the event of potential take-over, management will thus issue
debt to enhance their chances of staying in control
However, management's control can also decrease with the use of debt, in the form
of bankruptcy, increased monitoring by creditors and less available cash flow.
Therefore, management would not be motivated to take on excessive debt, rather the
minimum amount possible to ward off a rival. However, this assumes existing
management are interested only in maintaining control and warding off rivals.
Harris and Raviv (1988) note that the capital gain on existing management's shares
may far outweigh any benefit derived from retaining control. They, therefore,
suggest that existing management decide which outcome would maximise their
personal pay-off, and influence the decision through their share-holding which can
be altered through the use of debt.
In short, if existing management decides the take-over is optimal to them, they will
not issue debt. If retaining control is optimal they will issue debt. Although Harris
and Raviv establish that control is not existing management's only interest, the link
between existing management's capital gains and firm value appears unexplained.
The fact that existing management might be willing to 'cut and run' i.e. they decide
the take-over is optimal, implies that they perceive the gain from selling their shares
to the rival, to outweigh their loss of control and loss of future share value, the
product of their own managerial abilities. Therefore, unless the rival offer is
exceptional, it could imply that they themselves doubt their own abilities. It follows
that the opposite could be true when existing management fights for control. If this
were the situation, superior managerial ability may be reflected in the outcome of
take-overs determined by the size of respective share-holdings with no adverse
effect on firm value.
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Harris and Raviv(1988) note that in take-overs determined purely by ability and not
by respective share-holdings, some debt is generally required. As the take-over is
not the result of a majority share-holding by the rival, existing management could
be reluctant to relinquish their share. They could issue debt to increase the fraction
of their holding. However, if existing management had superior ability, they could
perceive that other investors would be aware of this, and decide that only a
moderate amount of debt would be required to retain control. If a rival takes control
on the basis of ability, existing management might not have been able to issue
enough debt to guarantee their control. Perhaps the firm was already heavily debt
financed, which could also provide a reason for other investors to question existing
management's capabilities.
Hams and Raviv conclude that, on average, take-over targets will increase their
debt levels and that leverage is negatively related to take-over success. They suggest
that firms in which a take-over has failed because the rival could not obtain a large
enough share will have higher debt levels than firms in which a take-over has failed
or succeeded purely of the basis of managerial ability. In this case, the firm is likely
to have lower debt levels if the take-over failed and higher debt levels if it
succeeded.
Stulz (1988) and Israel (1991) arrive at similar conclusions to Harris and Raviv
(1988). However, Stulz assumes that existing management will not tender their
shares in any take-over attempt. If they will not tender their shares, a rival must
purchase 50% of shares from passive investors assuming that the passive investors
vote for the existing management. The greater the issue of debt, the greater the
management share, and the larger the fraction of the passive investors' shares that
must be acquired by the rival. Consequently, the more the rival has to pay. Thus the
premium paid to the shareholders of a firm targeted for take-over increases with the
firm's debt levels, e'en though the likelihood of take-over decreases.
Harris and Raviv (1991) note that although corporate control considerations
influence capital structure, it is only a short-term influence in response to the threat
of imminent take-overs. They advocate that it has 'nothing to say about the long run
capital structure of firms'. This could be true in most cases, but what about firms
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that are constantly in the lime light for being under threat of take-over? Even if
corporate control does impact only on capital structure in the short-term, it still has
implications. If firms use debt to react to imminent take-overs they won't always be
at their optimal debt ratio under the static trade-off theory. This could further
account for observed differences in firms classed as similar under the static trade-off
framework?
3.1.10 Corporate strategy
Recently, capital structure theory has related the mix of debt and equity to corporate
strategy in terms of competition, management/control and growth/expansion.
However, corporate strategy does not appear to offer an entirely new explanation of
how firms determine their levels of debt and equity. It appears to characterise
environments in which certain benefits/costs from issuing debt are
enhanced/reduced.
Competitive strategy
The competitive strategy adopted by a firm is said to determine the nature of assets
employed, which in turn influences debt levels (Jordon, Lowe and Taylor, 1998).
Three alternative competitive strategies are distinguished. In firms that take a cost
leadership approach, competition is in terms of offering widely available
products/services at low cost. If products/services are widely available or
standardised, the assets required to produce or sell them are likely to be tangible and
flexible. In firms that take a product innovation approach, competition is in terms of
offering unique products/services with less emphasis on price. The development,
production and sale of unique products/services might involve significant research
and is likely to be available on a smaller scale. Therefore, the assets required are
likely to be firm-specific, more intangible and less easily redeployed. Competition
in terms of product differentiation is a strategy in between the other two.
Products/services offered are differentiated from similar alternatives. As
products/services are differentiated, certain features may be firm specific, and thus
assets may be more inflexible and intangible compared to those in firms competing
entirely on the basis of price. However, as similar alternatives exist, assets may be
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more flexible and tangible compared to those in firms competing on the basis of
product uniqueness.
It is suggested that firms with intangible inflexible assets have an increased
potential for financial distress and a decrease in their ability to borrow due to lack of
collateral. Therefore, firms with a product innovation competitive strategy should
have the lowest proportion of debt, followed by firms adopting product
differentiation strategies. Firms with cost leadership strategies should have the
highest proportion of debt.
Management/control strategy
The management or corporate control strategy adopted by firms is said to be related
to debt levels (Belkaoui, 1999). There is said to be more opportunity, for
management to procure personal benefits at a cost to the firm when control is
centralised, i.e. concentrated with certain individuals rather than delegated across a
range of individuals responsible for managing divisions or segments of the firm.
Consequently, the agency costs from conflicts of interest between shareholders and
management would be higher, increasing the cost of debt. One of the aims of
decentralisation is to reduce opportunism and thus the agency costs and
subsequently the cost of debt would be less. On this basis, centrally controlled firms
should have lower debt levels than divisionalised firms. If the aim is to reduce
opportunism by divisionalisation, then as well as benefiting from lower agency
costs of debt, debt also provides the benefit of limiting the availability of free cash
flow, which further reduces opportunism.
Growth/expansion strategy
The growth/expansion strategy adopted is said to impact on the operating risk of a
firm, which in turn, influences debt levels (Belkaoui, 1999). If a firm expands by
spreading its business activities across different markets, when adopting a strategy
of unrelated diversification, operating risk is reduced. The company has the
potential to increase activity in one market to compensate for a decline in another. A
firm is also likely to hold a wider spectrum of re-deployable assets if it expands
through unrelated diversification.
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If a firm concentrates on its existing business activity, or expands by integrating the
activities of direct suppliers/customers, a decline in the market could have a serious
impact. When adopting these strategies, companies are said to 'have all their eggs in
one basket and are merely widening the basket in which they are kept'. In which
case, operating risk would be high.
Expansion in terms of related diversification (i.e. spreading business across a range
of related markets) is said to be somewhere in between. Thus, in terms of changes to
market demand, the highest operating risk is said to be associated with no expansion
strategy, followed by vertical integration, then related diversification, with unrelated
diversification being associated with the lowest operating risk.
However, it is pertinent to note that integration or related diversification strategies
could be considered less risky in terms of individual market share, as an element of
cunent expertise and knowledge would apply. Further, there is an element of risk
diversifying into an unrelated market of which a firm has no experience. Under
these terms, unrelated diversification might be said to be associated with the highest
operating risk.
On balance, the operating risk associated with changes in market demand are
probably more severe, as firms have the potential to purchase expertise and
knowledge in the unrelated areas they wish to diversify into. In terms of relative
debt levels, it is suggested that the lower the operating risk and the more re-
deployable the assets, the lower the potential for financial distress and thus the
higher the potential for debt. On this basis, companies experiencing unrelated
diversification would be expected to have higher debt levels than those experiencing
no expansion or expansion through integration.
However, the expansion strategy adopted is also thought to influence debt levels
through the need to co-ordinate and process information. It is suggested that
integrating the activities of suppliers/customers, or related divisions, requires more
co-ordination and information processing, which in turn requires more financing.
Unrelated diversification requires less co-ordination of divisions and thus less
financing (Belkaoui, 1999). On this basis, companies experiencing unrelated
diversification would be expected to have lower debt levels than those experiencing
expansion through integration.
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In summary, two aspects of corporate strategy appear to influence the potential
financial distress costs of debt. Competitive strategy through the nature of assets
employed and growth/expansion strategy through the degree of operating risk.
However, the growth/expansion strategy also impacts on the degree of finance
required to co-ordinate and process information. The management/control strategy
influences the agency cost of debt arising from conflicts between shareholders and
managers. Theory thus predicts that firms competing in terms of cost leadership,
managed divisionally, and expanding through unrelated diversification would have
the highest debt levels. Firms competing by product uniqueness, managed centrally,
and with no expansion strategy would, ceteris paribus, have the lowest debt levels.
However, predictions only remain valid if the individual strategies adopted all
aspire to similar levels of debt finance. There is no indication of which strategy
takes priority, or how much debt, for example, a firm competing in terms of product
uniqueness and expanding by unrelated diversification, is likely to take?
3.1.11 Summary of capital structure theory
The various elements to capital structure theory are summarised in Figure 3.2. At
the outset, firms appear to either adopt a level of optimum finance which dictates
dividend payout and investment levels (static trade-off theory) or they adopt a level
of dividend payout and investment which consequently dictates the level of finance
(pecking order theory).
In the static trade-off theory, the various costs and benefits of issuing debt are
balanced, in the pecking order, equity issues are avoided by issuing debt for as long
as possible. However, equity issues are avoided in order to prevent the signalling of
information to investors resulting in a decrease in firm value. Unless debt holders
restrict firms' access to additional debt finance, equity is issued only when issuing
debt would result in a greater decrease in firm value. To arrive at this decision,
balancing the benefits and costs of issuing additional debt appears to be necessary.
Therefore, the interest tax shield benefit, financial distress costs, and agency
benefits and costs of debt may not necessarily be exclusive to the static trade-off.
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The stakeholder, corporate control and strategy theories do not appear to offer a
process by which the mix of debt and equity is chosen. Rather the stakeholder
theory identifies how the characteristics of a firm's inputs/products affect its
financial distress potential, and strategy theory identifies environments in which
financial distress and agency costs are enhanced/mitigated. These situations, along
with other characteristics/environments identified as promoting high or low levels
of debt, are summarised in Table 3.1
A firm with high and low levels of debt might be expected to exhibit the
characteristics listed in the final two columns of Table 3.1 respectively. There
appears to be some theoretical conflict in terms of profitability, investment
opportunities, and the level of debt. Under the pecking order theory, firms would
have higher debt levels when internal equity (i.e. profitability/available cash flow)
was insufficient and investment opportunities were extensive. It follows the
opposite would be true for firms with lower levels of debt. However, the financial
distress potential is greater for firms with low profitability in terms of their ability to
meet interest payments. On this basis, high profitability would be associated with
high levels of debt. Further, the cost of debt holders imposing restrictive covenants
is greater for firms facing extensive investment opportunities. On this basis,
extensive investment opportunities would be associated with low levels of debt. A
further conflict arises in terms of a firm's growth! expansion strategy. An unrelated
diversification growth strategy suggests lower operating risk, a high debt level
characteristic. However, this strategy also requires less co-ordination and processing
of information compared to other growth strategies, reducing the need for finance.
Capital structure theory does not yet claim to provide all the answers. The
benefits/costs of issuing debt are unlikely to be given equal weight, and weightings
could well differ across firms. In which case, it would be difficult to predetermine
the mix of debt and equity in a firm experiencing both debt enhancing and debt
mitigating characteristics - it is a complex, multidimensional decision. However,
the theory presented in this chapter does provide a framework within which
financing decisions can be evaluated.
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Table 3.1: Characteristics/environments promoting higMow levels of debt
Theoretical	 Costfbenefit	 Characteristic/Environment Promoting:
basisto issuing ______________________ _________________________
_________________________________ 	 debt	 High levels of debt
	 Low levels of debt
Interest rates	 costs	 Low interest rates
	 High interest rates
Interest tax shield	 benefit	 High marginal tax rate
	 Low marginal tax rate
Financial distress potential	 costs
Ability to meet interest payments 	 Low operating risk
	 High operating risk
High profitability	 Low profitability
In the event of liquidation 	 Large proportion of
	 Few firm-specific intangible,
standardised tangible	 inflexible assets
assets, easily redeployed
Action by stakeholders in response
to potential financial distress:
Loss of customers resulting in
	 Provision of non-durable 	 Provision of products whose
lower prices charged
	 products and services, 	 quality is important but
Less specialised products	 unobservable, products
whose quality is easily	 which require future servicing.
assessed.
Loss of workforce resulting in
	 Non-specialised work
	 Specially trained and
higher wage claims	 force	 experienced employees
Loss of supplier confidence resulting	 Inputs in general supply
	 Inputs specially supplied
in higher input prices and reduced
credit facilities
Agency benefits/costs
Conflict between shareholders and
	 benefit	 Management own a low 	 Management own a high
managers in maximising firm value
	 shareholding	 shareholding
No management	 Management compensation
compensation schemes
	 schemes
Imposition by debtholders of restrictive	 costs	 Risk averse managers
	 Risk taking managers
covenants	 Mature firms with 	 Young firms with limited
abundant cash flows,	 cash flows.
Limited opportunities to
	 Growth opportunities to
invest in risky projects	 expand in new directions
Corporate control considerations: 	 benefit	 Companies attracting	 Companies not attracting
take-over bids	 take-over bids or managers
anxious for possible take-over
to succeed.
Pecking order theory:	 requirement Extensive opportunities to Limited opportunities for
Requirement for debt to meet dividend 	 invest in projects which
	 investment
pay-out and investment needs
	 yield a higher return than
interest on debt
Insufficient internal equity Sufficient internal equity
Competitive strategy:
	 based on costs Cost leadership strategy
	 Product innovation strategy
Managementfcontrol strategy:
	 based on
	 Divisionalised firms
	 Centrally controlled firms
benefit
Growth/expansion strategy:
In terms of operating risk	 based on costs Unrelated diversification
	 No expansion/growth
In terms of co-ordination and
processing of information 	 requirement Integration	 Unrelated diversification
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The only other proposition is an idea put forward by Miller (1977) of neutral
mutation. He suggested that firms fall into financing patterns or habits, which have
no material effect on firm value. Habits cause managers to feel secure and if no
serious damage arises as a result, they don't appear to be questioned. However if
financing decisions are a product of individual habits, then evaluating them provides
no logical purpose. As Myers (1984) concluded, the idea of neutral mutation isn't
an option in determining corporate capital structure, when it makes the game of
research much too hard to play!
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Capital structure: prior evidence
Prior researchers have adopted two alternative approaches in their quest for
empirical evidence on the determinants of capital structure. The intentions and
perceptions of corporate managers in capital structure decisions have been
investigated by survey. However, the majority of studies use accounting/company
data and observe capital structure choices to infer the determinants of capital
structure. There appears to be a distinct lack of experimental research in which the
determinants of capital structure might be observed by requesting participants to
make a financing choice.
In the remainder of this section, studies adopting a survey-based approach are
presented first, prior to studies based on the analysis of accounting data. The
evidence obtained from each study is further classified according to the theoretical
aspect of capital structure under investigation, using the framework presented in
Section 3.1. Where applicable, studies are grouped on the basis of their country of
origin to enable any international differences to be highlighted.
3.2: Capital structure survey-based prior research
The majority of prior research adopting a survey approach is based in the US.
Donaldson's (1961) early interview-based study of the financing practices of a
sample of 25 large US corporations initiated the development of the pecking order
theory of capital structure. Donaldson found managers to strongly favour internal
funds, and to only consider external funds when the need was unavoidable. Cutting
dividends was only a consideration in response to extreme financial distress.
Although equity issues were not completely ruled out, they were notably scarce.
The existence of an optimal capital structure did not appear to arise.
The absence of an optimal debt level is urther substantiated in an international
study2 by Stonehill et al. (1973). Executives were found to attach considerable
importance to the statement 'we do not try to maintain any particular debt ratio on a
year to year ad hoc basis, but rather take advantage of favourable financing
opportunities to issue either debt or equity as they occur'. Unfortunately, these
comments are equally contradictory to the pecking order framework.
2	 on companies in US, Japan, France, Norway and Holland
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The financing policies and practices in large US corporations were further
investigated by Scott and Johnson (1982) in a questionnaire based survey.
Completed responses were received from 212 of the 1979 Fortune 1000 firms, a
response rate of approximately 21%. Questions were designed to explore how
financial gearing was measured, who was influential in formulating target financial
structure ratios, and whether firms conform to the concepts of optimal capital
structure and corporate debt capacity. A summary of the questions asked in relation
to these issues and the responses provided is shown in Table 3.2.
From these responses, Scott and Johnson concluded that target gearing ratios, set by
management, were used in making financing decisions. This is consistent with the
static trade-off theory of capital structure. They also highlighted that respondents
appear to accept the concept of optimal capital structure. However, the fact that
firms believe that an appropriate amount of debt will lower the cost of capital but an
excessive amount will increase costs, is open to interpretation. The situation
described mirrors the traditionalist view presented at the beginning of the previous
section. However, respondents might also expect capital costs to decrease initially
with the use of debt as a result of the interest tax shield. When debt becomes
excessive, capital costs rise as the cost of financial distress outweighs any tax
benefit. It would, thus, have been useful if Scott and Johnson had further
investigated the reasons behind respondents' views. They further concluded that
respondents appeared to accept the concept of debt capacity. Although they
obtained information concerning individuals actual target proportions of debt, there
is no explanation of how management arrived at these targets. However, the mere
fact that management appeared to predominantly conStrain debt capacity is
contradictory to the pecking order framework in which debt is externally
constrained.
Pinegar and Wilbricht (1989) claimed to deal more extensively with obtaining
evidence in relation to capital structure theory in their questionnaire survey. They
examined the extent to which capital structure models were adopted in the financing
decisions made by 176 of the Fortune 500 firms for 1986 (response rate of 35.2%).
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A summary of the questions asked in relation to theoretical issues and the responses
provided is shown in Table 3.3.
In contrast to Scott and Johnson, Pinegar and Wilbricht's findings appear to lend
more support to the pecking order framework. Following a hierarchy of sources
appeared more favourable among respondents compared to maintaining target
capital structures. The preference for internal equity over debt and debt over
common equity is further consistent with the pecking order theory. However, the
preference for straight preferred stock over convertible preferred stock is
contradictory when convertible preferred stock is considered less risky.
The pecking order is said to arise out of the existence of asymmetrical information.
Pinegar and Wilbricht observed that many of their respondents appeared to disagree
with the notion of market efficiency, at least for some of the time. However, further
statistical tests failed to establish if respondents' view of market efficiency had any
impact on their financing choice. The fact that respondents indicated that the
financing decision is the most flexible in comparison to investment and dividend
decisions contradicts the static trade-off theory, and adds further credence to the
pecking order theory. Also, respondents were found to place more importance on
the projected cash flow or earnings and the risk of assets to be financed, rather than
benefits/costs of issuing debt. This could further indicate that investment dictates
the level of finance. Although corporate tax rates were found to be of some
importance, the costs of bankruptcy appeared to be the least significant aspect to
financing decisions.
Norton (1989) also used a questionnaire survey to test the assumptions and
hypotheses arising under the static trade-off, pecking order and agency theories of
capital structure. His findings are based on ,completed responses by 98 of the 1984
Fortune 500 firms (response rate of 21% based on the 468 firms mailed). Although
Norton's response rate is comparable with that of Scott and Johnson's, the total
number of respondents is less than half. Further, Norton's response rate and total
number of respondents are both significantly less than achieved by Pinegar and
Wilbricht, whose survey was conducted in a similar time period.
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Table 3.3: A summary of the theory explored, questions asked and responses
provided in Pinegar and Wilbricht's (1989) survey
Issues explored	 Abbreviated question 	 Response
Static trade-off theory vs In raising new funds does your firm: 	 68.8% indicated a
Pecking order theory	 seek to maintain a target capital structure by using approximately 	 preference for a hierarchy
constant proportions of several types of long term capital
simultaneously
OR
follow a hierarchy in which the most advantageous sources are
exhausted before other sources are used
Pecking order	 Rank following sources in order of preference for financing new 	 Order of preference:
predictions	 investments: 	 Internal equity (ranked
Internal equity	 first by 84,3%)
External common equity	 Straight debt (ranked
Straight debt	 second by 7 1.9%)
Convertible debt	 Convertible debt
Straight preferred stock 	 External common equity
Convertible prefered stock
	
	
Straight preferred stock
Convertible preferred stock
Asymmetric information Approximately what % of the time would you estimate that your
firm's securities are priced fairly by the market?
>80%	 47.20% responded
50-80%	 40.30% responded
<50%	 11.90% responded
Static trade-off theory vs Given an attractive new growth opportunity that could not be taken	 82.40% indicated financing
Pecking order theory	 without departing from your target capital structure or financing	 decision to be most flexible
Does finance decision 	 hierarchy, cutting dividend or selling off other assets, what action
dictate investment or 	 is your firm likely to take?
viceversa?	 ___________________________
Costs and benefits	 Indicate the relative importance of following in your firms financing 	 Mean response 1 being
of issuing debt	 decisions:	 unimportant, 5- important
Projected cash flow or earnings from assets to be financed 	 4.41
Avoiding dilution of common shareholder claims 	 3.94
Risk of asset to be financed	 3.91
Restrictive covenants of senior securities 	 3.62
Avoiding mispricings of securities to be issued	 3.60
Corporate tax rate	 3.52
Voting control	 3.24
Level of depreciation and other non-debt tax shields 	 3.05
Correcting mispricings of outstanding securities	 2.66
Personal tax rates of debt and equity holders 	 2.14
____________________ Costs_of bankruptcy 	 1.58
Issues influencing	 Indicate the relative importance of following in your firm's financing 	 Mean response 1 being
financing decision	 decisions:	 ,	 unimportant, 5- important
Maintaining financial flexibility	 4.55
Ensuring long-term survivability	 4.55
Maintaining a predictable source of funds	 4.05
Maximising security prices 	 3.99
Maintaining financial independence	 3.99
Maintaining a high debt rating	 3.56
_____________________ Maintaining comparability with other firms in the industry 	 2.47
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A summary of the relevant issues addressed, questions asked, and responses
provided are shown in Table 3.4. Norton's respondents appeared to follow a
pecking order or hierarchy when making issues of debt and equity. However, this
did not appear to be to the exclusion of maintaining a target debt/equity ratio.
Although the interest tax shield did appear to be an important consideration in the
use of debt, financial distress potential was not a significant feature. Respondents
indicated that they had no idea when it came to estimating bankruptcy costs. Thus,
the target ratio was not the product of balancing the present value of the tax shield
with possible bankruptcy costs. The agency costs of debt were also not a significant
consideration amongst respondents, and consequently neither were steps to reduce
agency costs.
Although respondents clearly appeared to follow a pecking order of financing
sources, the reasoning behind this appears less clear. Respondents did not appear
overly concerned with market responses to new issues of debt and equity, nor did
they admit to the existence of asymmetrical information between themselves and
the market place. Further, respondents did not appear to believe that issuing equity
ends unfavourable signals and debt sends favourable signals to the market place.
Private placements were uncommon among respondents and not considered to
reduce the problem of asymmetrical information.
On balance, Norton's evidence appears conflicting. Although there is evidence to
suggest respondents follow a hierarchy of sources in order of preference consistent
with the pecking order theory, there is no evidence to suggest the pecking order
arises out of asymmetrical information. Although there is some evidence of target
debt/equity ratios and the importance of tax considerations, there is no evidence of a
trade-off, as financial distress and agency costs of debt appeared not important. It
would have been useful if Norton could have investigated alternative reasoning
behind following a pecking order and target debt/equity ratios, especially in relation
to who/what dictates the capacity for debt.
The study of most relevance to the present US business environment, is the recent
survey of corporate financing practices by Graham and Harvey (2001). In addition
to the practices of the Fortune 500 firms for 1998, they also increased the scope of
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Table 3.4: A summary of the theory explored, questions asked and responses
provided in Norton's (1989) survey
Issues explored	 Abbreviated question	 Response1
Pecking order theory	 Which of the following describes the underlying firm philosophy in
making debt and equity issues:(tick all applicable)
1 )use internal money as much as possible 2)issue short term debt,
long term debt 3)issue convertible securities 4)issue common stock	 79%
Asymmetric information Consider new market responses to new issues of debt and equity 	 42%
Avoid equity issues or 	 Alternate between debt and equity issues	 5%
target ratios?
Asymmetric information Choice depends on existence of any differences in firm value
between management and the marketplace	 8%
Static trade-off theory 	 Try to balance PV of tax shield with possible bankruptcy costs 	 4%
Static trade-off theory	 Issue debt and equity to stay close to a target debt/equity ratio	 62%
Target ratio?	 Use no long term debt	 2%
External debt constraint Borrow the maximum available 	 3%
Borrow the maximum available with an A etc credit rating	 31%
Financial distress or T/O Maintain a given coverage ratio	 25%
Financial distress	 Careful firm evaluation of cash-flow variation and bankruptcy 	 6%
Respective costs	 Issue debt when interest rates low, issue stock when prices high 	 25%
Respective costs goes
	
Issue debt when interest rates low, issue stock when prices high
against Static trade-off	 even if no present need to build up fund cushion 	 15%
andPecking order	 _______________________
Agency theory	 Reasons for the issue of convertible bonds/preferred stock
Take advantage of an unexpected common stock price increase 	 10%
Help make the issue more marketable 	 13%
Lower financing costs	 31%
N/A orno response	 61%
Agency theory:	 If bankruptcy occurred, the chief officers/ executive vice presidents 	 3 0.9% agreed
Managers act in S/H	 would, in general, find comparable positions elsewhere 	 25.5% neutral
interest to protect their	 43.6% disagreed
personal reputations
Agency theory:	 The firm would suggest restrictive covenants to a doubtful lender	 10.6% agreed
in hopes of convinvcing lender to allow firm to borrow money	 8.5% neutral
80.9% disagreed
Agency theory:	 If the firm could issue Long term debt at the same after-issue, 	 10.8% agreed
after-tax cost of uninsured debt, the firm would increase its relative 	 24.7% neutral
_____________________ use_of debtfinancing 	 64.5% disagreed
Agency theory /	 . Debt and equity costs are determined by the market and cannot be 	 42.1% agreed
Asymmetric information substantially affected by management actions (eg. more puplic 	 16.8% neutral
disclosures or agreeing restrictive covenants). 	 41.1% disagreed
Asymmetric information The firm uses private placements of stocks/bonds for atleast 75%	 15.5% agreed
of all new issues	 4.1% neutral
80.4% disagreed
Asymmetric information The firm believes that private placements offer a satisfactory	 34.4% agreed
exchange of information between firm and investors without 	 29.2% neutral
______________________ publiciing proprietary information 	 36.5% disagreed
'When respondents asked to tick all applicable options, Norton expressed response as a % of total number of options ticked.
The response shown here is % of total respondents ticking a particular option to facilitate comparisons with other survey results
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Table 3.4 continued
Issues explored	 Abbreviated question 	 Response
Asymmetric information The firm believes a decision to issue long term debt sends a	 15.3% agreed
favourable signal to financial market concerning future long term 	 51% neutral
_______________________ prospects	 33.7% disagreed
Asymmetric information The firm believes a decision to issue common stock sends an 	 9.2% agreed
unfavourable signal to the financial markets 	 28.6% neutral
62.2% disagreed
Asymmetric information Stock prices usually decline when debt is issued	 8.3% agreed
19.8% neutral
______________________________________________________ 7 1.9% disagreed
Asymmetric information! Private placements offer the firm less restrictive covenants, all or in 	 13.3% agreed
Agency theory	 part due to a better information exchange 	 17.4% neutral
_________________________________________________________ 69.4% disagreed
Asymmetric information Would firm release proprietary information to the capital market 	 More than 2/3rds replied NO
that may tip off competitors to plans/strategy/present developments	 in all cases.
_____________________ if the information would lower cost of capital by 0.5%, 1% or 1.5%? ________________________
Attracting a clientele/ 	 The firm in its financing decisions, explicitly considers the difference 58.8% agreed
tax benefit of debt	 in the tax treatment of retained earnings, dividends, interest income 	 17.5% neutral
and capital gains from investors viewpoint 	 23.7% disagreed
Interest tax shield	 The use of equity finance would increase relative to debt finance 	 78.4% agreed
if common and preferred stock dividends were to become tax-	 14.4% neutral
____________________ deductible.	 7.2% disagreed
Interest tax shield	 The use of debt finance would decrease relative to equity if bond 	 79.4% agreed
interest were no longer tax-deductible 	 11.3% neutral
______________________________________________________ 9.3% disagreed
Interest tax shield	 The decision to issue debt or equity is affected by the existence of 	 42.3% agreed
tax loss carryforwards 	 36.1% neutral
21.7% disagreed
Financial distress	 If the firm were more R & D dependent for its success, the firm's	 30.9% agreed
potential	 debt/equity ratio would be lower	 32% neutral
37.1% disagreed
Financial distress	 Respondents asked to roughly estimate in case of bankruptcy,	 75% of respondents failed
potential	 total bankruptcy costs as a percentage of total assets 	 to provide a response
Clientele effect	 New issues of debt and equity are purposely targeted by the firm 	 26.8% agreed
to attract certain investor groups (eg. low risk/return, high risk/return, 17.5% neutral
financial institutions, individuals) as opposed to the capital market 	 55.7% disagreed
asa whole	 _________________________
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their investigation by including members of the Financial Executives Institute.
Completed responses were received by 392 of the Fortune 500 firms and 4400 FEI
members, a response rate of approximately 8.5%. Although Graham and Harvey's
response was very low in relation to the number of potential respondents mailed,
they indicated that it was comparable with other FBI quarterly surveys, and other
academic surveys in recent times. In addition, the total number of respondents
exceeds any of the previous capital structure survey investigations.
A summary of the issues explored by Graham and Harvey, the questions they asked
and the responses they received is shown in Table 3.5. The responses are based on
those for the entire sample, however Graham and Harvey further analysed responses
by key firm characteristics to provide additional insight. There is evidence to
suggest that respondents adopt a target debt ratio. However, in most cases, the target
did not appear to be extremely strict. Financial flexibility (i.e. the ability to obtain
further debt finances) was of paramount importance. Respondents appear to issue
equity in order to maintain a target debt/equity ratio, especially when the firm was
highly geared. In contrast, debt did not appear to be issued in response to the
accumulation of substantial profits. Respondents did not appear to delay issuing or
retiring debt because of the transaction costs and fees. In relation to the static trade-
off theory, this could suggest that actual debt ratios were optimal. It also dispels the
alternative explanation for the preference of internal equity over debt, over external
equity, in the pecking order.
Graham and Harvey did not explicitly inquire whether respondents balanced the
various costs and benefits of issuing debt when determining target ratios. However,
they did investigate the relative importance of the costs and benefits. The interest
tax shield was found to be of moderate importance in choosing the appropriate
amount of debt. It was found to be of particular importance to large, regulated,
dividend-paying firms, which are suggested as having the highest tax rates. The
personal taxes facing investors appeared insignificant. The importance of corporate
tax implications was further corroborated when respondents indicated that
favourable tax treatment relative to the US was fairly important when issuing
foreign debt. The importance of the potential costs of financial distress was not
apparent among respondents. However, Graham and Harvey suggested that an
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Table 3.5: A summary of the theory explored, questions asked and responses
provided in Graham and Harvey's (2001) survey
Issues explored	 Abbreviated question	 Response1
Short term versus long 	 What factors affect your firm's choice between short and long term
term debt	 debt?	 Mean response
-Matching the maturity of our debt with life of our assets 	 2.60
-We issue LT debt to minimise the risk of having to 'refinance' in
bad times	 2.15
-We issue ST when ST interest rates are low compared to LT 	 1.89
-We issue ST when waiting for LT market interest rates to decline 	 1.78
-We borrow ST so that returns from new projects can be captured
more fully by S/H, rather than committing to pay LT profits as
interest to debt holders	 0.94
-We expect our credit rating to improve so borrow ST until it does	 0.85
-Borrowing ST reduces the chance that our firm will want to take on
risky projects	 0.53
-Other	 Practical cash
management consideration
Capital markets	 Has firm seriously considered issuing debt in foreign countries? 	 31% Yes
increasingly global	 If so what factors effect the decision?
-Providing a natural hedge (e.g.. if foreign currency devalues, not
obligated to pay interest in $US) 	 3.15
-Keeping 'source of funds' close to 'use of funds' 	 2.67
-Favourable tax treatment relative to US 	 2.26
-Foreign interest rates may be lower than domestic rates	 2.19
-Foreign regulations require debt to be issued abroad 	 0.61
-Other	 To broaden finance source
Agency theory	 Has your firm seriously considered issuing convertible debt? 	 20% Yes
If so what factors effect the decision?
-Convertibles are inexpensive way to issue delayed common stock 	 2.49
Pecking order	 -Our stock is currently undervalued 	 2.34
-Ability to 'call' or force conversion if/when needed 	 2.29
-Avoid short term equity dilution	 2.18
-To attract investors unsure about riskiness of company 	 2.07
-Convertibles are less expensive than straight debt 	 1.85
-Other firms in our industry successfully use convertibles 	 1.10
-Protecting bondholders against unfavourable actions by managers
or stockholders	 0.62
Decision to issue	 Has your firm seriously considered issuing common stock? 	 38% Yes
common stock	 If so what factors effect the decision?
-Earnings per share dilution	 2.84
Asymmetric information -The amount by which our stock is undervalued or overvalued by the
market	 2.69
-If stock price has recently risen, the price at which we can issue
is high	 2.53
Agency theory	 -Providing shares to employee bonus/stock option schemes 	 2.34
Static trade-off theory	 -Maintaining a target debt-to-equity ratio 	 2.26
Corporate control	 -Diluting the holding of certain shareholders 	 2.14
Pecking order	 -Stock is our least risky source of funds	 1.76
Pecking order	 -Whether recent profits have been sufficient to fund activities 	 1.76
Industry influence	 -Using a similar amount of equity as other firms in industry 	 1.45
Asymmetric information -Issuing stock gives investors a better impression of firm's
prospects than using debt 	 1.31
Pecking order	 -Inability to obtain funds using debt, convertibles, or other sources 	 1.15
-Common stock is our cheapest source of funds 	 1.10
Tax benefit	 -The capital gains tax rates faced by our investors (relative to tax
rates on dividends)	 0.82
-Other	 Preferred currency for
acquisitions
'0-not important to 4-very important
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Table 3.5 continued
Issues explored	 Abbreviated question 	 Response'
Static trade-off theory
	 Does firm have a target range for your debt ratio?
No target range	 19%
Flexible target range 	 37%
Somewhat tight target range	 34%
____________________ Strict target range
	 10%
What factors affect how you choose the appropriate amount of debt?
Pecking order?	 -Financial flexibility (restrict debt so we have enough internal funds
available to pursue new projects when they come along)
	 2.59
External constraint	 -Our credit ratings (as assigned by rating agencies)
	 2.46
P0/financial distress
	 -The volatility of our earnings and cash flows
	 2.32
Interest tax shield 	 -The tax advantage of interest deductibility 	 2.07
PO/STO	 -Transition costs and fees for issuing debt
	 1.95
Industry effect	 -The debt levels of other firms in our industry
	 1.49
Financial distress cost	 -Potential costs of bankruptcy, near bankruptcy, financial distress
	 1.24
Stakeholder theory 	 -Limit debt so customers/suppliers are not worried about firm going
out of business	 1.24
Pecking order?	 -Restrict borrowing so profits from new/future projects can be
captured fully by shareholders and do not have to be paid out as
interest to debtholders 	 1.01
Corporate control
	 -We try to have sufficient debt so not attractive take-over target
	 0.73
Interest tax shield 	 -Personal tax cost investors face when they receive interest income
	 0.68
Asymmetric information -If we issue debt our competitors know we are unlikely to reduce
our output	 0.40
Agency theory
	 -To ensure upper management works hard and efficiently, we issue
sufficient debt to ensure that a large proportion of cash flow is
conmiitted to interest payments
	 0.33
Stakeholder theory	 -A high debt ratio helps us bargain for concessions from employees
	 0.16
-Other: [responses included to minimise WACC, to fund projects!
growth as required, Covenants effect debt policy]
What other factors affect your firms debt policy?
Cost of debt	 -We issue debt when interest rates are particularly low
	 2.22
-We issue debt when our recent profits are not sufficient to fund
Pecking order	 our activities	 2.13
Asymmetric information -We use debt when equity is undervalued by the market 	 1.56
Asymmetric information -Changes in the price of our common stock
	 1.08
STO actual=optimal 	 -We delay issuing debt because of transaction costs and fees
	 1.06
debt ratios	 -We delay retiring debt because of recapitalisation costs and fees
	 1.04
Asymmetric information -Using debt gives investors a better impression of firms prospects
than issuing stock	 0.96
Rebalancing ratios
	 -We issue debt when we have accumulated substantial profits	 0.53
t0not
 important to 4-very important
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indirect importance might be inferred by the importance placed on credit ratings and
earnings/cash flow volatility. In contradiction, the importance placed on
earnings/cash flow volatility could indicate the reliance on internal funds as
suggested in the pecking order, with the amount of debt depending on the
requirement for external funds.
The agency costs/benefits of debt did not appear to rate significant consideration,
although five respondents did indicate that covenants were important when asked
what other factors affect how the appropriate amount of debt is chosen. However,
little importance was placed on the fact that convertibles are less expensive than
straight debt. Even less importance was placed on using convertibles to protect
bond-holders against unfavourable actions by management/shareholders. The use of
debt to mitigate conflicts between shareholders and management would not appear
to be important. Graham and Harvey's evidence suggests that alternative means are
employed such as encouraging managerial ownership. Respondents considered that
providing shares to employees/stock option schemes were important factors in
issuing equity. Respondents did not appear to place any importance on using debt to
encourage management efficiency and to ensure that a large proportion of cash flow
is committed to interest payments. However, Graham and Harvey further suggest
that respondents might have been reluctant to admit to such action. They might also
have been reluctant to take such action, if it meant curtailing the resources they
themselves have most ability to appropriate.
In relation to corporate control considerations, Graham and Harvey suggested that
there was moderate evidence that firms issue equity to dilute the shareholding of
certain investors, though this bore no relation to the degree of management
ownership. There appeared little support for firms using debt to prevent take-overs.
Graham and Harvey obtained moderate evidence that firms issued debt when
interest rates were low, and issued short-term debt when short-term rates were low
or long-term rates were expected to decline. They also found that favourable foreign
rates could influence the decision to issue debt abroad. This evidence is not
inconsistent with firms balancing the various costs and benefits of debt. However, it
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lends no support to firms issuing debt purely in response to the requirement for
additional finance.
Graham and Harvey did not explicitly inquire whether respondents followed a
hierarchy or pecking order of preferred financial sources. However, they did
investigate the theoretical arguments on which the pecking order is based. There is
moderate evidence to suggest that debt was issued when recent profits were not
sufficient to fund activities. Also, there is evidence to suggest that respondents'
decisions to issue equity were affected by the amount that equity was believed to be
under/over valued by the market. However, there is less evidence to suggest debt
was used when equity was undervalued, and using debt was not thought to give
investors any better impression of future prospects than issuing equity. Further the
inability to obtain funds using debt and other sources did not appear important in the
decision to issue equity.
Graham and Harvey concluded that their study provided weak evidence in
suggesting that capital structure decisions are made according to both the static
trade-off and the pecking order theories. However, owing to the lack of specific
inquiries as to whether firms following a pecking order, there appears more
evidence in relation to target debt ratios. The interest tax shield benefit to debt, and
the cost in respect of interest rates are apparently important, but benefits and costs
are not necessarily optimised, if target ratios also incorporate the preservation of
debt capacity. Fundamentally, it is not clear whether capital structure dictates
investment and dividend payout or vice-versa. Based on Graham and Harvey's
evidence, the actual situation could well be interpreted as a combination of both.
Survey evidence outside the US, particularly in relation to the UK, appears to be
extremely limited. Although somewhat dated, Fawthrop and Terry's (1975) survey
of the use of leasing finance in 54 major UK corporations did encapsulate certain
capital structure issues. A summary of the capital structure theory explored,
questions asked and responses provided are shown in Table 3.6. Fawthrop and Terry
found strong evidence to suggest that respondents used debt to equity ratios to
constrain their debt limits. Consideration also appeared to be given to the ability to
meet interest payments. Debt ratios appeared to be primarily determined on the
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Table 3.6: A summary of the capital structure theory explored, questions asked
and response provided in Fawthrop and Terry ' s (1975) survey
Issues explored	 Abbreviated question	 Response
Use of debt finance	 Would you resort to debt to finance capital expenditure? 	 98% Yes (n=45)
Use of debt finance	 Would you tend to use a series of short-term debt expedients,
_____________________ periodically consolidated' by a longer-term funding operation?	 93% Yes (n42)
Debt capacity	 Do you consider that there is a limit to the amount of debt a
	
98% Yes (n=51)
company ought to use (apart from the limits imposed by the
______________________ borrowing powers of directors) 	 ________________________
Definition debt capacity Does this limit tend, in fact, to be set by any or all of the following? 	 (n=48)
-The ratio of debt to equity in the balance sheet 	 73% very relevent
23% relevant
4% irrelevant
-The prior charges cover in the profit and loss account 	 48% very relevent
40% relevant
12% irrelevant
-The prior charges cover afforded by some kind of cash flow	 35% very relevent
forecast	 40% relevant
25% irrelevant
-Pushing borrowing up to the limit obtainable from all sources of	 6% very relevent
lending open to the company, without regard to any special ratio 	 25% relevant
or indicator	 69% irrelevant
What determines	 Is the standard for the debt/equity ratio set by any or all of the
debt ratio	 following?
An acceptable ratio for UK industry at large? 	 19% very relevent
36% relevant
47% irrelevant
An acceptable ratio for companies in your industry? 	 34% very relevent
30% relevant
36% irrelevant
-An acceptable ratio for companies of your size	 28% very relevent
47% relevant
35% irrelevant
-It will minimise the overall cost of finance 	 45% very relevent
32% relevant
23% irrelevant
-It will be acceptable to your shareholders	 38% very relevent
46% relevant
17% irrelevant
-It does not seem too risky to management in terms of company	 34% very relevent
survival	 36% relevant
30% irrelevant
-It does not seem too risky to management in terms of flexibility 	 43% very relevent
or future room to manoeuvre 	 35% relevant
22% irrelevant
-An acceptable ratio as specified by your merchant bank or 	 26% very relevent
other financial adviser 	 38% relevant
36% irrelevant
Types of debt	 Which type of debt would you use? (n=44)	 1st	 2nd	 Last
Bank overdraft	 82	 16	 2
Merchant bank loan	 11	 20	 7
Formal debenture	 7	 9	 18
Hire purchasing	 0	 5	 9
Leasing	 9	 20	 16
Bill of exchange	 5	 5	 5
Acceptance credit 	 2	 16	 11
Others	 0	 2	 2
Term loan, euro dollar
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basis of maintaining financial flexibility and shareholder acceptance. Although
Fawthrop and Terry's evidence is limited, the desire for 'flexibility and future room
to manoeuvre' faintly resembles certain pecking order notions of capital structure.
Allen (1991) investigated the determinants of the capital structure of 48 listed
Australian companies in a questionnaire/interview based field study. Although
respondents appeared to place some importance on target debt ratios and the tax
implications of debt, they appeared mostly concerned with maintaining spare debt
capacity. In addition, internal funds appeared to be marginally favoured. Allen
argued that his findings supported Donaldson's pecking order theory of capital
structure. Although debt was considered favourable to equity for financing major
expansions, there was no apparent difference when financing acquisitions. There is
little evidence to suggest that debt limits were externally constrained. In fact,
evidence of a target ratio together with maintaining debt capacity suggests an
internally set debt constraint. There was some evidence to suggest that market
conditions were a consideration when issuing equity. In favourable conditions,
equity appeared to be issued to reduce leverage. This is contrary to the pecking
order prediction of issuing equity only as a last resort.
Allen extended his work by conducting a survey specifically designed to investigate
the extent to which firms in Australia, the UK and Japan maintained debt capacity.
His evidence is based on responses from 132 listed Australian firms (response rate
24%), 67 of the largest UK firms ranked by turnover in the 1989 Times 1000
(response rate 13%), and 53 Japanese firms listed in the first section of the Tokyo
stock exchange in 1992 (response rate 10%). A summary of his findings is shown in
Table 3.8. In contrast to Japanese firms, firms in the UK appeared to maintain debt
capacity, as did the majority of firms in Australia. Findings appear to suggest that
the policy was driven by a need to be in a ppsition to seize opportunities or to make
acquisitions rather than a matter of insurance. This evidence supports the use of debt
as and when required as suggested in the pecking order theory.
Prior survey evidence is summarised in Table 3.9. Although somewhat mixed, on
balance on the basis of prior researchers own conclusions, it appears that the
pecking order theory gains most support. However, although maintaining spare debt
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Table 3.7: A summary of the theory explored, questions asked and responses
provided in Allen's (1991) survey
Issues explored	 Abbreviated question	 Response
Interest tax shield	 Do tax issues have a major influence on your decisions? 	 85% Yes (n=40)
Static trade-off theory	 Do you have a target debt ratio? 	 75% Yes (n=48)
Maintaining debt capacity Do you have a policy for maintaining spare debt capacity?	 93% Yes (n43)
Maintaining debt capacity Could you borrow more at the same interest rate? 	 78% Yes (n45)
Industry effect	 Do you see your borrowing in idustry terms? 	 32% Yes (n=47)
Increase debt capacity?	 Do you make use of off-balance sheet financing techniques? 	 32% Yes (n28)
Defining debt capacity	 Do respondents have a perceived limit on their total borrowing
which they would not wish to exceed, if so how determined? 	 (n=48)
Defined by debenture trust deeds or negative pledge agreements 	 46% specific upper limit
By debt/equity	 23%
By debt/total tangible assets 	 25%
By interest cover	 2%
By equity/total assets 	 6%
By term debt/equity plus total debt 	 1%
Financial risk	 How do respondents analyse financial risk? 	 (n=48)
By interest cover	 13%
By cash flow projections/ability to repay debt 	 46%
Asset value	 2%
Gearing ratio	 4%
All of the above	 17%
No reply	 19%
Pecking order	 Do you prefer to fund your business by means of internal or	 (n=48)
external funding sources?
Internal	 52%
Mix	 44%
Depends on scale 	 2%
No preference	 2%
Duration of financing	 Do you have any preferences for short-, medium- or long-term 	 (n=48)
funding sources?
Short (up to 1 year) 	 13%
Medium/short (up to 3 years)	 23%
Medium (up to 5 years)	 13%
Long (>5 years)	 2%
Policy of matching assets and liabilities	 25%
Term does not matter	 2%
Depends on interest rates 	 8%
A balance of short/medium/longh 	 8%
Reasons for issuing	 Under what circumstances would you make an equity issue?	 (n=48)
equity	 To fund a major expansion	 8%
To make an acquisition	 19%
To reduce leverage	 6%
If market conditions are right	 2%
To reduce leverage if market conditions right	 44%
Avoid it	 15%
Reasons for issuing debt	 Under what circumstances would you make a debt issue?	 (n=48)
To fund a major expansion 	 29%
To make an acquisition	 19%
To add to liquidity	 2%
If market conditions are right 	 27%
To fund a long-term asset if market conditions right	 4%
______________________ Avoid it 	 8%
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Table 3.8: A summary of the theory explored, questions asked and responses
provided in Allen 's (1991) international survey on debt capacity
Issues explored	 Abbreviated question	 _____________ Response ____________
	
_____________________ ___________________________________ Australia
	 UK	 Japan
Investigating policies re 	 Do you have a policy of maintaining spare	 55% Yes	 88% Yes	 32%
spare-borrowing capacity 	 borrowing capacity?	 (n=132)	 (n=67)	 (n=50)
If yes, indicate what percentage of
existing borrowing is maintained as spare?
Mean	 23.70%	 45.30%	 93.60%
Range	 100.00%	 200.00%	 290.00%
Minimum	 0.00%	 0.00%	 10.00%
Maximum	 100.00%	 200.00%	 300.00%
Median	 13.00%	 36.50%	 50.00%
Standard deviation	 28.50%	 40.63%	 88.70%
Sources of spare	 Please indicate the nature and source of
borrowing capacity	 this spare borrowing capacity: 	 (n=67)	 (n=58)	 (n=17)
Committed line of credit	 22%	 47%	 63%
Uncommitted line	 6%	 14%	 -
Bank line
	
21%	 19%	 19%
Bank bill facility	 30%	 2%	 6%
Assets of the company	 2%	 -	 13%
Lease lines
	
3%	 -	 -
Mortgage lending	 2%	 -	 -
________________________ Overdraft facility
	 15%	 19%	 -
Explanations of why spare Please indicate why you have a policy of
borrowing capacity is 	 maintaining spare borrowing capacity:	 (n=64)	 (n=60)	 (n=16)
maintained	 For unplanned circumstances 	 41%	 45%	 31%
Reserveforcrisis 	 9%	 13%	 13%
For unplanned opportunities 	 30%	 23%	 38%
Special projects	 5%	 -	 19%
For acquisitions	 14%	 17%	 -
_____________________ Policy of not levering up	 2%	 2%	 -
Investigating the ability 	 How much could you borrow (as a % of
to borrow more without an existing borrowings) without increasing
impact on the interest rate your average borrowing costs?
paid?	 Mean	 42.49%	 60.42%	 99.05%
Range	 500.00%	 500.00%	 919.00%
Minimum	 0.00%	 0.00%	 0.00%
Maximum	 500.00%	 500.00%	 9 19.00%
Median	 20.00%	 27.50%	 45.00%
Standard deviation	 74.68%	 90.49%	 200.4 1%
Respondents with additional borrowing
of 20% or more of existing borrowing
without increasing average borrowing costs 	 63%	 89%	 20%
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capacity and financial flexibility appears to be of major concern, the use of target
debt ratios and the tax implications of debt do not appear irrelevant. These findings
are reflected in Graham and Harvey's (2001) study which, on the basis of timing, is
relevant to the current business environment. In addition, studies prior to Graham
and Harvey appear to be extremely partial, making it difficult to draw robust
conclusions. However, Graham and Harvey appear to have implicitly investigated
certain theoretical issues, when a more explicit inquiry might have provided
additional insight. Further, there appears a definite lack of survey evidence in the
UK both past and present. Therefore, the survey investigation in the present study
could not fail to be considered anything less than an urgent necessity.
3.3: Capital structure prior research using accounting/company data
The analysis of accounting data has been used to investigate both the way firms
determine their levels of debt and equity (i.e. static trade-off or pecking order), and
to identify firm characteristics that appear to promote highllow levels of debt. Two
main approaches have been adopted. Firstly, the examination of cross-sectional
relationships between debt ratios and other firm characteristics. Secondly, by the
examination of firms' previous decisions to issue debt or equity
3.3.1 Relationships between the degree of use of debt and other firm characteristics
A significant number of previous studies have examined the relationship between
debt and other firm characteristics. Each study claims to focus on different aspects
of capital structure theory. However, certain firm characteristics have been
examined by several researchers. In order to provide a coherent review, an outline
of previous researchers' intentions is provided on a study-by-study basis. However,
findings are summarised according to the relationships being tested and the proxies
used. Prior studies are also grouped according to their country of origin
61
US based studies
A summary of the relationships investigated between capital structure and other
firm characteristics and the subsequent findings is shown in Table 3.10.
Fern and Jones (1979) investigated the relationship between the capital structure
and the industrial classifications, size, variability of income and operating leverage
of 233 industrial firms over the time periods 1969 to 1974 and 1971 to 1976. They
found the degree of financial leverage to be associated to an industry classification
based on dominant and similar product lines. However, their findings did not
indicate that firms in certain industries were likely to be more highly geared than in
others. In fact, firms in each industry group were found to exhibit varying degrees
of debt. This appears to suggest that the industry classification used could be
partially capturing some other common characteristic. Small firms, on the basis of
low average sales, were found to exhibit either high or low levels of gearing,
compared to intermediary levels exhibited by large firms.
Business risk proxied by measures of historical volatility in sales and cash flow was
not significantly related to financial gearing. A strong negative relationship was
found between operating leverage and the use of debt. Fern and Jones note that
'operating leverage may be defined as the use of fixed costs but is generally
associated with the employment of fixed assets which can magnify the variability in
a firm's future income.' They used the proportion of fixed assets to total assets as a
proxy for operating leverage. However, a negative relationship between gearing and
this measure might not necessarily be expected if a large proportion of fixed assets
provides collateral for borrowing. Also, a large proportion of tangible fixed assets
reduces the potential costs of financial distress in the event of liquidation.
Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984) used cross-sectional firm-specific data to test for
the existence of an optimal capital structure. They constructed an ordinary least
squared regression model for 821 firms, with long-term debt to value ratio over the
period 1962 to 1981 as the dependent variable. Independent variables were used to
proxy the agency costs, tax benefits and financial distress potential of debt. Industry
dummy variables were also included to account for cross-sectional differences in
capital structure. In comparison to Fern and Jones, Bradley et al. found a much
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stronger industry influence on financial gearing. Industry dummy variables
appeared to explain 54% of the variation in gearing across firms. Firms in the drugs
and cosmetics industry exhibited the lowest levels of gearing and firms in the airline
industry exhibited the highest.
Bradley et al. found a negative relationship between financial gearing and
variability in earnings, which is consistent with the financial distress element in
determining optimal capital structure. A negative relationship was also found
between gearing and the proportion of advertising and research and development
costs to net sales, used as a proxy for potential agency costs. However, against
expectations, the relationship between gearing and non-debt tax shields was found
to be positive. The interest tax shield benefit of debt, and hence the use of debt, is
expected to be reduced by the presence of non-debt tax shield. However, highly
profitable firms may still benefit from interest tax shields despite high levels of
other non-debt tax shields. Thus, Bradley et al.'s measure of non-debt tax shield
only partially captures the possible benefit to be derived from the interest tax shield
of debt.
Titman and Wessels (1988) examined the relationship between a broader set of firm
characteristics and long-term and short-term and convertible debt for 469 firms.
Three- year averages were used over three sub-periods spanning 1974 to 1982. They
employed a factor analytic approach to mitigate any measurement problems arising
from the use of proxy variables. In addition to the relationships tested in the
previous two US studies, Titman and Wessels also considered the relationships
between debt levels and firm profitability, asset structure and growth.
In support of Bradley et al., Titman and Wessels also found a negative relationship
between debt ratios and both the proportions of research and development costs and
selling expenses to sales. However, they employed these measures as proxies for
'uniqueness of a firm's line of business' rather than a firm's potential agency costs.
Product uniqueness, according to the stakeholder theory, promotes low levels of
debt as it imposes high costs on customers, employees and suppliers in the event of
liquidation. This is said to also apply to firms with products that require specialised
after service or part replacement. Titman and Wessels confirmed this to be the case
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when using an industry dummy variable for firms producing machinery and
equipment. They also found short-term debt ratios to be negatively related to firm
size, which they suggest might reflect the relatively high transaction costs facing
small firms when issuing long-term debt. Profitability was found to have a
significantly negative relationship with financial gearing when debt was scaled with
the market value of equity. This is consistent with the pecking order preference for
primarily financing with internal reserves. Titman and Wessels found all other
relationships to be statistically insignificant.
Barton, Hill and Sundaram (1989) investigated the relationship between capital
structure and the same firm characteristics (excluding industry influence) as
investigated by Titman and Wessels, albeit under the premise of specifically testing
the stakeholder theory predictions of capital structure. Like Titman and Wessels,
they also found a negative relationship between debt levels and profitability. In
addition, they categorised their sample into two different strategy groups, related
and unrelated diversification. They found firms with related product markets and
technologies to have lower debt ratios than firms with unrelated activities. Based on
the proposition that firms with related activities are likely to have common
stakeholders, they suggest that findings support the stakeholder theory of capital
structure. However, the existence of common stakeholders doesn't necessarily infer
that they would be in receipt of high costs in the event of liquidation, if alternative
products, manufacturers or employers were available elsewhere. Barton et al.' s
findings might be better explained by the argument that related diversification is
associated with a higher overall operating risk than unrelated diversification.
Baskin (1989) considered the relationship between financial gearing and
profitability, dividend payout and investment/growth in an investigation of the
pecking order theory. He employed ordinary least squared regression analysis to
data for 378 Fortune 500 firms spanning the time period 1960 to 1972. He found
both past and present profitability to be negatively related to debt levels and growth
and past dividend payout to be positively related to debt levels. He suggested that
these findings coincide with the pecking-order predictions of preference for internal
finance with debt requirements dictated by dividend payout and investment
opportunities.
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Chang and Rhee (1990) examined the relationship between financial leverage and
dividend policy for 508 firms spanning the time period 1969 to 1987. They used
attributes such as growth potential, earnings variability, non-debt tax shields, size
and profitability as control variables. Like Baskin, they found a strong correlation
between debt and dividend ratios. Using regression analysis they also found a
negative relationship between debt and profitability and a positive relationship
between debt and growth. However, they interpret the evidence of a positive
relationship between debt and dividend ratios as support for the integration of a tax-
induced dividend clientele effect and financial leverage clientele effect. They note
that under the dividend clientele effect a negative relationship exists between
shareholder tax rates and dividend payout, and under the financial leverage clientele
effect, a negative relationship also exists between shareholder tax rates and financial
leverage. Thus combined the relationship between dividend payout and financial
leverage is positive. Chang and Rhee fail to acknowledge the possibility that in
order to sustain high dividend payout and investment, firms may simply require
more debt finance.
Balakrishnan and Fox (1993) focused on the relative importance of industry and
firm effects on capital structure. They based their analysis on 295 single business
firms over the time period 1978 to 1987 to control for the effects of diversification.
As in previous studies, they used a regression model to investigate the relationship
between financial gearing and earnings volatility, non-debt tax shields, research and
development and advertising intensity, and growth opportunities. However, they
also decomposed the total sample variance in capital structure into firm, industry
and time components. The firm components were based on Compustat firm
identification numbers. The firm effect was found to be most important, it explained
52% of capital structure variance. Inter-industry differences were found to account
for 10% and time differences 1%.
Balaknshnan and Fox thus concluded the importance of unique firm characteristics
in determining capital structure. However, their findings might suggest more than
just a unique combination of firm characteristics which influence capital structure
through the various costs and benefits associated with debt. They could also suggest
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the existence of differences in the emphasis placed on the various costs and benefits
by individual firms.
Graham, Lemmon and Schaliheim (1998) specifically investigated the interest tax
shield benefit to debt in their study of lease and debt determinants3 . Rather than
considering the possible benefit to be obtained from the interest tax shield through
separate measures of profitability and non-debt tax shields, they employed a
simulated marginal tax rate measure. This incorporated net operating loss carry-
forwards and carry-backs, as well as investment tax credits. A positive relationship
was found between this measure and the level of debt for 18193 firm year
observations over the time period 1981 to 1992. These findings infer that firms with
the highest debt levels also derive the most benefit from the interest tax shield of
debt. However, Graham (2000), in a further study, went on to quantify the tax
benefit to debt. He estimated, under firm-specific benefit functions, the capitalised
tax benefit of debt to equal 9.7% of firm value, or 4.3% net of personal taxes. He
noted that for a typical firm, this benefit could be increased to about 15% before it
begins to decline. His findings, therefore, appear to suggest that although interest
tax shields are influential in financing decisions, because tax benefits are not
exhausted, other costs and benefits to debt are a consideration.
As an aside, Gordon and Lee (1999) used corporate tax return data to focus on the
variation in tax incentives across firms and the impact on debt. They found that
taxes appear to have a large effect on the use of debt by the smallest and largest
firms but less effect for firms of intermediate size. This appears to suggest that the
tax benefit to debt is not as important to larger firms compared to smaller firms, and
much less important to intermediary firms. In which case, other costs and benefits
of debt, which vary in degree with firm size might also exert influence.
Graham, Lemmon and Schaliheim also used dummy time variables in their
regression model to control for changes in financial policies. The coefficient
estimates of the time variables were not found to be statistically significant. This
could provide at least some degree of reassurance to previous studies in which time
has only been partially captured through the use of averages.
Graham et al.'s study is outlined in more detail in section 3.7.2 of this chapter
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Mebran, Taggart and Yermack (1999), adopting a financial contracting cost
perspective, found CEO ownership to be positively related to debt financing in their
investigation of CEO ownership and leasing. 4
 They used regression analysis for
1056 firm observations over the period 1986 to 1991. They suggested that, as
shareholders, those making the financing decisions are more aware of the agency
benefits of debt. Committing cash flow to interest payments reduces the
opportunities for lower levels of management to use surplus funds to their own
personal benefit. However, the degree with which lower management could use
surplus funds for personal benefit might be debatable. The positive relationship
between CEO ownership and debt might reflect a strategy to maintain corporate
control. However, their findings might also suggest that those with personal
financial interest beyond their employment take a closer look at all the benefits of
debt financing. It is unlikely that financing decisions made by those with a
significant personal share-holding will follow Miller's process of neutral mutation.
In addition to other control variables, Mehran et al. employed a simulated marginal
tax rate based on Graham et al.'s measure. In contrast to Graham et al, they found a
negative relationship between marginal tax rate and the level of debt. They mainly
attribute this result to their use of a relatively smaller sample size. However, the
difference in findings might equally arise from differences in the combination of
independent variables used. Mehran et al.'s findings appear to cast some shadow of
doubt on the degree of importance placed on the interest-tax shield benefit to debt.
Belkaoui (1999) used covariance analysis to investigate the relationship between
capital structure and the investment opportunities facing US manufacturing and
servicing firms. He found a significant difference between the debt to equity ratios
of high growth and low growth firms, with high growth firms exhibiting lower debt
levels. He also found firms with high multi-nationality to have high debt ratios than
low multi-nationality. This might be expected if firms are able to lower operating
risk by spreading their business across international markets.
' Mehran et al.'s study is outlined in more detail in section 3.7.2 of this chapter
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International studies
A summary of the relationships investigated between capital structure and other
firm characteristics across countries is shown in Table 3.11.
Toy at a!. (1974) investigated whether growth, profitability and risk variables were
determinants of corporate debt ratios in the manufacturing sector in industrialised
countries. They used regression analysis for a sample of 816 firms in four selected
industries in Japan, France, Norway, Holland and the US during the period 1966 to
1972. With the exception of France, they found individual models for each country
to be highly significant, i.e. a relatively high variation in capital structure was
explained by the growth, profitability and risk variables. In addition, a positive
relationship was found between financial gearing and both variability in earnings in
the US, Japan and Norway, and growth in the US and Japan. However, these
findings are contrary to the financial distress and agency costs of debt.
Kester (1986) tested the hypothesis that Japanese manufacturing is more highly
geared than US manufacturing, based on the suggestion that the increase in
Japanese competitiveness may be partially due to an aggressive use of relatively low
cost debt finance. He employed regression analysis to cross-sectional data for 344
Japanese firms and 452 US firms over the period 1982 to 1983. In contrast to Toy et
al., Kester used a dummy variable to account for the different countries, rather than
obtaining separate models for both countries. The country dummy variable was set
to 0 for Japan and 1 for the US. The significantly negative relationship found
between gearing and the country dummy indicated that Japanese firms exhibit
higher levels of debt. Kester also found firms in mature, heavy industries such as
steel, general chemicals, non-ferrous metals, paper, petroleum and refining to
exhibit higher levels of debt. In contrast to Toy et al., he failed to observe a
significant relationship between financial gearing and variability of earnings.
Rajan and Zingales (1995) investigated the determinants of capital structure in
major industrialised countries, namely the US, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, the
UK and Canada. They employed regression analysis to samples of firms from each
country. At an aggregate level, they found financial gearing to be fairly similar
across countries. They used measures of profitability, size, investment opportunity
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and asset structure to explain cross-sectional differences in gearing. The only
conflicting difference apparent across companies appears to be in terms of firm size.
A negative relationship was found between size and gearing in Germany compared
to a positive relationship in the US, Japan, the UK and Canada. The relationship
between gearing and profitability was insignificant across firms in Germany, France
and Italy, and the relationship with size was also insignificant for France and Italy.
However, findings could be attributed to the use of significantly smaller samples of
firms in Germany, France and Italy compared to the sample size for the other four
countries.
Wald (1999) examined firm factors correlated with capital structure in France,
Germany, Japan, the UK and the US. Aside from limiting the scope of countries,
Wald's study differed from that of Rajan and Zingales by examining a wider set of
firm characteristics. Although Rajan and Zingales' general conclusions of similar
financial gearing across countries were confirmed, Wald claimed to identify areas
where differences might exist. He concluded that the variables measuring variability
of earnings, growth and firm size have a different effect on gearing in different
countries. As institutions and agencies differ across countries he inferred that this
might be a significant determinant of capital structure. However, in criticism of
these conclusions, similar measures of variability in earnings have produced
conflicting results in studies within the US.
UK based studies
A summary of the relationships investigated between capital structure and other
firm characteristics and the subsequent findings is shown in Table 3.12.
Bennett and Donnelly (1993) examined the cross-sectional variation in gearing
among 433 non-financial UK firms. They considered six measures of financial
gearing based on total, long-term and short-term debt, and both market and book
firm values. To explain cross-sectional differences in gearing they used variables
attributed to various capital structure theories. They performed multiple regression
analysis with the gearing measures as the dependent variables, and measures of
profitability, size, asset structure, non-debt tax shields, variability of earnings,
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growth and industry classification as independent variables. They found industry
classification to be significant based on an increase in the explanatory power of
regression models when industry dummy variables were included. Firm profitability
and size were found to be significant long-term debt determinants, whereas asset
structure appeared to be significant in relation to short-term debt. The proxy for
non-debt tax shield was found to have a significantly negative relationship with
financial gearing, and variability of earnings to have a significantly positive
relationship. Bennett and Donnelly concluded that the relationship found between
financial gearing and firm size, asset structure and non-debt tax shields supported
the balancing theory of optimal capital structure, although the relationship between
financial gearing and variability of earnings was contrary to the financial distress
potential of debt.
Lasfer (1995) concentrated on the impact of corporation tax and agency costs on the
capital structure of 88 UK industrial and commercial firms over the period 1972 to
1983. He used two measures of financial gearing, which he suggested captured both
short run and long run capital structure determinants. However, the measures both
employed long-term debt, with the market value of equity to capture short run
determinants and book value of equity to capture long run determinants. He
employed several independent variables derived from the tax hypothesis or agency
theory of debt. Multiple regression analysis was used to investigate the relationships
between financial gearing and alternative tax variables independently, as well as
alternative measures of investment opportunities. Lasfer suggested that agency costs
are the major determinants of capital structure on the basis of finding a negative
relationship between investment opportunities and financial gearing. In addition, he
noted the importance of agency benefits to debt. He suggested the importance of
debt in mitigating free cash flow problems on the basis of observing firms with high
cash flow and low investment opportunities to use more debt than firms with low
cash flow and high investment opportunities.
Lasfer's findings suggest that ëorporate taxes do not appear to have a major impact
on determining capital structure. The relationship between effective corporation tax
rate and financial gearing was found to be insignificant. Also, the relationship
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between a tax exhaustion dummy variable and financial gearing was found to be
either positive or negative depending on the definition of financial gearing used.
Adedeji (1998) investigated the relationship between dividend payout, financial
gearing and investment opportunities for 224 UK firms over the period 1993 to
1996, in accordance with the predictions of the pecking order hypothesis of capital
structure. In addition to testing if financial gearing is a function of dividend payout
and investment opportunities as well as other factors, Adedeji also tested if dividend
payout is a function of financial leverage and investment, and if investment is a
function of dividend payout and financial leverage. Multiple regression analysis was
used with financial gearing, dividend payout and investment as dependent variables.
Adedeji used measures of profitability, size, asset structure, variability of earnings,
non-debt tax shields, research and development to control for differences in gearing,
investment and dividend payout across firms. In line with the pecking order
predictions, Adedeji found a positive relationship between financial gearing and
dividend payout and a negative relationship between financial gearing and
profitability. These findings mirrored those of a previous study conducted by Allen
(1993) in an Australian context. Adedeji found the relationship between profitability
and dividend payout to be insignificant. Thus his findings infer that debt might be
relied on to sustain dividend payout, rather than used to meet short falls in internal
funds.
Adedeji also found a negative relationship between dividend payout and investment.
However, the relationship between financial gearing and investment was
insignificant. Previous researchers have found a negative relationship between
investment opportunities, measured by market to book values, and financial gearing.
This is expected in relation to agency theory of debt. Adedeji's investment
opportunity measure of average change tn total assets is in line with growth
measures employed by previous researchers. Therefore, the use of the term
investment opportunities by Adedeji, in the context of previous research is
somewhat confusing. However, his findings in terms of financial gearing and
growth are not inconsistent with previous research.
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Jordon, Lowe and Taylor (1998) investigated both financial and strategic
determinants of capital structure in smalllmedium sized firms. They used a
questioimaire to obtain information concerning the corporate and competitive
strategies of firms, which they used in conjunction with financial statement data
obtained from the FAME database. Multiple regression analysis, using alternative
measures of financial gearing, was employed for 219 private and independent firms
with turnover between Lim and LiOm over the period 1989 to 1993. The purpose of
their analysis was to determine whether firm strategy provided any additional
explanatory power given the best financial model of capital structure. In contrast to
other studies, multiple regression analysis was performed by omitting blocks of
variables representing corporate strategy, competitive strategy and pecking order
implications in order to assess the impact on explanatory power. Extensive
diagnostic testing was also undertaken in order to establish the robustness of results.
The relationship between corporate strategy, on the basis of the degree of
diversification adopted by firms and capital structure was found to be insignificant.
However, Jordon et a!. noted that this is hardly surprising in the context of small
firms owing to a fairly limited spread of assets and activities. The relationship
between competitive strategy and capital structure was found to be significant.
Innovation strategies appear to be negatively related to debt, compared to a positive
relationship between capital structure and both cost leadership and differentiation
strategies. Jordon et al. concluded that in small firms this is more likely to reflect a
reluctance to lend rather than a reluctance to borrow.
Jordon et al. used three variables to test the pecking order theory of capital structure.
They found a positive relationship between debt and a dummy variable recording
whether access to finance is important for firm performance. They, thus, concluded
that retained earnings, the first preference in the pecking order, were unlikely to be
sufficient. Howev&r, firms adopting high optimal debt levels under the trade-off
theory might also place importance on access to finance. They may require access in
order to increase debt levels as the costs and benefits of debt change over time. A
positive relationship was found between debt and a dummy variable indicating
whether access to finance has been a problem for a firm. Jordon et al. concluded that
this suggests that firms have reached debt levels that outsiders deem to be the
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prudent limit. The implication being that, firms will take on debt until the source is
exhausted in line with the pecking order theory of capital structure. However, access
problems to finance arise from lenders' perceptions of personal detriment if further
debt is advanced. A firm could equally perceive the benefits of additional debt
finance to outweigh the costs, in the process of optimising capital structure.
Jordon et al. claim to further substantiate the pecking order theory on the basis of a
negative relationship between debt and the ratio of non-executive to executive
directors. They suggest that, in small firms, non-executive directors are appointed in
order to bring in extra equity capital. However, this can only really be substantiated
by an analysis of the actual share-holdings of non-executive directors. The number
of non-executive directors could equally be capturing some other firm characteristic.
The positive relationship found between financial gearing and variability of
earnings, and the negative relationship found between financial gearing and
effective tax rate are not consistent with the static trade-off theory of capital
structure.
Bevan and Danbolt (2002) analysed the determinants of capital structure for a
sample of 822 UK companies using a variety of book value and market value
measures of gearing. They focused on the difficulties involved in measuring gearing
and tested the sensitivity of Rajan and Zingales' UK results to variations in gearing
measures. Bevan and Danbolt used measures of size, profitability, asset tangibility
and investment opportunities as independent variables. In addition, total debt was
decomposed onto long and short-term and various sub-elements. Although similar
results were obtained in comparison to Rajan and Zingales , Bevan and Danbolt also
found results to be model specific. For example, when total debt in the gearing
measure was adjusted for trade credit and equivalent, a significant negative
relationship with asset tangibility was found. This contrasted the positive
relationship found with other gearing measures. Although a positive relationship
was found between size and total debt, size appeared to be significantly negatively
correlated with short-term bank borrowing. Bevan and Danbolt thus concluded that
a full understanding of capital structure required a detailed analysis of all forms of
debt
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Ozkan (2001) focused on the dynamics of capital structure and the nature of
adjustments to targets. He adopted a dynamic model with the use of panel data for
390 non-financial and non-utility UK firms over the period 1984 to 1996. The
generalised method of moments (GMM) estimation process was used to control for
firm specific effects. Ozkan found firms to exhibit long-term target ratios. Any
adjustments to target appeared to occur relatively quickly, implying that the cost of
being away from target and costs of adjustment were of equal importance to firms.
Ozkan also found profitability, liquidity, investment opportunities and non-debt tax
shield to be negatively related to debt.
Summaiy
The relationships between financial gearing and other characteristics of firms in the
US, UK and elsewhere are summarised below. The summary is based on the
predominant relationships observed, i.e. the relationships found by the majority of
studies. The approach is similar to 'vote-counting' methods (Light and Smith,
1971) which have been previously used to quantify the research findings of several
similar studies. In 'vote-counting', previous research was analysed by categorising
each study's results into positive significant, non-significant and negative
significant categories. Conclusions were based on resulting tallies. Vote-counting is
no longer recommended because of poor statistical properties associated with its use
(Wolf, 1986). The approach used to summarise previous findings in the present
study differs in that relationships are only classed as positive, negative or
insignificant when it clearly appears to be the case. A question mark is used to
denote the situation when several studies have produced conflicting results and thus
the relationship remains unclear. Although, the findings of previous studies could be
analysed using a formal process of meta-analysis, in which the sample size,
explanatory power, etc. of each study is taken into account, it is outwith the scope of
this thesis.
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Relationships between financial gearing and other firm characteristics:
Firm Characteristic	 US Studies	 International	 UK Studies
Studies
Size	 POS	 ?	 ?
Variability of earnings
	 ?	 ?	 POS
Industry	 SIG	 SIG	 SIG
Asset structure	 ?	 POS	 POS
Agency problems! Uniqueness
	 NEG	 NEG	 MEG
Non-debt tax shield	 POS	 INSIG	 NEG
Profitability	 NEG	 NEG	 NEG
Marginal tax rate
	 ?	 ?
Dividend payout	 POS	 POS
Growth	 ?	 POS	 INSIG
Investment opportunities	 NEG	 NEG	 NEG
CEO / Management Ownership 	 POS	 INSIG
Multi-nationality	 POS
Availability of cash flow	 POS
Probability of default •
	INSIG
Market assessment of firm risk
	 POS
Liquidity	 MEG
Corporate strategy	 INSIG
Competitive strategy	 SIG
Firm size appears to have a positive impact on debt levels in US firms but the
relationship from International and UK studies is less clear. On balance, the
relationship between variability of earnings and debt levels is somewhat mixed. The
industry in which a.firm operates appears t6 be influential. Firms investing in large
proportions of research and development (measuring agency problems/uniqueness)
appear to have lower debt levels, as do highly profitable firms. If investment in
research and development represents the opportunity to invest in risky projects then
this is consistent with the agency costs of debt.
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A negative relationship between profitability and the use of debt is consistent with
the pecking order preference for the use of internal funds. However, it is not
necessarily indicative that the tax benefits of debt are unimportant. A highly
profitable firm could obtain little benefit from interest tax shields in the presence of
high levels of non-debt tax shields. Conversely, a firm with low levels of non-debt
tax shields could benefit from interest tax shields even though it was not highly
profitable. In the UK, the relationship between debt and non-debt tax shields
appears to be negative. In contrast, US firms with high levels of non-debt tax shields
appear to also exhibit high levels of gearing. However, high levels of non-debt tax
shields represent high levels of investment in qualifying fixed assets and/or previous
tax losses. If a firm has previous tax losses, internal profits are unlikely to provide
sufficient finance. Also, in the pecking order theory, investment dictates the
requirement for external finance. Thus the positive relationship between non-debt
tax shields and debt could equally illustrate the pecking order theory rather than
refute the importance of the interest tax shield benefit to debt. However, the
importance of tax benefits is not widely established. Although in the US, Graham et
a!. combined profitability and non-debt tax shields in a measure of marginal tax rate
and found a positive relationship with debt, Mebran et al. found a negative
relationship using the same measure. Jordan et a!. also found a negative relationship
between the effective tax rate facing UK small firms and their levels of debt.
The level of debt appears to be positively related to dividend payout, another
pecking order prediction. In the US, CEO ownership appears to be positively related
to debt levels, as does firm multi-nationality. In the UK, the availability of free cash
flow appears to be positively related to debt. This appears to be more consistent
with the agency benefit to debt and a low financial distress potential, rather than the
pecking order preference for internal funds. There is evidence to suggest a link
between the competitive strategy and capital structure adopted by smalllmedium
sized UK firms. Firms adopting product innovation or uniqueness strategies appear
to employ less debt than firms adopting cost leadership or differentiation strategies.
In summary, the existence of relationships between certain firm characteristics and
financial gearing is evident from previous cross-sectiènal studies. However, in
certain instances, findings appear to be conflicting and there is difficulty in
81
interpreting precisely the relationship that explanatory variables are capturing.
Moreover, it appears almost impossible to capture all possible relationships in one
model, resulting in the undertaking of so many studies with a slightly different
focus. Relationships are likely to exist between the various firm characteristics
employed as explanatory variables. The absence of rigorous diagnostic testing in the
majority of studies could, therefore be a serious cause for concern. A thorough
analysis of the relationships between firm characteristics themselves, outwith
financial gearing, might provide the most appropriate set of independent variables to
include in a regression model to determine capital structure.
3.3.2 The process of how firm's determine their levels of debt and equity
Fama and French (1999) investigated the static trade-off versus the pecking order
predictions for determining capital structure. They used cross-sectional regression
models to determine how long-term gearing and dividend payout vary with the
profitability, investment opportunities and earnings volatility across US firms. They
were concerned as to whether gearing reverts to an average measure and whether
dividends and/or debt are used to absorb short-term variation in earnings and
investment. Their analysis involved year by year cross-sectional regression over the
period 1965 to 1997 for a large sample (approximately 1549 per regression) of US
firms. Average slopes were used to draw inferences. With reference to the pecking
order predictions, profitable firms were found to have higher dividend payout, and
firms with more investment opportunities to have lower payout. However, Fama
and French failed to establish a relationship between gearing and investment. When
investment opportunities were controlled for, profitable firms were found to exhibit
lower debt levels. However, this is not conclusive evidence of what Fama and
French claim is a failure of the static trade-off predictions. The existence of a static
trade-off, is however, questioned in light of inconclusive evidence as to whether
gearing is mean reverting.
Fama and French concluded that capital structure is determined by the pecking
order in dividend paying firms. They note that new equity issues are trivial for
dividend payers and there is little evidence to suggest that dividends vary to
accommodate short- term variation in investment. They suggest that debt appears to
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be the residual variable in financing decisions. However, in non-dividend paying
firms more investments are financed with new equity issues, and debt is used to
absorb short-term variation in earnings and investment.
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) also viewed the pecking order and static trade-off
as contending theories of capital structure. They constructed individual regression
models based on the two alternative theories. In the pecking order, a firm is
expected to issue debt when internal funds are insufficient for investment and
maintaining dividend payout. On this basis, Shyam-Sunder and Myers proposed that
deviations in the use of debt over time should be related to a deficit in the flow of
firm funds. They derived this deficit from a comparison of outflows on dividend
payments, capital expenditure, increase in working capital and repayment of
existing debt, and inflows from operating cash flows after interest and taxes.
In the static trade-off theory, a firm operates at optimal capital structure. Shyam -
Sunder and Myers thus proposed that changes in debt ratios should be explained by
deviations in current debt ratios from targets. They used both historical averages
and estimates according to firm characteristics used in prior cross-sectional capital
structure studies as targets. For a sample of mature US corporations, the pecking
order model was found to provide higher explanatory power. However, the static
trade-off model also performed well when considered independently. Despite
placing greater confidence in the pecking order model, Shyam-Sunder and Myers
acknowledged that it might be less efficient in explaining the decision of a sample
of growth companies investing heavily in intangible assets.
Frank and Goyal (2000) also tested the pecking order theory against the static trade-
off using a broad cross-section of US firms over the period 1980 to 1998. Based on
the ideas of Shyam-Sunder and Myers, Frank and Goyal tested the impact of each of
the individual elements of fund flow deficit on corporate debt. They also considered
whether the information set used to test the pecking order is appropriate, and
whether the omission of other firm characteristics such as asset tangibility, market
to book values, size and profitability is significant.
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In contrast to Shyam-Sunder and Myers, and contrary to the pecking order
predictions, Frank and Goyal found no evidence of corporate debt being determined
by a financing deficit. However, firms were observed to revert to average debt
levels in line with the static trade-off theory. Firms with low gearing were found to
closely maintain it year by year, whereas firms with moderate gearing exhibited
greater variation. When debt matured, it did not appear to be completely replaced
and thus gearing declined. The relationship between dividend policy and debt was
found to be dependent on firm size. Large firms appeared willing to borrow to pay
dividends, whereas small firms appeared to pay dividends while reducing their debt.
Frank and Goyal's final conclusion that a simple observation of pre-existing gearing
explains much more of the variation in gearing than all the financial factors put
together is somewhat worrying. It echo's Miller's suggestion of neutral mutation.
3.3.3 Examination of previous decisions by firms to issue debt or equity
US based studies
In an early study, Taggart (1977) used a generalised least squares procedure to
estimate his model of corporate financing decisions, and found non-financial
corporations to base their decisions to issue debt and equity on the need for
permanent capital and on their long-term debt capacity. Debt issues leading to
excessive debt levels appeared to be counteracted by issues of equity. Taggart's
evidence is frequently quoted in support of the static trade-off theory of capital
structure. However, Taggart also concluded that a firm's capital increased to the
extent it could retain earnings, while any shortfall appeared to be made up through
debt and equity issues. Although equity did not appear to be issued only as a last
resort, the primary use of internal funds is reminiscent of the pecking order theory.
Javiland and Harris (1984) also used a generalised least square procedure to
examine the issues of debt and equity for 108 firms over the period 1966 to 1978.
They found that firms appeared to adjust to long run financial targets, and the speed
with which they adjust appeared to be affected by firm size, interest rate and the
level of share price. The issue of debt seemed to be postponed in favour of short-
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term debt and equity issues when lower long-term interest rates were expected. The
use of equity was more apparent when a firm's share price was high. Javiland and
Harris concluded that target amounts of debt were the driving force in financing
behaviour.
Opler and Titman (1996) examined the determinants of financing choices when
firms made significant changes in their debt and equity levels over the period 1974
to 1993. Their analysis involved two stages. Gearing ratios were regressed on many
of the variables used in previous cross-sectional studies to obtain predicted ratios as
proxies for optimal ratios. Differences between firms' actual and optimal ratios
were then used in a logit analysis to predict when a firm issues debt or equity.
Variables capturing deviations from targets such as past profitability, past share
returns and market to book ratios were also included.
Results indicated that firms appear to move towards target debt ratios when altering
their capital structure. The deviation between optimal and actual debt ratios was
found to be a strong indication of future issues of debt and equity. Firms, which had
been profitable in the past, were found to issue debt, whereas past share returns and
market to book ratios were found to be positively associated with the likelihood of
issuing equity.
Kochhar and Hitt (1998) examined the relationship between strategic diversification
decisions and the characteristics of funds used to finance them, using a three stage
least squares analysis. They considered the private and public issues of debt and
equity for 187 large US traded manufacturing firms over the period 1981 to 1982.
The time period was specifically chosen to avoid the downscoping and downsizing
of firms in later years. Results appeared to suggest that an increase in unrelated
diversification is a positive predictor of debt financing as a proportion of total new
financing, whereas related diversification is a negative predictor. These findings are
in line with the theoretical proposition that an increase in diversification is
accompanied by a decrease in firm specific assets and thus financial distress
potential.
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Diversification by direct entry into another market, as opposed to acquiring a
business in another market, appeared to be financed by private rather than public
funds. However, this is not surprising if it is more difficult to assess the risk
involved in direct entry and private finance provides the opportunity for a better
exchange of information. Kochhar and Hitt concluded that not only does a firm's
diversification strategy influence its capital structure, but capital structures influence
diversification strategy.
Belkaoui (1999) also considered the relationship between capital structure and
diversification strategy. However, rather than analyse debt and equity issues, he
used analysis of covariance to examine adoptions of diversification strategies to
determine whether firms issued debt as a result of adopting a multidivisional form.
His sample comprised 62 firms adopting a diversification strategy within the time
period 1950 to 1978. Firms were classed according to unrelated diversification (16
firms), related diversification (22 firms) and vertical integration (24 firms).
Overall the implication of a diversification strategy appeared to be associated with
an increase in debt. However, in contrast to Kochhar and Hitt's findings, the
increase was only significant for firms employing related diversification. However,
the mean debt ratios of firms adopting unrelated diversification were found to be
significantly higher than vertically integrated and related diversified firms. Belkaoui
concluded that diversification strategy is a determinant of capital structure.
However, his findings appear to partially support Kochhar and Hitt's conclusions.
Firms with higher debt levels appear to undertake unrelated diversification
strategies rather than the other way around.
UK based studies
In the UK, Marsh (1982) examined 748 issues of debt and equity made by firms
over the period 1959 to 1970. A firm's choice of financing instrument was assumed
to be a function of the difference between actual and target debt ratios, and a firm is
likely to issue equity if the actual debt ratio exceeds target. As target debt ratios are
unobservable, measures to determine targets such as historical averages, company
size, and asset composition were used. Marsh used logit analysis to test the
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predictability of his model on a further sample of 110 equity and debt issues
between 1971 and 1974.
Overall findings suggested that the choice between debt and equity is heavily
influenced by market conditions, and the past history of share prices in choosing
between debt and equity. However, the choice appears to be made as if firms had
target levels of debt in mind, when those below targets appeared to issue debt. In
comparison with Javiland and Harris in the US, Marsh also found the issue of equity
to be favoured in response to high share price.
In a later study, Walsh and Ryan (1997) examined the impact of tax and agency
considerations on the decision to issue debt or equity. They identified 339 issues of
debt and equity for Times 1000 firms during the period 1984 to 1991. They used
proxies for agency costs and tax benefits in a binomial choice model, estimated
using a method of maximum likelihood. Findings suggested that both agency and
tax considerations are important. The average effective tax-rate of a firm and the
fixed assets in place increase the probability of a debt issue. Non-debt tax shields
and volatility decrease the probability of a debt issue. However, for a sub-sample of
firms of similar size, agency effects appeared to dominate tax considerations. Walsh
and Ryan's findings suggest that the costs and benefits associated with debt appear
to be considered when issuing new finance.
Summary
In summary, there is evidence to suggest that firms in both the UK and US operate
with target debt ratios. In addition, firms do not appear to be deterred from issuing
equity when market conditions are favourable. In the UK, there is some evidence to
suggest that the agency costs and tax benefits to debt are given consideration in the
decision to issue new finance. These findings are more in line with the static trade-
off theory of capital structure and refute the pecking order prediction that equity is
only issued as a last resort.
Diversification strategy and the issue of debt also appear to be interrelated for US
firms, with unrelated diversification being associated with higher debt levels.
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3.4: Summary: Capital structure theory and evidence
The theory and empirical evidence in relation to the various benefits and costs of
issuing debt is summarised in Table 3.13. There appears to be a mixture of both
supporting and contradictory evidence in relation to the suggested outcomes of
issuing debt. Previous survey evidence appears to totally contradict the importance
of financial distress costs and agency costs and benefits to debt, whereas the
evidence from previous accounting data based studies appears in support. However,
there is evidence, from studies adopting both methods, to suggest that a degree of
importance is placed on the interest tax shield benefit, asymmetrical information
benefit and corporate control benefit to issuing debt. The theory and evidence in
relation to certain strategic environments enhancing or reducing the benefits/costs of
debt is summarised in Table 3.14. The evidence in support of the influences of
competitive strategy, growthlexpansion strategy, management/control strategy and
investment location, is the product of accounting data based studies. Finally, the
theory and evidence in relation to the process of how firms determine their debt
ratios, the static trade-off theory versus the pecking order theory, is summarised in
Table 3.15. There is supporting evidence, from studies adopting both methods, for
both the static trade-off theory and the pecking order theory of capital structure.
On balance the process of determining capital structure appears to be a grey area,
rather than a straight black or white choice between two alternative theories. There
is little evidence to suggest debt ratios are purely the product of a trade-off between
the costs and benefits of debt, or purely represent the requirement for external
finance to meet dividend payout and investment opportunities. In reality, capital
structure appears to arise from a combination of both. A firm's requirement for debt
appears to be influenced by its profitability, dividend payout and capital
expenditure. Profitable firms appear to acquire less debt inferring their preference
for using internal funds, and changes in debt over time appear to relate to shortfalls
in funds. However, firms do not appear to issue equity only as a last resort. They
appear to operate with, at the very least, loose target amounts of debt; and these
targets appear internally rather than externally constrained. A degree of importance
appears to be attached to the interest tax shield of debt, although the direct costs of
financial distress, namely bankruptcy, appear less of a concern. However, firms
appear to have some awareness of their financial distress potential. Strategic
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environments categorise firms with similar characteristics. Innovative firms appear
to employ less debt and unrelated diversified firms appear to employ more debt in
response to their respective financial distress potential. Although there is some
empirical support for the importance of agency benefits/costs to debt, it arises from
accounting data based studies. In the absence of any survey-based evidence, the
variables used to proxy agency costs and benefits in these studies might equally be
capturing some other relationship.
In short, perhaps Myers (1984) suggestion of a modified pecking order is more
realistic? Firms prefer to use internal funds followed by debt. However, the
asymmetrical information argument to using debt is not the only consideration.
Other benefits and costs enter the equation, and there comes a point when the cost
of increasing the proportion of debt in relation to equity outweighs the benefits.
Hence the observation of target ratios. How and why firms decide where this point
is appears to remain somewhat of a mystery. In addition, target ratios may not
necessarily represent the optimal benefit from using debt if firms retain an ability to
borrow more in the event of the unexpected.
Empirical evidence in the UK appears fairly limited. In addition, an element of the
previous evidence obtained in the US, UK and elsewhere could be considered
somewhat outdated in relation to the present business environment. The empirical
evidence that does exist in the UK is almost entirely based on the use of accounting
data. Different studies have focused on certain aspects of capital structure, but their
approach appears to prohibit an investigation of the entire picture. The survey
method extends the scope of such an investigation and provides the opportunity to
establish the relative importance of all theoretical issues. A survey of capital
structure determinants in the UK thus appears an essential and long over due
empirical input to the overall debate.
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3.5 Theoretical reasons for leasing
The use of leasing in the UK grew substantially during the 1970's and early 1980's.
It has been widely proposed that such sustained growth owed itself to an
environment in which tax rules were favourable and specific accounting regulation
in respect of leasing absent. Over time, the tax implications and accounting
regulations have changed. A 25% writing down allowance has replaced the 100%
first year capital allowance, and the introduction of SSAP21 has resulted in the
balance sheet capitalisation of finance leases. Despite this, leasing has remained
popular, suggesting that continuing benefits must be derived from its use. Several
authors5 have considered reasons why leasing may be considered preferable to
financing purchase by non-leasing debt alternatives. These reasons can be grouped
into foir categories: tax savings; borrowing capacity; conflicts of interest and
repayment; risk sharing and other financialltransactional reasons.
3.5.1 Tax savings
In a lease agreement, legal ownership and the right to claim capital tax allowances
remains with the lessor. If the lessor can make better use of capital tax allowances
than the lessee, then potential lessees may be enticed with the offer of lower rental
payments (Smith and Wakeman, 1985; Schallheim, 1994; Belkaoui, 1998; Day,
2000). This benefit is only applicable if the leased asset is qualifying plant and
machinery, and if the lessee has insufficient use for capital allowances (i.e. low
levels of taxable profits, losses carried forward or high levels of other tax shields).
Even if potential lessees can themselves utilise capital allowances, Drury and
Braund (1990) suggested that both parties could still benefit from leasing. Timing
differences in accounting year ends could enable the lessor to make use of tax
allowances earlier than lessee, or the lessor might be able to borrow at a lower rate
than the lessee. However, any benefit derived from capital allowances was curtailed
by the 1997 Finance Act. New rules were introduced resulting in capital expenditure
in respect of finance leases being time apportioned in the first year. The writing
down allowance was also reduced to 6% in respect of long-life (25 year) capital
expenditure.
5,Smith and Wakeman (1985); Schaitheim (1994); Belkaoui (1998) and Day (2000)
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Any benefits from the transfer of capital allowances to the lessor are reduced if the
lessor obtains less benefit from capital allowances than the lessee. New tax rules
have been introduced increasing the benefits to small-medium sized companies.
Qualifying capital expenditure by these companies now receives a 50% written
down allowance in the first year with 12% for long-life assets.
Leasing can provide the opportunity to bring any tax savings forward. At the outset,
the lease rental payment or interest plus depreciation of the asset can exceed the
interest payment on borrowing plus the writing down capital allowance. This is true
in respect of capitalised finance leases for qualifying assets with a useful life of four
years or less. When assets are depreciated over periods of longer than six years,
writing down capital allowances will exceed depreciation in the first few years. Tax
savings on behalf of the lessee may still arise even though an asset does not qualify
for capital allowances because lease rentals paid are tax deductible. Although the
increased cost of lease rentals, imposed to compensate the lessor for the absence of
capital allowances, may reduce the tax savings, leasing can still potentially be
beneficial. This is especially true if the lessee makes rental payments in respect of
commercial buildings/offices and if the lessor is of non-tax paying status.
3.5.2 Borrowing capacity, conflicts of interest and repayment reasons
The theoretical relationship between lease and debt finance, and thus the impact of
leasing on debt capacity is discussed in section 3.9 of this chapter. However, it is
suggested (Schaliheim, 1994; Day, 2000) that leasing might be used to extend a
fin-n's capacity for borrowing if managers perceive that leasing obligations consume
less or even no debt capacity compared to non-leasing debt alternatives. Further, it
is suggested that lease agreements contain less restrictive covenants and thus have
less impact on obtaining future finance (Smith and Wakeman, 1985; Schallheim,
1994; Day, 2000).
Restrictive covenants are used to mitigate conflicts of interest between debt holders
and shareholders, and may restrict investment in riskier projects, designed to
potentially benefit shareholders. Leasing, being a high priority claim is said to limit
the risk and consequently may reduce under-investment (Stulz and Johnson, 1985).
96
Therefore, firms with growth/investment opportunities are more likely to employ
leasing (Barclay and Smith, 1995).
Smith and Wakeman (1985) suggested that conflicts of interest between lessee and
lessor are more likely to arise if assets are firm specific. The lessor attempts to
capitalise on the fact that these assets are critical and alternatives are not easily
available. Thus firms with specific/specialised assets are likely to be deterred from
leasing.
Leasing can be arranged for any size of operations. It is equally available for
individual assets, smaller scale operations and larger scale acquisitions; whereas
medium/long-term debt is usually arranged on a large scale (Schallheim, 1994;
Belkaoui, 1998). Leasing might be classed as revenue expenditure and thus has the
potential to avoid the formal sanctioning process applicable to capital expenditure
(Schaliheim, 1994; Day, 2000). However, this is likely to be limited to assets
financed under operating lease agreements.
Leasing may be favourable to other forms of borrowing in terms of cash flow
considerations. It provides 100% finance for an asset with a limited deposit of a
rental payment in advance. Lease agreements are flexible, incorporating features
such as balloon rentals to enable repayment to accommodate fluctuations in cash
flows (Schallheim, 1994; Day, 2000). However, in today's competitive financial
environment, this kind of flexibility may also be incorporated into other non-leasing
forms of finance.
3.5.3 Risk sharing reasons
Operating leases are said to reduce the risk of obsolescence and provide the
flexibility to obtain modern or upgraded equipment (Smith and Wakeman, 1985;
Schaliheim, 1994; Belkaoui, 1998; Day, 2000). This is beneficial for firms whose
assets are continually changing with technology. If lessors have a diversified
portfolio, then the cost of obsolescence can be borne more cheaply, reflected in the
cost of rental payments. However, if assets are highly specialised then the lessor is
unlikely to be able to bear the cost of obsolescence any more cheaply than the
lessee.
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Lessors may be in a better position to acquire standardised assets, which they supply
to numerous lessees, through bulk purchase (Smith and Wakeman, 1985;
Schaliheim, 1994; Day, 2000). This could be beneficial to small firms who suffer
from diseconomies of scale. However, large firms may themselves be in a better
position to acquire purchase discounts, and the introduction of the lessor, a third
party between the buyer and seller may actually result in a higher purchase price.
This may not necessarily deter large firms from leasing if they can achieve the 'best
of both worlds' through sale and lease back arrangements. Lessors may have easier
access/more opportunity to dispose of equipment at the end of a lease agreement,
which could be reflected in lower rental costs, or benefit lessees if they participate
in disposal proceeds. This could be important in relation to standardised assets,
generally required for less than their economic lives.
Leasing eliminates the risk of significant costs of transferring ownership. This is
beneficial in relation to the transfer of ownership of assets such as property, when
the legal fees and taxes are significant.
3.5.4 Other financial/transactional reasons
Despite the introduction of SSAP21 requiring finance lease capitalisation, leasing
could still be favoured for its 'off balance sheet' nature. Operating lease rentals
remain expensed in the profit and loss account, with neither the leased asset nor
liability appearing on the balance sheet. SSAP21 is said to provide the opportunity
for lease agreements to be classified as operating leases, and managers appear
unwilling to disclose methods used in lease classification (Loveday, 1994). Tweedie
and Whittington (1990, p.88) noted, when considering current problems in financial
reporting, that there are companies 'whose effective asset base and liabilities are not
wholly on the balance sheet as a result of the extensive use of leasing and the
arbitrary nature of the leasing standards rules'.
If managers benefit from compensation schemes or bonus linked to balance sheet
ratios, then operating leases may be used to increase return on investment using
operating leased assets without increasing investment (Smith and Wakeman, 1985).
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If managers are also shareholders, they may perceive operating leases to have a less
adverse effect on firm value as the market does not fully anticipate the balance sheet
impact of operating leases.
It is suggested that the application process for lease finance is easier than with other
sources of finance, and carries minimum paper work (Day, 2000). Also, leasing is
conveniently offered at points of sale. The overall cost of an asset may be reduced if
a manufacturer offers advantageous lease terms. It is also suggested that leasing can
provide an economical means of obtaining excellent servicing and maintenance of
equipment (Belkaoui, 1998).
3.5.5 Summary
The various reasons for leasing are summarised in Figure 3.3. It is apparent that the
use of leasing may not only be determined in terms of cost, but also for more
practical reasons. Although tax savings and 'off-balance sheet' benefits to leasing
have eroded over time, they are still suggested as playing a part in the decision.
Many of the benefits/costs of issuing debt, identified in section 3.1, are equally
applicable to leasing. However, the benefits identified in this section suggest why
leasing might be considered preferable to non-leasing debt alternatives. These
additional benefits to leasing along with characteristics/environments enhancing or
mitigating these benefits, are summarised in Table 3.16. A firm with high and low
levels of leasing might be expected to exhibit the characteristics listed respectively.
Although many firm characteristics promote either high or low levels of both
leasing and non-leasing debt, there are certain areas of conflict. Firms with high
marginal tax rates are expected to have high levels of debt (interest tax shield
benefit, Table 3.1). However, firms with high marginal tax rates can benefit from
using their own capital tax allowances, and have less incentive to lease. Firms with
management compensation schemes are expected to exhibit low levels of debt, as
the requirement of debt to reduce conflict of interest between shareholders and
managers in maximising firm value is minimised (Table 3.1). However, firms in
which management benefits from compensation schemes/bonus linked to returns on
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Table 3.16: Characteristics/environments promoting high/low levels of leasing
Theoretical basis	 Benefit/cost of	 Characteristic/Environment Promoting:
	
leasingto
	 __________________________ ____________________________
shareholders
and/or managers	 High levels of leasing	 Low levels of leasing
Tax savings:	 Benefit
Transfer of capital allowances in exchange 	 *Qualifying plant & machinery 	 *Nonqualifying asset
for lower rentals 	 *Lessee has insufficient use for	 *Lessee makes better use of
capital allowances	 capital allowances - small!
*Operating lease expenditure	 medium sized firms
(not time apportioned) 	 *thng life capital expenditure
Opportunities to bring tax savings forward 	 Useful life<= 4 years	 Useful life>6 years
Lease rental tax deductible	 *Nonqualifying assets
*Non.tax paying lessor
Impact on debt capacity:	 Benefit
Leasing perceived as having less impact 	 Firms near their capacity for 	 Firms with low levels of debt
on debt capacity than non-leasing	 debt
alternatives - ability to extend debt capacity
Less restrictive covenants:	 Benefit
Leasing mitigates under investment	 Firms with high growth! 	 Mature firms with little growth
investment opportunities	 /investment opportunities
Agency costs
	 Cost
Conflicts between lessor and lessee	 Standardised/readily available 	 Specialised/ firm specific assets
_______________________________________________________ ____________________ assets
Any scale of operations: 	 Benefit
Leasing available for any scale of assets,	 Small scale operations,	 Large scale operations
medium-long term debt usually on a large 	 individual assets
scale
Avoidance of capital expenditure application 	 Benefit
process:
Operating leased assets classed as revenue	 Firms with strict & lengthy	 Firms in which capital expenditure
expenditure	 capital expenditure application 	 application poses no problem
_______________________________________________ __________________ process 	 ___________________________________
Cash flow considerations:
100% finance with limited deposit of advance	 Benefit	 Limited cash flow	 Abundant cash flow
rent
Flexible repayment features	 Seasonal fluctuations in cash
	
Constant/steady stream of cash
_______________________________________	 flow	 flow
Off- balance sheet financing:
Operating leases used to increase ROT 	 Benefit	 Managers benefiting from
without increasing investment	 compensation schemes or bonus
linked to ROT
Risk sharing:
Operating leases reduce risk of obsolescence, 	 Benefit	 Firm assets constantly changing 	 Assets on which technology has
and provide flexibility to obtain modern or
	 with technology	 limited impact
upgraded equipment
Lessor has the ability to bear costs of 	 Firms with standardised assets	 Firms with specialised assets
obsolescence cheaper than lessee, reflected
in lower rental costs
Lessors ability to acquire standardised assets
	 Small firms - suffer from dis- 	 Large firms - better position to
through bulk purchase	 economies of scale	 negotiate
Lessors ability to dispose of leased assets at
end of useful economic life
Leasing eliminates the risk of significant 	 Leased property where legal
costs of transferring ownership	 fees and taxes are significant 	 _______________________________
Convenience:
Leasing has an easier application process, 	 Benefit	 Situations when finance required
minimum paper work	 instantly
Lease finance offered at point of sale
Economical means of obtaining servicing 	 Assets requiring servicing and	 Firms capable of servicing and
and maintenance	 maintenance	 maintaining themselves
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investment are expected to exhibit high levels of 'off-balance sheet' operating
leases.
Firms with abundant cash flows are expected to exhibit high levels of debt due to a
lower financial distress potential and lower agency costs in terms of restrictive
covenants (Table 3.1). However, firms with abundant cash flows have less
requirement for the 100% finance or flexible repayment features of leasing. Owing
to the greater restrictive covenants imposed in debt contracts, growth firms or firms
with extensive investment opportunities are likely to exhibit low levels of debt and
high levels of leasing. Firms with limited investment opportunities are also likely to
exhibit lower debt levels in accordance with the pecking order theory (Table 3.1).
Firm Characteristics promoting conflicting levels of both leasing and non-leasing
debt
Levels of Non-Leasing
Firm Characteristic 	 Levels of Leasing	
Debt
High marginal tax rate	 Low Levels: Own use of 	 High Levels: Benefit
capital allowances	 from interest tax shield
Management compensation High Levels of 'off- 	 Low Levels: Minimum
schemes linked to balance	 balance sheet' operating	 agency problems
sheet ratios	 leases	 between shareholders
and managers
Abundant cash flows	 Low Levels: Less 	 High Levels: Low
requirement for finance or financial distress
flexible repayment	 potential
High growth or investment High Levels: Less 	 Low Levels: Greater
opportunities	 restrictive covenants	 restrictive covenants
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Reasons for leasing: Prior evidence
Prior researchers have investigated the use of leasing using two alternative
approaches. The intentions/perceptions of corporate managers in leasing decisions
have been investigated by survey, and accounting/company data has been used in
order to observe leasing choices.
3.6 Leasing survey-based prior research
The majority of research adopting a survey approach is UK based, and then
conducted before the introduction of SSAP21 and prior to the current tax status.
UK surveys prior to SSAP21 and tax changes
Fawthrop and Terry (1975) investigated how UK corporate financial managers
perceived and used leasing in a questionnaire based survey. The timing
approximately coincided with growth in the use of leasing in the UK. Responses
were obtained for 54 major corporations, and were explored during subsequent
interviews. A summary of the questions asked in relation to leasing, and the
responses provided is shown in Table 3.17.
A significant use of leasing was evident amongst respondents, with plant and
machinery being the most common type of asset leased. However, as Fawthrop and
Terry failed to report how many of the 54 corporations didn't use leasing, it is
difficult to establish the extent to which respondents leased only certain types or all
types of asset.
On balance, leasing was considered more expensive. Fawthrop and Terry suggested
that 'some company executives still rely on vague perceptions and intuitive guesses
rather than economic analysis'. This suggestion was based on 25 respondents
admitting to intuitively considering leasing to be more expensive. It is unclear
whether Fawthrop and Terry were implying that leasing might not be more
expensive or that respondents should adopt an analytical approach. Irrespective, 33
respondents considered leasing to be more expensive on the basis of detailed
comparative cost studies. Further, it is unclear how many of the respon&nts who
intuitively consider leasing to be more expensive, went on to perform comparative
cost analysis. Fawthrop and Terry claimed to show that different leasing policies are
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Table 3.17: A summary of the leasing issues explored, questions asked and responses
provided in Fawthrop and Terry's (1975) survey
Issues explored	 Abbreviated question	 Response
Use of lease financing Does your company use, or has it used leasing?	 last 2-3 yr Now Consider
For plant and machinery	 18 firms 32 firms 7 firms
For goods vehicles	 15 firms 15 firms 7 firms
For company cars 	 13 firms 12 firms 10 firms
For any other equipment 	 17 firms 17 firms 10 firms
___________________ Not at all	 9 firms 6 firms 3 firms
Lease-debt	 In thinking about lease/debt ratios, would you include	 YES	 NO
substitutability	 leasing?	 13 firms	 30 firms
Factors determining	 If your company used, uses or will use leasing, do any of the	 Very
the use of leasing	 following factors apply?	 Relevant Relevant Irrelevant
* The need was/is/will be urgent, no other funds being
available, i.e. leasing is 'emergency funding'	 7 firms 4 firms 28 firms
*Leasing is part of a 'planned financing mix' 	 17 firms 12 firms 12 firms
*Leasing is 'spill-over financing, i.e. covers deficiencies or
short falls in planning	 7 firms 6 firms 25 firms
*Leasing is 'off-balance sheet' finance and so:
(a) does not affect borrowing capacity 	 8 firms 15 firms 18 firms
(b) Improves the apparent return on capital employed	 4 firms 14 firms 19 firms
*Because your company has very large capital allowances,
any new equipment would be unable to benefit fully from
the 100% first year relief and so leasing was used as an
____________________ alternative 	 8 firms 5 firms 25 firms
Evaluation of the
	
When evaluating a lease proposal do you make the decision 	 YES	 NO
leasing decision	 upon:
(a) whether the interest rate implicit in the lease repayment
is higher or lower than a specified interest rate 	 21 firms	 4 firms
or
(b) an aggregate of lease repayments, operating costs and
_____________________ revenues generated by the project, clearing a DCF hurdle rate? 	 17 firms	 5 firms
Cost of leasing	 Do you consider leasing to be an expensive form of finance in 	 YES	 NO
relation to other sources?
Intuitively	 25 firms	 6 firms
____________________ By detailed comparative costs	 33 firms	 12 firms
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a product of the financial circumstances facing a company. This is perhaps justified
considering that the relevance of factors in determining the use of leasing was not
universally established.
Sykes (1976) examined the leasing practice in 202 British Institute of Management
member companies. A summary of the evidence obtained is shown in Table 3.18.
The advantages of finance leases, operating leases and hire purchase were
investigated separately. As this research was conducted prior to the introduction of
SSAP21's definitions of finance and operating leases, it is not clear how the
classification was made. This is especially true when 23 companies indicated that
finance leases have the advantage of reducing capital involvement with the
maximum potential loss reduced, as the lease can be terminated prematurely.
Leases, classified as finance leases under SSAP21, can be terminated early, but the
amounts outstanding in respect of capital repayment must be paid regardless,
usually along with a penalty amount of interest.
Leasing and hire purchase did appear to be accepted by a number of companies as
providing additional sources of funds, mainly in terms of cash flow advantages. The
importance of immediate availability of tax allowances when leasing equipment was
not established across all respondents. Sykes found that in many cases this was
because taxable profits were thought to be insufficient to absorb capital allowances
or group relief could be utilised. He also found that large companies (annual
tumover>±1000million) placed more importance on tax allowances.
Tomkins, Lowe and Morgan (1979) investigated the significance of leasing to small
UK firms. They used a system of allocating 100 points over a number of reasons for
leasing to indicate the relative importance. A summary of the evidence obtained is
shown in Table 3.19. Unfortunately, only 1J small companies were found to lease,
in comparison to 167 who gave reasons for not leasing, mainly because of limited
investment opportunities financed from other sources. Of the minority engaged in
leasing, it seemed to be in order to avoid capital outlay, or because no other sources
of finance were available at the time.
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Table 3.18: A summary of the evidence from Sykes 's (1976) survey
Issues explored	 Abbreviated question	 Response
Hire	 Operating Finance
purchase	 leases	 leases
Advantages of leasing Advantages of leasing as a source of funds: 	 (n=193)	 (n=185) (n=175)
*provides source of funds-does not utilise existing working
capital	 67 firms 76 firms 67 firms
*Usually permits 100% financing-full cost of asset can
normally be borrowed, secured only on that asset	 23 firms 37 firms 29 firms
!ss restrictive source of finance-no dilution of equity, no
dependence on solvency	 22 firms 28 firms 22 firms
*Undisclosed source of finance-gearing effectively increased
without disclosure on balance sheet 	 -	 29 firms 23 firms
*Reduced capital involvement-maximum potential loss reduced,
as lease can be terminated prematurely 	 -	 21 firms 23 firms
Budgetary advantages of leasing
*Smoothes cash flow
	
45 firms 48 firms 41 firms
*Hedge against inflation-removes problems of possible
increase in interest rates 	 19 firms 22 firms 17 firms
*Budgetary accuracy	 17 firms 21 firms 22 firms
*Stability..terms independent of market conditions or changes
in government policy	 15 firms 17 firms 15 firms
*Flexibility of contract-may be drawn up to suit the needs of
____________________ the lessee, e.g.repayments timed to suit cash flows 	 -	 30 firms 21 firms
Tax implications	 The importance of immediate availability of tax allowances
when leasing equipment	 (n=193)
*Vitally important	 7%
*Importaflt	 19%
*Undecjded	 9%
*Relatively unimportant	 34%
____________________ *Totally unimportant
	
31%
Table 3.19: A summary of the evidence from Tomkins, Lowe and Morgan 's (1979) survey
Issues explored	 Abbreviated question 	 Response
	Operating Finance	 All
leases	 leases	 leasing
Reasons for leasing	 Reasons why small company lessees are leasing 	 (n=16)	 (n=2)	 (n=17)
*No large capital outlay 	 75.9%	 50%	 7 1.5%
*Asset not on balance sheet 	 2.5%	 2.4%
*savings on administration of assets 	 1.6%	 1.5%
*Stabilised financing arrangements 	 1.6%	 1.5%
*Taxation advantage	 3.1%	 2.9%
_____________________ 'Other (No other source of finance available at the time)	 15.3%	 50%	 20.3%
Reasons for not	 Reasons why some small companies do not lease	 (n= 167)
leasing	 *Did not think of it	 0.7%
*Aware of existence of leasing but no ready information 	 1.5%
*Leasing was too expensive	 26.8%
*JjC bank manager more sympathetic in difficult times	 8.7%
*Other (Limited investment financed from other sources) 	 62.3%
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Hull and Hubbard (1980) investigated the attitudes and decision criteria of 1000
potential lessees in a questionnaire survey, in addition to samples of lessors and
lease-brokers. A response rate of approximately 30% was obtained, and subsequent
interviews were held. A summary of the questions put to potential lessees and
responses provided is shown in Table 3.20.
Hull and Hubbard concluded that non-tax paying reasons for leasing are important.
However, they don't appear to have explicitly investigated the importance of tax,
rather they have associated it with leasing being cheaper than purchase. This is
surprising given their suggestion that the importance of tax should not be
understated. They also appear to believe that the high growth in leasing following
the introduction of 100% first year allowances, when many companies had no
mainstream corporation tax liabilities, was more than just a coincidence.
Hull and Hubbard claimed to identify a gulf between the theory and practice of
lease evaluation, on the basis that only 49% of respondents used discounted cash
flow and many appeared to be using incorrect discount rates. They appeared to
suggest that incorrect lease evaluation subsequently affects leasing use. In addition,
comments from both lessees and lessors suggested that lessees who could evaluate
lessor's returns were in a position to negotiate better lease terms. The use of leasing
to safeguard against obsolescence was not found to be important amongst
respondents. This is not surprising given that the time period, late 1970's, was not
as technologically advanced as the present day. Also, leased assets did not appear to
be constantly updated given that 84% of agreements entered secondary period.
Further, Hull and Hubbard stated that they were only concerned with the use of
finance leases. Although their study is also prior to the introduction of SSAP21,
they defined finance leases to include a 'non-cancellable' primary period of normally
5 years, or 3 years for short-life or high-risk assets, and up to 15 years for long-life
assets. During primary period the lessee is obligated to pay rentals, and at the end
normally receives between 95 to 99% of the disposal proceeds. It is difficult to
identify how finance leases safeguard against obsolescence, when primary period is
non-cancellable and the disposal proceeds may be negligible at the end.
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Table 3.20: A summary of the leasing issues explored, questions asked and responses
provided in Hull and Hubbard's (1980) survey
Issues explored	 Abbreviated question	 Response
___________________ ___________________________________________________ 	
(n_=_300)
Use of leasing	 Have you signed lease agreements in the previous two years? 	 56% Yes
Reasons for leasing	 What are the main reasons for leasing?	 Important	 Marginal
	
factors	 factors
*Conserved cash flow	 54%	 24%
*Cheaper than purchase	 45%	 19%
*Additional form of finance which does not affect other
borrowing sources	 27%	 26%
*Assisted in having a mixed financing strategy 	 22%	 27%
*safeguard against obsolescence	 18%	 19%
*Certainty of fixed payments	 12%	 31%
Evaluating the leasing Which lease evaluation methods are used?
decision	 *Net present value	 30%
*payback	 29%
*thternal rate of return 	 19%
*Accounting rate of return 	 10%
*No formal evaluation	 6%
*Others	 6%
In applying the discounted cash flow technique, what type of
discount rate is used?	 Before tax	 After tax
*Average cost of capital 	 4%	 5%
*Average cost of borrowing	 16%	 17%
*Marginal cost of capital	 0%	 2%
*Marginal cost of borrowing 	 13%	 13%
*Company set borrowing rate 	 13%	 17%
Reasons for not using *Lack of awareness	 1 firm
finance leasing	 *More expensive than alternatives	 59 firms
*Some key executives opposed to leasing 	 15 firms
*Fixed commitment leads to a loss of flexibility 	 6 firms
*Understates assets on balance sheet	 7 firms
*Lack of eligibility for government incentives 	 8 firms
*Incompatible with company's image 	 7 firms
*Qther (specify): Not group policy 	 7 firms
Duration of lease	 How often do lease agreements enter secondary period?	 84%
agreements
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UK surveys after the introduction of SSAP21 and tax changes
Mayes and Nicholas (1988) conducted a postal questionnaire survey of the leasing
behaviour of UK firms of different size. A sample of 1000 small/medium sized
firms was obtained from the South West Economic Planning Region and 85 larger
firms on the National Institute of Economic and Social Research survey panel.
Completed responses were obtained for 406 small/medium sized and 30 larger sized
firms. A summary of the leasing issues explored, questions asked and responses
provided is shown in Table 3.21.
At the time, finance leases appeared to be more predominantly in use compared to
operating leases. Also, the leasing of land and buildings did not appear common
among respondents. However, since Mayes and Nicholas did not explicitly
investigate the leasing of land and buildings, it could only be captured in terms of an
'other' category. Although Mayes and Nicholas identified that many respondents
used leasing as part of a corporate financial strategy, there is no evidence to suggest
the nature of financial strategies or where leasing fits in. Tax advantages did not
appear to be a prime motivation to lease. Rather, avoiding a large capital outlay
appeared to be of most importance to smaller firms. Owing to the fact that only 30
larger firms completed the survey, it is difficult to make comparisons in terms of
firm size. However, Mayes and Nicholas concluded that tax advantages were more
important to larger firms. The evidence appears to suggest that, the loss of 100%
first year capital tax allowances, would make leasing less attractive to a number of
both small and larger firms alike. Leasing did not appear to be used to boost the
degree or timing of investment. Sales aid leasing did not appear widespread, casting
doubt on the suggestion that leasing is conveniently offered at points of sale.
Drury and Braund (1990) used a questionnaire survey to investigate the opinions of
UK financial managers on issues relating to finance leases. They mailed 988 UK
quoted companies and achieved a response rate of 28% (273 completed
questionnaires). A summary of the questions asked and responses provided is shown
in Table 3.22.
The relative cost of leasing along with tax considerations appears to dominate the
leasing decision for large firms. Little importance appeared to be placed on other
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Table 3.21: A summary of the leasing issues explored, questions asked and responses
provided in Mayes and Nicholas 's (1988) survey
Issues explored	 Abbreviated question	 Response
	
SW'	 NIESR2
____________________ ____________________________________________________ (n=406) 	 (n=30)
Use of different types	 Has your company had leased assets:
of leasing	 *In the past financial year	 223	 23
*Five years ago	 211	 25
Types of leasing used:	 1 year 5 year 1 year 5 year
*Finance leasing only
	
112	 120	 9	 10
*Operating leasing only
	
31	 25	 1	 3
*Both	 78	 64	 13	 12
_____________________ *Not specified
	
2	 2 _____________
Nature of assets	 What type of assets are leased? 	 1 year 5 year 1 year 5 year
leased	 *plant and machinery 	 105	 95	 19	 20
*Vehicles
	
140	 117	 11	 13
*Computers	 117	 88	 19	 20
*Office equipment	 108	 101	 7	 5
______________________ *Other
	 10	 4	 3	 3
Company policy	 Your company uses leasing:	 1 year 5 year 1 year 5 year
towards leasing	 *As part of a corporate financial strategy	 130. 101	 19	 18
*Because no alternative was offered by the supplier 	 10	 10	 0	 0
*On an adhoc basis	 87	 98	 3	 6
*Other	 6	 5	 2	 2
(equipment for one large
contract, experiment, tooling,
commercialloperating
_______________________ _____________________________________________________________ considerations) ______________
Reasons for leasing	 What factors does your company take into account when
deciding to lease?	 1 year 5 year 1 year 5 year
*Avoiding large capital outlay	 148	 145	 3	 5
*Expanding debt capacity	 31	 19	 4	 4
*TaJ(
 advantages	 77	 74	 18	 19
*Safeguarding against obsolescence	 51	 35	 7	 8
_________________ *Other
	 26	 19	 4	 3
Reasons for not
	 What factors does your company take into account when
leasing	 deciding not to lease?
*Too expensive compared to other sources of funds 	 37	 2
*Asset did not qualify for capital allowances	 8	 0
*prefer to own assets	 50	 0
*Able to take direct advantage of capital allowances 	 47	 2
____________________ *Other
	 4	 0
Cost of leasing	 Why do you consider leasing to be more expensive than	 Most respondents indicated
alternatives?	 that 'company is in a tax-
paying position with no
shortage of funds' or leasing
costs include lessor's costs
and profits which are not
______________________ _________________________________________________________ included in alternatives
Research survey panel
3Leasing has no impact on quantity of investment because leasing is limited to equipment peripheral to main business,
investment/financing decisions taken separately. Leasing increased investment because capital savings, simpler investment,
cash flow, lack of alternative funds, specific assets acquired (computers), tax advantages reflected in cost, off-balance sheet.
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Table 3.21 continued
How leasing affects	 What is the effect of leasing on the quantity of investment
quantity of investment	 undertaken by your company?
undertaken?	 *vestment increased	 59	 2
*Remajns unaltered 3	200	 24
*Decreased
	
6	 0
______________________ *Not specified
	
3	 ______________
How leasing affects 	 The use of leasing has caused your companys
timing of investments 	 investments to be:
*brought forward
	
56	 2
*remajn unaltered	 202	 24
*delayed
	
2	 0
*not specified	 8	 0
(reasons for being brought
forward included lack of
available funds, cash flow &
taxadvantages) _______________
Use of sales-aid	 Does your company offer sales aid leasing? 	 36 Yes	 6 Yes
leasing by customers	 What method of sales-aid leasing is used?
*'flijough a finance company	 26	 5
*Through a lease broker 	 1	 0
*Thj ough own finance company or division 	 8	 3
*Other	 3	 0
What effect has sales-aid leasing had on customer sales?
*Increased
	
15	 3
*Remains unaltered	 17	 2
*Not specified	 4	 1
What effect has sales-aid leasing had on the timing of
customers decisions to purchase?
*Been brought forward	 13	 1
*Remains unaltered	 18	 4
______________________ *Not specified	 5	 1
The effects of changes What effect has the 1984 budget had on the amount of
in rates of corporation	 leasing undertaken by your company?
tax and capital	 *Increased	 50	 2
allowances announced	 unaltered	 150	 12
in budget	 *Decreased	 58	 11
____________________ *Not Specified
	
10	 1
The future use of	 After March 1986, your company will:
leasing after March	 *Use more operating leases than finance leasing	 43	 5
1986 when capital	 *Use more finance leasing than operating leasing	 59	 2
allowances phased	 *Use other forms of finance instead 	 88	 13
out	 *Not specified	 78	 6
'SW=Companies in the South West Economic Planning Region
2NIESR=Companies on the National Institute of Economic and Social Research survey panel
3Leasing has no impact on quantity of investment because Iea'sing is limited to equipment peripheral to main business,
investment/financing decisions taken separately. Leasing increased investment because capital savings, simpler investment,
cash flow, lack of alternative funds, specific assets acquired (computers), tax advantages reflected in cost, off-balance sheet.
111
Table 3.22: A summary of the leasing issues explored, questions asked and responses
provided in Drury and Braund ' s (1990) survey
Issues explored	 Abbreviated question	 Response
Factors influencing	 How important are the following factors in your company's
leasing decision	 decision to acquire assets by finance lease rather than
purchase (or borrow and purchase)? 	 VI AM Al BAI NI'
*Rate of interest implicit in lease financing compared to
borrowing	 50.6 30.3 11.7 3.9	 3.5
*corporation tax considerations	 38.7 28.3 22.6 5.2	 5.2
*Leasing is easier to arrange from an administrative view than
borrowing	 0.9	 3.5 17.1 18.4 60.1
*L .se finance can be obtained with greater ease and fewer
restrictions than other forms of finance 	 0.4 6.6 22.5 20.7 49.8
*Conservation of working capital	 11 24.2 30 10.6 24.2
*Ability of a lease to offer a complete package including e.g.
servicing agreements 	 0.4 10.1 24 21.8 43.7
*Leasing permits 100% financing - the full cost of the asset is
met	 2.2 12.8 28.6 17.2 39.2
*Leases can be arranged in which the rental payments increase
over the lease period, thus enabling low rentals to be charged
______________________ against profits in the early stages of a projects life 	 0	 8.4 13.9 27.9 49.8
Factors influencing	 Indicate the relative importance of the following factors in the
the decision to use	 decision to finance the acquisition of an asset by a source of
sources of finance other finance other than leasing? 	 VI AM Al BAI NI
than leasing	 *Leasing is more expensive than borrowing 	 51.5 35.3 6.6 3.7 2.9
*Loss of grants/taxation allowances if asset is leased 	 34.5 25.6 19.8 8.8 11.3
*Some key executives opposed to leasing 	 3	 6.3 16.1 23.3 51.3
*Lack of awareness of leasing	 1.3 3.4 16.3 20.2 58.8
*Company does not have legal ownership of asset 	 1.7 7.6 21.5 27 42.2
*Leasing indicates a source of financial weakness 	 1.3 3.4 18.4 24.5 52.4
*Leasing is more difficult to arrange than borrowing 	 1.4 7.2 17.2 22.6 51.6
*'I J(
 variation clauses in lease contracts make other sources
of finance appear more attractive	 4.6 16.7 35.7 16.3 26.7
*Jasing requires advance rentals and so does not provide
___________________ 100% financing	 0.5 4.1 27.4 26 42
Past and estimated 	 Indicate the % of new asset acquisitions financed by leasing
future leasing activity	 for accounting year end: 	 0% 1-25 26-50 5 1-75 76-100
	
1983 42.7 39.9 7.3	 6	 4.1
	
1984 39.5 41.4 8.2	 6.8	 4.1
	
1985 38.7 41	 10.8	 5	 4.5
	1986 44.2 40	 8.8 3.3	 3.7
	
Estimate 1987 41.3 42.7 8.3 5.5	 2.2
_____________________	 Estimate 1988 40.2 43.8 8.2	 5	 2.8
Future use of leasing	 How will the extent of your company's finance leasing change 	 Removal	 SSAP21
arising from removal of as a result: 	 of FYA
FYA and SSAP21	 *Significant decrease	 11.4	 3.1
• *Some decrease	 14	 11.4
*No change	 62	 82.9
*Some increase	 10.9	 2.6
______________________ *Significant increase
	
1.7
'VI=vitally important, AAI=above average importance, AI=average importance, BAI=below average importance,
N1=not important)
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Table 3.22 continued
Loss of 'off-balance	 To what extent do you believe companies would seek to
	 44% of respondents supported
sheet' advantage	 structure new lease contracts in a way which did not require 	 the view that firms would
capitalisation?	 replace finance leases with
_______________________ _____________________________________________________________ operating leases
Tax advantages	 When evaluating finance leases, do you estimate whether or
not you will be paying corporate taxes over the life of the 	 88% responded Yes
_______________________ proposed leases?
Lease evaluation	 Do you consider the leasing decision to be a financing
decision which is taken only after the decision to acquire the 	 86% responded Yes
assethas been made?	 ______________________________
Choice between leasing With which alternative sources of finance is leasing compared
and other finance	 to?
*Bank borrowing	 50%
*Hire purchase	 15%
*Allfon rather than specific debt 	 16%
____________________ *Internal finance
	
19%
Lease evaluation	 *Company compares the present value of the lease with the
present value of borrowing alternatives 	 57%
*Cornpany uses more than one evaluation method 	 10%
*Use Internal rate of return	 23%
*Equivalent loan method
	
15%
*No formal evaluation	 15%
Please indicate the interest rates used to evaluate finance
leases:
*Before tax rate	 22%(tax paying firms used
incorrectly)
*After tax borrowing rate	 5%(non-tax paying firms used
incorrectly)
*WACC	 14%
____________________ *Non
..discounting methods used 	 14%
'VI=vitally important, AAI=above average importance, AI=average importance, BAI=below average importance,
N1=not important)
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qualitative and cash flow considerations. Drury and Braund suggested that larger
firms would be expected to face the same borrowing/procurement costs as lessors.
They thus concluded that the only potential cost advantage arising from a leasing
arrangement would be if the lessor were able to capture tax shields earlier than the
lessee could. However, a more explicit investigation into the
borrowing/procurement costs facing lessees, in comparison to leasing costs, would
have substantiated their argument. Although cost considerations were also dominant
for smaller firms, they also appeared to attach importance to qualitative and cash
flow factors.
Despite the importance placed on corporation tax considerations, a decrease in
leasing in response to the removal of first year allowances was not anticipated by
the majority of respondents. Although 83% of respondents indicated that the
introduction of SSAP21 would have no impact on their company's finance leasing,
44% indicated that they thought finance leases would be replaced by operating
leases to avoid capitalisation. The importance of 'off-balance sheet' financing in the
decision to lease pre and post SSAP21 would have been substantiated by a direct
enquiry as to the importance placed on the 'off-balance sheet' nature of leasing.
However, Drury and Braund' s research was restricted to the use of finance leasing,
which as a result of SSAP21 are recorded on balance sheet, and excluded operating
leases.
US surveys
O'Brien and Nunnally's (1983) survey was mailed to the first 195 Fortune 500
firms. Completed responses were received from 72 firms, equating to a response
rate of approximately 37%. A summary of the questions asked and responses
provided is shown in Table 3.23. Although O'Brien and Nunnally were primarily
concerned with lease evaluation methods, they did touch on the use of leasing and
considerations in the leasing decision.
Findings appeared to suggest that respondents favoured using the cost of debt when
net advantage to leasing analysis was performed. This adds support to the
suggestion that the use of leasing should not be considered independently from the
use of debt. O'Brien and Nunnally's respondents indicated that both tax reasons and
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Table 3.23: A summary of the leasing issues explored, questions asked and responses
provided in O ' Brien and Nunnally 's (1983) survey
Issues explored	 Abbreviated question	 Response
Scale of leasing	 Please indicate your company's total assets and annual leasing 	 Annual lease payments:
payments in relation to	 payments:	 ($000,000)
company size	 Total assets ($000,000):
	
l-.499 .5-.999 1-3 over 3
200-499	 1
500-699
700-1499	 7
____________________ over 1500 	 1	 63
Lease evaluation	 In making leasing decisions, our company (check one)
*Analyses the potential of leasing an asset even if the
purchase of the asset would not be considered profitable 	 18 firms
*AnaJyses a leasing alternative only if the asset would have
been profitable on a purchase basis 	 54 firms
In making leasing decisions, our company (check one)
*performs a net advantage to leasing analysis	 Generally, net advantage to
*Finds the net present value of the project under both leasing
	
leasing. Others include the
and purchase alternatives and then selects the one with the 	 implicit interest cost found in
higher net present value	 internal rate of return fashion.
*Other
If company performs net advantage to leasing, the discount
rate used in our net advantage to lease analysis is (excluding
the one used for salvage value)
*After4ax WACC
*Aftertax cost of debt	 4 firms
*Before..tax cost of debt	 17 firms
_______________________ *Other, please explain
	 1 firm - range of rates
Determinants of	 Please discuss any other considerations in your leasing 	 Investment tax credit
leasing policy	 decision?	 Duration of lease
Treatment of the salvage value
Inflation
Technology forecasting
Rate of obsolescence
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risk sharing reasons in terms of residual values and obsolescence were
considerations in the leasing decision. However, O'Brien and Nunnally's use of an
open ended question to investigate considerations in the leasing decision, failed to
establish the relative importance of these alternative factors.
Mukherjee (1991) also investigated reasons for leasing along with the process of
lease evaluation. A questionnaire forwarded to 386 of the 1989 Fortune 500 was
completed by 103 firms, equating to a response rate of approximately 27%. A
summary of the questions asked and responses provided is shown in Table 3.24.
Mukherjee found that leasing appeared to be used as a source of financing once the
decision to acquire an asset had been made. The majority of respondents who used
leasing were found to use it to finance up to 5% of their total assets. Avoiding the
risk of obsolescence appeared to be the most important advantage to leasing,
followed by a lower cost compared to borrowing. The tax and 'off-balance sheet'
advantages to leasing appeared to be insignificant.
Bathala and Mukherjee (1995) investigated the leasing practices of small US firms
(firms having between $10 and $500 millions in sales). A questionnaire mailed to
862 private and public firms was completed by 104, a response rate of
approximately 12%. The response was thus comparatively low in relation to other
leasing surveys. A summary of the questions asked and responses provided is
shown in Table 3.25. In support of O'Brien and Nunnally's findings, Bathala and
Mukherjee also found the majority of small firms who leased to use it to finance up
to 5% of their total assets. Lease covenants appeared to be less restrictive than those
imposed by other creditors. Small firms appeared to favour leasing for 'off-balance
sheet' advantages, and the provision of 100% financing.
Prior survey evidence is summarised in Table 3.26. On balance the cost of leasing
and tax implications (despite the removal of 100% first year allowances) appear to
be important considerations. However, there is also evidence to suggest that other
qualitative factors are important, especially to smaller firms. These findings are
reflected in Drury and Braund's (1990) study, which is the most recent survey in the
UK to date. However, the financing decisions made in relation to the business
environment in the late 1980's when Drury and Braund's survey was conducted, no
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Table 3.24: A summary of the leasing issues explored, questions asked and responses
provided in Mukherjee's (1991) survey
Issues explored	 Abbreviated question	 Response
Scale of use of leasing	 To what extent is leasing used to acquire assets?
*No lease financing	 19.4%
*Leasing finances 0.1 to 5% of assets	 61.2%
*Leasing finances 5.1 to 10% of assets	 10.7%
_____________________ *Leasing finances over 10% of assets
	 8.7%
Lease evaluation	 How does your company perform the leasing analysis?
*Leasing is viewed as a financing decision
	 88%
*Leasing is viewed as an investment decision	 7%
*Leasing may be viewed as either a financing/investment
decision	 2 firms	 I 83
*Uncertain	 2 firms	 I 83
Under what circumstances would a project that has been
rejected at the capital budgeting stage be accepted based on
the net advantage to leasing (a negative NPV project becomes
worthwhile investment when a favourable lease term is
available only with project)
*No lease analysis is performed
	 49%
*Lease analysis is seldom performed
	 10%
*Lease analysis is performed regularly 	 4%
*No/uncle response
	 7%
Reasons for leasing	 How important are the following advantages to leasing
relative to other financing sources?
*Avoiding the risk of obsolescence	 82%
*Possibility of leasing being cheaper than borrowing
	 57%
*Length of lease period
	 5%
*Tax deductibility of land lease payments 	 5%
*Off_balance sheet financing 	 3 firms
_______________________ *Avoidance of capital expenditure controls
	 2 firms
Future use of leasing	 Do you expect your future lease financing to:
in light of recent tax 	 *Jncrease	 12 firms
changes	 *Decrease	 8 firms
*Remain unchanged	 42 firms
*Not sure
	 16 firms
*No/unclear response
	 5 firms
Tax considerations
seldom motive behind
____________________	 leasing
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Table 3.25: A summary of the leasing issues explored, questions asked and responses
provided in Bathala and Mukherjee's (1995) survey
Issues explored	 Abbreviated question	 Response
(n=104)
Use of leasing to 	 Do companies enter lease agreements? 	 53.8% Yes
finance what types of	 46.2% No
asset	 If so, which items are leased?
*Automobjles
	 33 firms
*plant, equipment and buildings 	 23 firms
*Office equipment and machinery	 41 firms
*Computers
	 25 firms
*Land
	 4 firms
_____________________ Others 	 13 firms
Degree of use and
	
What % of assets are financed by leasing?
types of leasing	 0%	 48 firms
0.lto5%	 4Ofirms
5.1 to 10%	 5 firms
10.01 to 20%	 4 firms
Over 20%	 7 firms
What types of leasing are used?
*Operating/maintenance leases
	 39 firms
*Fjnanc&capjtaj leases
	 33 firms
*Sale and lease back	 7 firms
*Leveraged leases
	 1 firm
_____________________ *Other
	 3 firms
Lease evaluation	 In making a decision to lease:
*We do not perform any type of quantitative analyses
but rely on our judgement and experience	 13 firms
*We do not perform any type of quantitative analyses
because we prefer to lease some types of asset 	 8 firms
*We (or our consultants) do perform some type of
quantitative analysis
	 27 firms
*Investing and lease versus buy decisions are
simultaneously determined	 12 firms
*L.ease versus buy analysis is followed by the
_____________________ investing decisions
	
1 firm
Perceived advantages	 To what extent do you agree with the following
to leasing over	 statements regarding advantages of leasing over
borrowing	 borrowing	 SA/A SDID NAD NS/A1
*Leasing, unlike borrowing, avoids the risk of
obsolescence	 32	 13	 3	 4
*Legal consequences of default are less severe for
leasing	 16	 17	 11	 9
*Generally, lease terms are more favourable	 18	 21	 13
*Frequently equipment can be leased for longer 	 16	 17	 18
*Generafly, lease covenants are less restrictive 	 30	 11	 8	 3
*Tax advantage is the most important reason for
leasing	 14	 23	 11	 3
*Offbalance sheet accounting is an advantage of
leasing	 41	 6	 2	 3
*Leasing provides 100% financing with no down
payment	 35	 6	 7	 3
*Conlract costs are lower for leasing. 	 10	 18	 13	 9
*We prefer to lease because we are subject to
alternative minimum tax	 5	 17	 17	 11
Comparison of debt 	 Please check the type of restrictions that may be placed
and lease finance in	 by your firms creditors and lessors	 By creditors By lessors
terms of the restrictive	 *Restnctjons on future borrowing	 23	 2
covenants faced by
	
*Restiictions on additional leasing	 8	 7
small firms	 *esj-jcion on dividends	 18	 2
on future investments	 13	 1
*Minimum working capital requirement	 20	 5
*Maximum debt to equity ratio 	 26	 3
*Seeking membership on firms board
	 2	 1
______________________ *Requiring more equity contributions 	 2	 2
'SA/A=strongly agree/agree, SD/D=strongly disagree/disagree, NAD-i-neither agree or disagree, NS/A=not sure/applicable
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way relate to the global business environment of today, the beginning of the 21st
century. In addition, Drury and Braund concentrated on the use of finance leases
which according to subsequent research (Marston and Harris, 1988; Beattie et al.,
1998) has paled into insignificance in comparison to the use of operating leases.
Drury and Braund also considered the leasing decision in isolation. As lease and
debt appear to be at least partial substitutes (Marston and Harris, 1988; Beattie et
a!., 2000), a lack of consideration as to how firms decide on their levels of debt
including leasing appears to be a serious shortcoming. Therefore, the survey
investigation of leasing and corporate financing decisions in the present study has
the potential to contribute significantly.
3.7 Leasing: prior research using accounting/company data
The analysis of accounting/company data has been used to identify firm
characteristics that appear to be associated with highllow levels of leasing. Two
approaches have been adopted. Firstly, by comparing the characteristics of leasing
and non-leasing firms, using Univariate, Multivariate and Logit analysis. Secondly,
by examining relationships between the degree of use of leasing and other firm
characteristics using Tobit, OLS and Ordered Logit analysis.
3.7.1 Comparisons of the characteristics of leasing and non-leasing firms
Two studies in the US and one UK study, which compare the characteristics of
leasing and non-leasing firms, have been identified. A summary of the findings is
shown in Table 3.27.
US Studies
Kare and Herbst (1990) tested the hypothesis that highly profitable firms prefer to
use debt to leasing on the basis of cost. They suggested that profitable firms could
obtain debt more cheaply, and that unprofitable firms may not have access to low
cost debt and would thus resort to leasing. Kare and Herbst drew on theoretical
support for the cost of leasing being substantially higher than the cost of debt6.
However, they also suggested that highly profitable firms could make their own use
Long, 1977; Sorenson and Johnson, 1977; Crawford, Harper and McConnell, 1981.
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of tax shelters (i.e. capital tax allowances), whereas less profitable firms may obtain
more benefit from transferring allowances to a lessor.
Analysis of variance was used to make comparisons between 259 non-leasing firms
and 114 leasing firms, on the basis of financial gearing, size and profitability, for
the period 1976 to 1986. The use of leasing was represented by the capitalised value
of finance lease obligations in relation to total assets. When profitability was
measured by earnings before interest and taxes as a proportion of sales, leasing
firms appeared to exhibit lower profitability. However, when earnings as a
proportion of total assets was used, there was no significant difference between
leasing and non-leasing firms.
Kare and Herbst reconciled these conflicting results in terms of the efficiency of
asset utilisation. They concluded that leasing firms are more efficient, i.e. they
employ fewer assets to generate a dollar in sales compared to non-leasing firms,
although no explanation was provided as to why. However, if leasing firms, i.e.
firms engaged in finance leasing, were also engaged in operating leasing, then they
might not be more efficient, but simply employing more assets than recorded on
balance sheet to generate sales. Regardless, the conflicting results found using the
alternative measures of profitability renders the relationship unclear. Further, as
Kare and Herbst suggested that profitable firms opt for cheaper alternatives to
leasing, it would have been useful if they had also examined the relationship
between profitability and non-leasing debt. Kare and Herbst did find financial
gearing to be higher for leasing firms and leasing firms to be of larger size.
Krishnan and Moyer (1994) investigated the role of bankruptcy costs in the
lease/borrow decision. They suggested that leasing is associated with lower
bankruptcy costs compared to non-leasing debt. However, as it is also generally
associated with higher transaction costs, the decision to lease becomes a trade-off
between the two. This trade-off is suggested as an explanation of why borrowing is
preferred by more creditworthy firms and leasing by less creditworthy firms, i.e.
firms that have a greater potential for bankruptcy. Industry classifications were used
as a proxy for lease potential on the basis that bankruptcy potential is related to the
nature of firm assets, which in turn are a product of the industry in which the firm
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operates. Krishnan and Moyer also investigated the suggestion that leasing may be
favoured by growth firms as a result of investment disincentive and asset
substitution problems encountered with debt. Leasing is associated with a specific
asset thus avoiding asset substitution. Growth firms tend to be relatively cash poor
and may also favour leasing for the 100% financing option.
Average data was obtained, from The Disclosure Database and Compustat, for 98
firms reporting capitalised leasing on the balance sheet and 410 firms without, for
the period 1984 to 1986. Both univariate and multivariate analysis were used to
compare the characteristics of leasing and non-leasing firms. Leasing firms were
found to have lower retained earnings, lower interest coverage and higher operating
risk, all of which suggest a higher potential for financial distress. Further, firms in
manufacturing were found to employ less leasing than retailing, transportation and
mining, whose assets, Krishnan and Moyer suggested, are less firm specific.
Leasing firms were also found to have higher growth rates and higher levels of
long-term debt in relation to total assets. Krishnan and Moyer concluded that their
results suggested that as bankruptcy potential increases, lease finance does indeed
become attractive, offsetting the high transactional costs normally associated with it.
Although there is evidence to suggest a positive association between leasing and
financial distress potential, there is no evidence provided to suggest transactional
costs are offset or that leasing is actually associated with high transactional costs.
UK Studies
Lasfer and Levis (1998) analysed the use of finance leases and hire purchase for
3008 UK quoted and unquoted companies over the period 1982 to 1996. Operating
leases were excluded from their analysis on the basis of being "nothing more than a
short-term cancellable lease". This total disregard for operating leases is a serious
cause for concern. Under SSAP21, any lease agreement in which the present value
of minimum paymefits amounts to less than 90% of the fair value of the leased asset
can be classed as an operating lease. Thus, SSAP21 provides the opportunity for
leases, which are substantially more than short-term cancellable leases, to be classed
as operating leases. In addition, Edwards (1997) found 95% of the lease payments
made by 2288 UK companies in 1994 to relate to operating leases. This evidence
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suggests that a predominant and prolific use of operating leases existed in the UK
during at least part of the duration of Lasfer and Levis's study.
Univariate and logit analysis was used to compare leasing and non-leasing
companies. Comparisons were made on the basis of size, tax position, financial
gearing ratios, growth opportunities and profitability. Companies engaged in leasing
were found to be larger in terms of sales turnover and exhibited higher gearing
ratios and market to book ratios. Leasing companies were also found to have higher
profitability. However, comparisons were made with non-leasing companies on the
basis of absolute profit before interest and taxes. By failing to scale profit by sales
turnover or total assets, Lasfer and Levis failed to remove the element of company
size. All things being equal, a larger company would exhibit a larger total profit in
absolute terms. However, in relation to the sales achieved or the assets in use, a
smaller company may be more profitable.
Leasing companies were found to have higher growth levels when growth was
measured by additions to other tangible fixed assets. This supports the suggestion
that leasing may be favoured in growth companies to avoid asset substitution
problems and for the provision of 100% financing. Lasfer and Levis also used
research and development costs to sales to proxy growth and found no significant
difference between leasing and non-leasing companies. However, previous capital
structure studies have used research and development to sales as a proxy for product
uniqueness (see Table 3.10). In this case, leasing companies might have been
expected to exhibit lower research and development costs, as it is likely to be much
more expensive for lessors to bear the risks of unique or company specific assets in
comparison to standardised assets. Lasfer and Levis found the amount of tax
recoverable to set against future liabilities to be higher in leasing companies,
providing an element of support to leasing being used for transferring capital
allowances to a lessor.
Lasfer and Levis went on to consider the differences between leasing and non-
leasing companies, according to company size. They found profitability, financial
gearing and taxation to be positively correlated with leasing in large companies. In
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small companies, the leasing decision did not appear to be driven by taxation or
profitability, but by growth opportunities.
3.7.2 Relationships between the degree of use leasing and other firm characteristics
Several studies have examined the relationships between leasing and other firm
characteristics, either by focusing on the determinants of leasing policy, or as a by-
product when investigating the extent to which lease and debt are substitutes7 . An
outline of previous researchers' intentions is provided on a study-by-study basis.
However, findings are summarised according to the relationships tested and the
proxies used. Prior studies are also grouped according to country of origin.
US based studies
A summary of the relationships investigated between leasing and other firm
characteristics and the subsequent findings is shown in Table 3.28.
Ang and Peterson (1984) examined the relationship between certain firm
characteristics and the level of leasing, when investigating the extent to which leases
displace debt. A sample of approximately 600 non-regulated and non-financial US
firms were used for the period 1976 to 1981. Ang and Peterson only considered the
use of capitalised finance leases and ignored the use of operating leases. Tobit
analysis was used with the lease ratio as the dependent variable, and financial
gearing, operating risk, operating leverage, profitability, expected growth, size and
liquidity as independent variables. Leasing appeared to be significantly negatively
related to both operating leverage and profitability, and significantly positively
related to liquidity. This supports expectations that profitable firms employ less
lease finance. However, a lack of liquidity might be expected to encourage leasing
activities rather than be associated with their absence.
Although Ang and Peterson did not include tax rate as an independent variable, they
did compare the tax position of leasing and non-leasing firms. Surprisingly, they
found that the average effective tax rates of leasing firms were consistently higher
than those of non-leasing firms, in each of the six years of their study. This
Previous studies investigating lease-debt substitutability are presented in section 3.11 of this
chapter
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contradicts the theory that lessees who pay little or no tax have the most incentive to
lease by 'selling' their tax shields to lessors.
Bathala and Mukherjee (1995) used OLS regression analysis on data obtained from
their questionnaire survey (Section 3.6) to identify the determinants of lease
financing for 104 small firms. The proportion of firms' assets financed by all types
of leasing was used as the dependent variable, with measures of financial gearing,
size, profitability, growth, tax rate and geographical diversity as independent
variables. A positive relationship was found between leasing and both financial
gearing and firm size. Bathala and Mukherjee suggested that their findings implied
a complementary relationship between debt and lease financing. The use of leasing
is thus determined by the use of debt. However, the complementary relationship
found could be the product of debt capacity differences across firms, if the other
independent variables failed to provide adequate control.
The negative relationship found between tax rate and leasing contrasts with Ang and
Peterson's findings. Bathala and Mukherjee also found firms operating nationally or
internationally to undertake more leasing than those operating locally or regionally.
However, it is difficult to segregate exactly what geographical diversity is
capturing, when it relates to alternative firm characteristics such as firm size and
operating risk, for example.
Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) examined the relationship between the use of leasing
and various firm characteristics, when evaluating the influence of financial
contracting costs on the incentive to lease. They considered both the use of
capitalised finance leases and 'off-balance sheet' operating leases. The propensity to
use finance leases was measured as the proportion of net capitalised finance leases
to the net property, plant and equipment recorded on the balance sheet. The use of
operating leases was quantified by comparing the footnote disclosure of
commitments due in one year to these rental commitments plus the annual flow of
depreciation and opportunity cost of holding property, plant and equipment.
Opportunity cost was estimated as the net book value of property, plant and
equipment times an opportunity rate. Annual firm data was obtained from
Compustat for the period 1986 to 1991, resulting in approximately 2000
128
observations per year. Tobit and OLS regression analysis were used to examine the
relationship between leasing propensity and operating risk, size, tax position,
industry classification, dividend policy, cash flow, use of debt capacity and
differences in technology.
The use of leasing was found to be positively related to large tax loss carry
forwards, consistent with leasing being a mechanism for transferring capital tax
allowances to a lessor. Firms that pay no dividends appeared to be more likely to
use leasing, whereas firms with abundant cash flows, high bond ratings and high
capital intensity appeared less likely to use operating leases. The negative
relationship between leasing and cash flow supports the suggestion that leasing is
favoured for providing 100% finance and flexible repayment. Sharpe and Nguyen
concluded that given the extensive use of leasing to finance new equipment
investment in the US in recent years, "a comprehensive analysis of corporate capital
structure should not disregard the role of leasing". It follows that this is also true of
an analysis of the role of leasing. It should not be considered out of context,
independent from overall corporate capital structure. This failing is an aspect, which
the present study has seen fit to address.
Graham, Lemmon and Schallheim (1998) examined tax effects on leasing. They
used a forward-looking estimate of before-financing corporate marginal tax rate in
response to the suggestion that many commonly used tax proxies are problematic.
Lease payments are tax deductible and thus reduce taxable income and marginal tax
rate. This infers a negative relationship between leasing and tax position, masking
the expected positive relationship by which firms paying little or no tax opt for
leasing to transfer capital allowances. Firm data from Compustat was obtained for
the period 1981 to 1992, resulting in 18193 firm-year observations. Both capitalised
finance leases and operating leases were considered. The use of finance leases was
measured as the ratio of capital leases recorded on the balance sheet to the market
value of the firm. The use of operating leases was measured as the present value of
current-year rental expenses plus rental commitments over the next five years to the
market value of the firm. Tobit regression analysis was used to examine the
relationship between both types of leasing and firm size, tax position, industry
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classification, investment opportunities, asset structure and financial distress
potential.
Graham et a!. findings appeared to suggest that firms which are more likely to be in
a tax paying position are less likely to use operating leases. A positive relationship
was evident between financial distress potential and the use of leasing, supporting
the suggestion that leasing may be the last option available to distressed firms.
However, the negative relationship found between investment opportunities,
measured by the market to book ratio, is against expectations. Firms with high
investment opportunities were expected to exhibit higher levels of leasing as a result
of less restrictive covenants imposed by lease agreements, in comparison to those
imposed with non-leasing debt alternatives.
Mehran, Taggart and Yermack (1999) examined the effect of CEO share ownership
on leasing. Data was obtained from Compustat for a sample of 176 manufacturing
firms for the period 1986 to 1991, a total of 1056 firm-year observations. Tobit and
OLS regression analysis was used with leasing as the dependent variable and debt
intensity, size, tax position, investment opportunities, and ownership structure as
independent variables. Two alternative variables were used to measure leasing use.
Net capitalised leases to total assets was used to represent finance lease use, and the
share of lease payments in relation to total capital costs (based on Sharpe and
Nguyen's measurement) to capture total lease use, i.e. including the use of operating
leases.
Findings appear to suggest that CEO share ownership has a significantly positive
effect on leasing. Mehran et a! suggested that firm managers with larger ownership
stakes use leasing to reduce their exposure to obsolescence and other asset-specific
risk. In contrast to Graham et a!., the positive relationship between finance lease use
and tax position does not support the suggestion that leasing is used to transfer
capital allowances to a lessor. A positive relationship was found between debt
intensity and the use of finance leases, and both firm size and investment
opportunities and the use of total leasing.
130
Duke, Franz, Hunt and Toy (1999) examined the relationship between the use of
off-balance sheet operating leases and several firm specific characteristics. The
relative use of operating leases was measured as the minimum rental payments due
in the next five years in respect of non-cancellable, non-capitalised leases to total
assets. Duke et al. acknowledged that the present value of minimum lease payments
for all non-capitalised operating leases and finance leases would theoretically be the
best measure. However, they failed to include it on the basis that an estimation
would involve making assumptions in respect to lease terms, interest rates and
payment patterns. Although capitalisation does involve subjective judgements and
assumptions in light of the availability of limited information, it does not appear to
be sufficient grounds for excluding the measure. This is especially true when other
researchers (Imhoff, Lipe and Wright, 1991; Ely, 1995; Beattie, Edwards and
Goodacre, 1998) have made successful attempts and substantiated their assumptions
with sensitivity analysis.
Duke et a!. obtained data from four sources: Moody's Industrial Manual (1985),
Standard and Poor's Standard Corporate Descriptions (1985), Compustat and
corporate statements. The final sample comprised 192 firms with year-end data in
1984 or early 1985. Ordered Logit analysis was used to examine the relationship
between operating leases use and financial gearing, tax position, the existence of
restrictive covenants and compensation contracts, and ownership structure. This
involved categorising the dependent variable, operating lease use, into three discrete
groups. Category 1 included firms with no operating leases, category 2 included
firms with an operating lease use measure of between 0 and 0.086 1, and category 3
included firms with a measure above 0.086 1.
In support of Graham et al.'s findings, Duke et a!. also found a negative relationship
between a firm's tax position and the use of operating leases. In support of Mehran
et al.'s findings, a positive relationship was also found between ownership
concentration and the use of operating leases. The relationships between both the
existence of restrictive covenants and compensation schemes and the use of
operation leases were found to be insignificant. However, the mere existence of
restrictive covenants or compensation schemes does not establish the relative
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importance of these issues to individual firms/managers, and may thus have been
insufficient to establish any relationship.
UK Studies
A summary of the relationships investigated between leasing and other firm
characteristics and the subsequent findings is shown in Table 3.29.
Adedeji and Stapleton (1996) examined the relationship between a firm's lease ratio
and other characteristics in their investigation of lease-debt substitutability. Tobit
and OLS regression analysis were used for a sample of over 500 UK quoted
companies for the period 1990 to 1992. Adedeji and Stapleton only considered the
use of finance leases, and thus the lease ratio, the dependent variable, was measured
as capitalised finance leases to total assets. Measures of financial gearing, growth,
size, liquidity, tax position and industry classification were included as independent
variables. In light of evidence (Edwards, 1997) as to the significance of operating
leases in UK corporate financing during this time period, the omission of operating
leases seriously undermines the power of their study.
Adedeji and Stapleton only found the relationship between finance leasing and
liquidity to be significant when considering all the companies in their sample.
However, a negative relationship between finance leasing and liquidity, gearing,
growth and tax position was evident when a sub-sample of leasing companies were
considered in isolation. These findings appear to provide some support for
suggestions that leasing may he favoured for cash flow considerations, and dispute
suggestions that it may be favourable when faced with expected growth/investment
opportunities. The negative relationship between leasing and tax position could
provide some indication that finance leasing is used for tax saving reasons.
However, there is no explanation provided as to why gearing, growth and tax
position appear to influence a firm's use of leasing once it has decided to lease, but
fail to distinguish between leasing and non-leasing firms.
Beattie, Goodacre and Thomson (2000) investigated the relationship between a
comprehensive measure of leasing and certain firm characteristics in their
investigation of lease-debt substitutability. They pioneered the inclusion of
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constructively capitalised operating leases in UK research in recognition of the
predominant and prolific use of operating leases in recent years. Tobit and OLS
regression analysis were used for a sample of between 217 and 232 UK quoted
industrial and commercial companies over the period 1990 to 1994. Two alternative
measures of the leasing ratio were used as the dependent variable, long-term
capitalised finance leases to total assets, and the capitalised value of total leases
(including operating leases) to total assets. Measures of financial gearing,
profitability, asset structure, growth opportunity, size, industry classification, tax
position and liquidity were used as independent variables. The explanatory power of
the regression models obtained was much greater in comparison to those of Adedeji
and Stapleton. In addition, Beattie et al. performed rigorous diagnostic testing in
order to establish that the underlying assumptions of regression had been met, and
to confirm the robustness of their models.
Beattie et al. found a negative relationship between total leasing and financial
gearing, liquidity and asset structure. The inference that firms with high leasing
have low proportions of fixed assets in relation to total assets on the balance sheet is
logical if assets were predominately financed by off-balance sheet operating leases.
In contrast to Adedeji and Stapleton, Beattie et al. found industry classification to be
significant in the use of leasing, particularly in relation to the retail trade. Firms
operating in the retail trade may be more likely to employ leasing because their
assets are relatively standard. The market for leasing standardised assets is well
developed compared to the market for leasing one-of-a-kind assets, which may be
used in other industries. However, Beattie et al. suggested that tax incentives could
influence a retail company's use of leasing. There are generally no tax allowances
for the use of retail properties. However, if a retail company leases such property,
tax relief is available on the full lease rental payment each year. If the lessor is a
non-tax payer, for example a pension fund, then a reduction in total tax payable by
lessor and lessee reu1ts, at a detriment to the Inland Revenue. Thus, there is a tax
incentive to lease, rather than buy such retail property. This incentive does not
depend on the lessee being a low or non-tax payer, the usual tax incentive to lease,
rather it depends on the tax-paying status of the lessor.
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Summaiy
On balance, firms using finance leases appear to have higher levels of financial
gearing, higher growth in assets and a lower ability to service debt, in comparison to
firms that don't. However, the profitability and investment opportunities
experienced by firms using finance leases in comparison to those who don't is
unclear.
The relationships found between leasing and other characteristics of firms in the US
and UK are summarised below:
Firm characteristic	 US Studies	 UK Studies
Finance Operating Total Finance Operating Total
Gearing ratio	 POS	 POS	 NEG
Operating risk	 INSIG	 INSIG
Operating leverage	 NEG
Profitability	 ?	 INSIG
Growth	 INSIG	 INSIG	 ?
Size	 ?	 INSIG	 INSIG
Liquidity	 POS	 NEG	 NEG
Tax paying position	 POS	 NEG	 INSIG
Geographical diversity
	 POS
Industry	 SIG	 SIG
Dividend policy	 POS
Cash flow
	
NEG NEG
Use of debt capacity	 NEG	 NEG
Technology differences 	 SIG
Investment opportunities	 ?
Asset structure	 POS	 POS	 NEG
Financial distress	 POS
potential
Restrictive covenants	 INSIG
Management	 INSIG
compensation schemes
Ownership structure 	 P05	 P05
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Although US findings suggest that financial gearing is positively related to finance
leasing, UK evidence suggests that the relationship is negative when operating
leases are also given consideration. In the US and the UK, the existence of a linear
relationship between leasing and firm size is not clear. UK evidence suggests that
firms at both extremes of the size spectrum employ less leasing compared to firms
of medium size. Although a positive relationship was observed between liquidity
and finance leasing for a sample of US firms, the relationship appears negative for
UK firms in relation to both finance and total leasing. In the US, firms in a high tax
position or with substantial cash flows appear to employ less operating leases. High
levels of leasing in US firms appear to be associated with operating in a
nationallinternational environment, possessing a large proportion of fixed assets in
relation to total assets, a high financial distress potential and large proportion of
managerial ownership. Industry classification appears to exert influence on the use
of leasing in both the UK and US. Leasing is exceptionally prominent in the UK
retail trade.
The differences arising between the relationships found between levels of leasing
and other firm characteristics in the US and UK may partly be due to differences in
the time periods in which previous studies were conducted, as well as differences in
the proxies used. However, the evidence arising from the UK is fairly limited, a
situation the present study has seen fit to rectify.
3.8: Summary: Leasing theory and evidence
The theory and empirical evidence in relation to the various reasons for leasing is
summarised in Table 3.30.
There appears to be some evidence, albeit inconclusive, that tax reasons influence
the leasing decision. Although firms have failed to acknowledge that leasing is used
to expand debt capacity, total leasing obligations do appear to displace less than an
equivalent non-leasing debt. There is US evidence to suggest that lease covenants
are less restrictive, which would explain why growth firms appear to be engaged in
more leasing. Leasing appears to be favoured for cash flow considerations and for
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providing off-balance sheet financing. High technological firms appear to use more
leasing, which coincides with the importance placed on safeguarding against
obsolescence. The convenience associated with the application process for lease
financing does not appear to be an issue.
There appears to be little evidence obtained to support the suggestions that leasing
is favoured for availability on any scale, availability at point of sale, or avoidance of
capital expenditure application processes. Further, there is little evidence obtained
in relation to the lessor's ability to acquire/dispose of assets being an advantage, or
the avoidance of significant transfer of ownership costs. Thus, the evidence in
relation to leasing determinants appears somewhat incomplete.
Although the evidence from accounting data based studies highlights the existence
of relationships between leasing and other firm characteristics, it fails to capture the
more practical reasons for leasing. The survey method has the potential to extend
the scope of the enquiry. However, the majority of prior survey evidence is
somewhat outdated. The most recent UK survey (Drury and Braund, 1990) was
conducted over a decade ago. The global business environment of today, at the
beginning of the 21St century, bears no relation to the business environment of ten
years ago. Therefore, previous evidence in relation to leasing determinants must be
reviewed with caution. Even so it provides a benchmark against which the findings
of the present UK survey study can be assessed.
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3.9: The theoretical relationship between lease and debt finance in corporate
capital structures
Leasing involves a contractual commitment of corporate funds and is thus expected
to impact on a firm's ability to obtain future debt finance. If lease finance and debt
finance are substitutes, then an increase in one would result in a decrease in another,
if the level of debt in corporate capital structures is to be maintained. The empirical
degree of substitution is reflected in the debt-to-lease displacement ratio, a, which
can be defined as:
DRNL
 = DRL + OLRL
where:
DRNL = debt ratio of non-leasing firm
DRL = debt ratio of leasing firm
LRL = lease ratio of leasing firm
Four alternative views on the value of a, and hence the degree of debt capacity
leasing consumes, can be identified. The prominent view 8
 is that lease finance and
debt finance are perfect substitutes and a is equal to one. This view is based on the
contractual commitment of corporate funds under a lease agreement being non-
distinguishable from non-leasing debt commitments. Myers, Dill and Bautista
(1976) suggested that as some of the risks of ownership of leased assets remain with
lessors, leasing consumes less debt capacity, and a takes a value of less than one.
However this value is still greater than zero, as leasing obligations still attract an
element of risk impacting on debt capacity. Klein, Crawford and Aichian (1978)
suggested that leased assets which are industry or firm specific could be difficult to
sell in the event of default or bankruptcy, increasing the risk for investors and other
lenders compared to a firm acquiring the equivalent non-leasing debt. In this case,
a takes a value of greater than one, implying £1 of lease obligation consumes more
than £1 of non-leasing debt capacity.
Lewis and Schallheim (1992) suggest 'that because leasing is a mechanism for
selling excess tax deductions, it can motivate the lessee firm to increase the
proportion of debt in its capital structure relative to an otherwise identical firm that
does not use leasing'. In this way lease finance extends debt capacity and
8 Miller and Upton (1966), Lewellen et al. (1976), Franks and Hodges (1978), Levy and Sarnat
(1979), and Idol (1980)
140
relationships with non-leasing debt finance appears complementary. In this case,
a takes a value of less than zero.
Lease-debt substitutability: prior evidence
Several empirical studies have considered whether leasing and debt are
complementary or substitutes, i.e. they have investigated which of the hypothesised
values for a apply in practice. Perceptions of the relationship between leasing and
debt finance have been examined using both the survey and experimental approach.
The analysis of accounting data has also been used in attempts to actually observe
the relationship. However, in order to observe lease-debt substitutability, it is
necessary to assume that firms operate with target amounts of debt. Otherwise,
increases in both leasing and debt could be observed, not because they are
complementary and leasing has no impact on debt capacity, but because of an
increased use of debt capacity. Given that there is evidence to suggest the existence
of target debt ratios in both the UK and US, investigating lease-debt substitutability
by observation does not appear to be inappropriate.
3.10: Lease-debt substitutability: Survey/experimental based prior research
Several survey-based studies investigating the determinants of leasing in both the
US and UK have investigated how firms perceive the relationship between leasing
and debt. The questions asked and responses received are summarised in Table
3.31.
On balance, there does not appear to be a clear indication of the value of c from
survey evidence. This is hardly surprising when previous survey questions appear to
have only partially investigated the relationship. Fawthrop and Terry (1975) and
Hull and Hubbard's (1980) questions both implied that leasing has no effect on
borrowing capacity, and investigated the importance of this fact in the decision to
lease. Responses indicating that it was not an important factor could equally infer
that firms have other more important reasons for leasing, rather than because they
perceive that leasing does not have any impact on debt capacity. Drury and
Braund's (1990) evidence suggests that leasing is considered to consume debt
capacity, but not to the same degree as an equivalent amount of non-lease debt, i.e.
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Table 3.31: A summary of the responses provided to survey questions
investigating lease-debt substitutability
Setting	 Author	 Abbreviated question	 Response
UK	 Fawthrop & Terry
	
How relevant is the following in firm decision Very relevant: 8 firms
(1975)	 to lease?	 Relevant:	 15 firms
Leasing does not affect borrowing capacity
	
Irrelevant:	 18 firms
UK	 Hull & Hubbard	 What are the main reasons for leasing?	 27% responded important factor
(1980)	 Additional form of finance which does not
	
26% responded marginal factor
affect other borrowing sources
UK	 Drury & Braund	 To what extent do you agree with the
(1990)	 following statements?
(A) A commitment to lease an asset which 	 63% Disagreed
cost Lim reduces the borrowing capacity of
a firm by exactly Lim
(B) A commitment to lease an asset which 	 62% Agreed
cost Lim reduces the borrowing capacity of
a firm by less than Lim
US	 Mukherjee	 How do you view the lease-debt relationship?
(1991)	 Substitute	 38 Firms
Complement	 18 Firms
Independent	 25 Firms
No response	 2 Firms
US	 Bathala & Mukherjee Agreement with the following?
(1995)	 Leasing is a substitute for borrowing	 5 Firms
Leasing complements borrowing and
increases firm debt capacity	 26 Firms
Leasing has no bearing on borrowing 	 23 Firms
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a takes a value of less than one but greater than zero. However, the extent to which
Drury and Braund' s respondents believed that leasing has no impact on debt
capacity was only investigated implicitly by their agreement with perfect/imperfect
substitution. An explicit investigation as to the extent respondents perceived leasing
to have no impact would have provided useful clarification of the situation.
The evidence from US surveys is mixed, and on the basis of the scale of response, it
seems impossible to draw robust conclusions.
In an experimental situation, Bayless and Diltz (1986) observed the behaviour of
US bank loan officers to investigate the debt displacement effects of leasing.
Participants were asked to evaluate and recommend a maximum line of credit that
could be extended to a firm. The case presented to each lender was identical except
in the relative amounts of leasing and long-term debt, with the total amount
remaining constant. Lending officers were found to be less willing to extend credit
as a firm incurred leasing obligations. Bayless and Diltz concluded that a
substitutability relationship existed between lease and debt finance, with leasing
displacing 10% to 26% more unused debt capacity than debt finance, suggesting a
value for a of greater than one.
3.11: Lease-debt substitutability: Prior research based on the analysis of
accounting data
US based studies
Ang and Peterson (1984) examined the relationship between leasing and debt for
approximately 600 non-regulated, non-financial firms over the period 1976 to 1981.
Their timing coincided with the effective dates of the new US lease accounting
standard SFAS 13. Tobit regression analysis was used with the lease ratio as the
dependent variable and the debt ratio as the independent variable. Measures of
operating leverage, sales variability, profitability, expected growth, size and
liquidity were also included as independent variables to control for differences in
debt capacity and its usage across firms.
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Firms engaged in leasing were found to exhibit higher debt ratios than non-leasing
firms. Regression results also indicated a positive but mainly insignificant
relationship. Ang and Peterson thus concluded a complementary relationship, with
an increase in leasing being associated with an increase in debt, and a value of a of
less than zero. Smith and Wakeman (1985) suggested that Ang and Peterson's
complementary result probably reflects an inadequate control for debt capacity
differences across firms. Also firms with higher debt capacity may possess
characteristics which also make leasing more attractive. However, Ang and Peterson
ignored the contribution of operating leases in explaining the debt-to-lease
displacement ratio, a, on the grounds that the percentage of firms reporting non-
capitalised leases shrank from 13% in 1976 to 1% in 1981. This reduction,
combined with an increase in the percentage of firms leasing from 1976 to 1981,
was used to conclude the predominance of capitalised leases over non-capitalised
leases. Unfortunately subsequent evidence (Marston and Harris, 1988) casts doubt
on such an argument. It was found that although the proportion of capitalised leases
had increased significantly since the issuance of SFAS 13 in 1976, capitalised leases
accounted for only about 35% of total leasing in 1982.
Irrespective of the above criticisms, Kare and Herbst (1990) also advocated a
complementary relationship between lease and debt finance. They found, on
average, leasing firms to have significantly higher debt to equity ratios in
comparison to non-leasing firms.
To provide a stronger control for debt capacity differences across firms, Marston
and Harris (1988) compared changes in, as opposed to levels of, lease and debt
finance. Their sample comprised 271 US firms over the six-year period 1976 to
1982. An OLS regression model employing average debt and lease ratios over time
was used, and examined changes in financing subject to maintaining these averages.
A comprehensive measure of both capitalised and non-capitalised leasing was used.
It was justified considering capitalised leases accounted for only 35% of total
leasing in 1982.
Although Marston and Harris confirmed Ang and Peterson's findings that high-debt
firms often do engage in more leasing than low-debt firms, they found lease and
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debt finance to be substitutes. Firms appeared to engage in leasing at a cost of
reducing their ability to finance with non-leasing debt. However results did not
indicate perfect substitution, rather $1 of leasing displaced on average
approximately $0.6 of debt (i.e. a takes a value of less than one and greater than
zero). Marston and Harris suggested that this could be value creating if firms were
able to expand their debt capacity by replacing non-lease debt with leasing.
However, they noted that differences in the risk attached to the two alternatives
could well be recognised and priced appropriately by the market.
UK based studies
Garrod (1989) found that the debt levels of firms engaged in leasing seemed to be
increasing by a greater extent in comparison to those of their paired control firms.
His findings implied that lease and debt finance appeared to be complementary. In
contrast, Narayanaswamy (1994) found that, on average, finance leases like non-
leasing debt appear to exert a positive effect on the volatility of equity returns.
However leasing is considered more favourably in view of less risk being attached
(i.e. a takes a value of less than one but greater than zero).
Adedeji and Stapleton (1996) conducted an investigation based closely on Ang and
Peterson's (1984) methodology. They examined the relationship between lease and
debt ratios using Tobit regression analysis for a sample of 550 UK quoted firms,
and OLS regression for a sub-sample of firms engaged in leasing, for the period
1990 to 1992. Measures of price earnings, liquidity, size and tax rate were used to
control for cross-sectional differences in debt capacity. Adedeji and Stapleton
considered only finance leases when measuring lease ratios. They argued that
'finance leases are relevant, since it is this form of leasing that is fully substitutable
for debt.' In light of UK (Beattie, Goodacre and Edwards, 1998) and US (Marston
and Harris, 1988) evidence as to the significance of operating leases in corporate
financing, the omission of operating leases seriously undermines the significance of
their study.
Lease-debt substitutability from a market perspective has been investigated using measures of
capitalised lease finance (Bowman, 1980) and capitalised plus non-capitalised lease finance (Imhoff,
Lipe and Wright, 1993; Ely, 1995). Findings appear to suggest that leasing obligations make a
significant contribution to the association tests on market risk. These studies are examined in Part 3
of this thesis: Operating lease recognition in the UK assessment of equity risk.
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Adedeji and Stapleton found a negative relationship between finance lease ratios
and debt ratios for their sub-sample of leasing firms. However, finance leasing did
not appear to be a perfect substitute for debt, rather £1 of finance lease was found to
displace approximately £0.55 of debt (i.e. a taking a value of less than one and
greater than zero). These findings contradict the positive relationship found by Ang
and Peterson, and by Adedeji and Stapleton in the Tobit analysis for their entire
sample. Adedeji and Stapleton argued that this complementary relationship between
lease and debt finance was the product of differences in debt capacity between
leasing and non-leasing firms. They claimed to overcome the problem by
considering leasing firms in isolation, when they found lease and debt finance to be
substitutes. However Ang and Peterson continued to find a complementary
relationship even when they considered their sub-sample of firms engaged in
leasing. Furthermore, while the explanatory variables used in the regression model
are considered by Adedeji and Stapleton to be an adequate control for debt capacity
differences between leasing firms, they do not explain why they consider them
inadequate in controlling for differences between leasing and non-leasing firms.
Beattie, Goodacre and Thomson (2000) investigated the degree of substitutability
between leasing and non-leasing debt using a comprehensive measure of leasing,
which incorporated an estimate of the present value of operating lease liabilities. On
average, operating leases were estimated to be approximately thirteen times larger
than finance leases. The use of a comprehensive measure of leasing was, therefore,
justified and considered an improvement on the partial measures used in prior UK
studies. The relationship between leasing and non-leasing debt was examined for
300 listed industrial and commercial firms over the period 1990 to 1994. Measures
of asset structure, growth opportunities, size, industry classification, tax and
liquidity were used to control for debt capacity differences across firms. Empirical
results suggest that total leasing and non-leasing debt appear to be substitutes, with
£1 of leasing displacing, on average, £0.23 of non-leasing debt (i.e. a takes a value
of less than one and greater than zero). However, a positive relationship was found
between finance leases and debt for both the entire sample and a sub-sample of
leasing firms. These findings are consistent with those of Ang and Peterson, and in
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conflict with Adedeji and Stapleton's findings of a negative relationship for their
sub-sample of leasing firms.
Other studies: Belgium
Deloof and Verschueren (1999) investigated lease-debt substitutability for a sample
of 1066 large non-financial Belgian firms over the period 1992 to 1994. They
suggested that this setting provided an interesting case for investigation, because in
Belgium the lessee is considered to be the fiscal owner of assets and thus claims any
tax allowances, compared to the lessor claiming tax allowances in the US and UK.
Deloof and Verschueren closely followed Ang and Peterson's and Adedeji and
Stapleton's methodology. They found a significantly negative relationship between
financial leasing and the use of long-term debt, irrespective of whether firms use
leasing or not. However, there was no evidence of a one-to-one relationship, and
thus perfect substitution.
3.12: Summary: Lease-debt substitutability theory and evidence
The evidence concerning the relationship between lease and debt finance in
corporate capital structures, summarised below, appears to some extent mixed.
Setting	 Researchers	 Value of a
UK	 DruryandBraund(1990)	 O<zcc<i
US	 Bayless and Diltz (1986)
	 cx> 1
US	 Ang and Peterson (1984)
	 cx < 0
US	 Kare and Herbst (1990)
	 cx < 0
US	 Marston and Harris (1988)
	 0 < cc < 1
UK	 Garrod(1984)	 cx< 0
UK .
	 Narayanaswathy (1994)
	 0 < cx < 1
UK	 Adedeji and Stapleton (1996)
	 0 < cx < 1
UK	 Beattie, Goodacre & Thomson (2000)
	 0 < cx < 1
Belgium	 Deloof and Verschueren (1999)	 cx> 0
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However, the majority of previous studies have considered only the use of finance
leases and ignored operating leases. This appears to be a serious failing in light of
evidence to suggest a predominant and prolific use of operating leases in both the
UK and US in recent years (Marston and Harris, 1988; Beattie et al., 1998).
Marston and Harris (1988) and Beattie et al. (2000) pioneered the inclusion of
operating leases in the lease-debt substitutability issue in the US and UK,
respectively. Evidence from both studies suggests that leasing and non-leasing debt
appear to be at least partial substitutes. A firm's capital structure and its capacity for
debt appears to influence the use of leasing. The determinants of leasing should,
therefore, not be considered independently from the determinants of capital
structure. Previous studies in which the leasing decision has been considered in
isolation thus appear somewhat incomplete. The inclusive approach adopted in the
present study appears to be necessary.
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Chapter 4: Method used to investigate cor porate financing and
leasing decisions
4.1: Selection of research methods
The two broad research questions addressed in the present study are 'what are the
determinants of corporate capital structure?' and 'what determines corporate leasing
policy?' Due to the pre-existence of both capital structure theory and theoretical
reasons for leasing, the present study is primarily deductive in approach, i.e. it
involves testing existing theory.
Buckley, Buckley and Chiang (1976) suggest four possible research strategies for
testing existing theory. Firstly, opinion research in which views, opinions and
appraisals with respect to the particular research question are sought. Secondly,
empirical research which involves observation, and obtaining experience in relation
to the research question. This occurs in one of three possible domains, by case
study, field study or in a laboratory setting, all of which differ in terms of the degree
of experimental design and control. Experimental design refers to the presence of
formal hypotheses and research procedures, whereas control refers to the ability to
isolate and manipulate variables in order to study relationships. Both experimental
design and control are evident in a laboratory setting, experimental design is also
present in a field study, whereas both are absent in a case study situation. Thirdly,
archival research, which is concerned with the examination of recorded facts.
Finally, analytical research, which involves applying logic to the component parts
of a research question.
Several of these research strategies could be adopted in response to the questions of
how capital structure and leasing policy are determined. Answers could be found by
asking those making capital structure/leasipg decisions what they think (opinion
research) and what they actually do (empirical research). Real decision-making
could be observed in action, or observed by presenting decision-makers with
hypothetical situations (empirical research). Previous capital structure and leasing
decisions could also be analysed (archival empirical research).
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In reality, these related research questions have been addressed in two principal
ways. Firstly, using an archival empirical approach, by investigating corporate
management's previous actions through analysing accounting data. Secondly, by
investigating corporate management's experience, intentions and perceptions by
survey (empirical field study and opinion research). Both of these approaches have
the potential advantage of drawing on large samples, which facilitates inference to
large populations. An empirical case study approach, whilst determining the capital
structure and leasing policies in specific corporations, does not enable
generalisations to be made. Subsequently, it does not yet appear to have been
adopted in this area of research. However, if and when the determinants of capital
structure and leasing policy are generally established, it would be useful to
determine how specific corporations differ from the general theme. Capital structure
and leasing policy does not appear to have been widely examined by presenting
decision-makers with hypothetical situations. Although this approach has the
advantage of obtaining a general consensus to specific situations, in reality decision-
makers face a wide range of situations, which vary in magnitude in relation to the
individual corporations being managed. Thus, previous investigations have tended
to concentrate on experiencing capital structure and leasing decisions from within
individual business contexts.
Numerous US and UK studies' have taken the archival empirical approach by
comparing the characteristics of leasing and non-leasing companies, and by using
regression analysis to determine relationships between levels of leasing and other
firm characteristics. The relationships between gearing and other firm
characteristics have also been investigated 2. Although each study provides
incremental evidence, it is difficult to grasp an overall picture from this type of
analysis alone. In addition such studies require proxies for firm characteristics.
Different studies have used different proxies to measure the same characteristics
and, in some cases (ilot surprisingly) have obtained conflicting results. Further, it is
'Comparisons: US Kare and Herbst (1990); Krishnan and Moyer (1994). UK . Lasfer and Levis
(1998). Regressions: US Ang and Peterson (1984); Bathala and Mukherjee (1995); Sharpe and
Nguyen (1995), Graham et al. (1998), Duke et al. (1999), Mebran et al. (1999). UK- Adedeji and
Stapleton(1996); Beattie et al. (2000).
2 US - Toy et al. (1974); Fern and Jones (1979); Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984); Kester (1986);
Titman and Wessels (1988); Barton et al. (1989); Chang and Rhee, (1990).
UK Bennett and Donnelly (1993) and Adedeji (1998).
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not entirely certain whether the proxies used are measuring the characteristic being
tested or some other underlying variable.
The present study was therefore based on the second approach and involved a
questionnaire survey. A questionnaire provided the scope to obtain a wide range of
information in relation to corporate capital structures and leasing policy. This
method is not without problems. The collection of sufficient data for meaningful
analysis lies in the hands of respondents. Also there is a risk that respondents either
reply out of context (i.e. they indicate what they believe should happen in capital
structure and leasing decision-making rather than what actually happens), or they
fail to understand what is actually being asked. However, such. çroblems can be
addressed by taking steps to increase response rate, and by using carefully worded
questions (Kerlinger, 1979). Furthermore, there does not appear to be a survey
investigation into UK capital structure determinants in modem times, or a survey
investigation that extensively considers both leasing and capital structure
determinants anywhere at any time.
4.2: Method of delivery
The complexity, technical nature and scope of the subject matter, and the
requirement to produce a large representative sample precluded the use of face-to-
face or telephone delivery. A mail survey was, therefore, adopted. This has the
advantage of allowing respondents to visually absorb each question and the context
of a series of questions. It also enables respondents to take their time in answering
questions, at their own convenience (Mangione, 1995).
The growth of the Internet and e-mail users provides an alternative method to
traditional mailing. The use of e-mail delivery would be less costly in terms of both
time and money, and it has been shown to yield faster survey returns (Tse, 1998).
However, the response rate using e-mail has been shown to be lower in comparison
to traditional mailing. E-mail can be deleted at the touch of a button without any
regards for the contents, whereas an envelope is, at least, usually opened. Although
the majority of companies provide a contact e-mail address, the personal e-mail
address of individual personnel is less easily available. For these reasons, a decision
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was taken to mail hard copies of the questionnaire. However, once contact had been
established, e-mail was considered a desirable option for follow up interviews.
4.3: Sample selection and mailing list construction
A sample of finance directors from the population of UK quoted and industrial
companies were selected as recipients for the questionnaire. Quoted companies were
selected on the basis of their economic significance. Industrial companies were
selected on the basis that the majority of their leasing activity is conducted as
lessees, and in the present study, it is the users of leasing whose views are sought.
Financial companies were, thus, excluded on the basis that the majority of their
leasing activity is conducted as lessors. Financial companies include traditional
banks and finance houses, the majority of which are members of The Finance and
Leasing Association (FLA) and are substantial providers of lease finance. (For
example, FLA members extended lease agreements for approximately 19% of all
new fixed capital investment in plant, machinery, vehicles, ships and aircraft in
1997). Property companies and insurance companies are major lessors of
commercial land and buildings in the UK, and investment trusts tend to operate in
shares rather than 'real assets'. Furthermore, any leasing activity conducted as
lessees by financial companies has been shown to be fairly insignificant compared
to that of industrial companies (Edwards, 1997).
The sample was selected from companies on the UKQI list in Datastream. The
UKQI list was obtained in March 2000 for all companies with year-end accounting
data between the l January 1998 and 31st December 1999. This period was chosen
to ensure any companies changing their year-end and not reporting in 1999 were
included, and also because, at the time the list was extracted, Datastream had not
been updated to 31t December 1999. The availability of year-end data was
considered important for the further analysis of responses and to facilitate
comparisons between respondents and non-respondents when testing for non-
response bias.
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The list extracted comprised 1311 companies, but it was recognised that companies
that had since de-listed would be included. However, it was envisaged that these
companies would be identified and removed during the mailing list construction
process.
The mailing list was constructed by displaying the extel card for each company in
the commercial database Sequencer. The addresses, telephone-numbers and finance
directors' name were copied and pasted into a spreadsheet. Sequencer was used to
identify whether companies were in receivership/administration or had merged. In
such cases they were removed from the mailing list, as a response was considered
unlikely. The Hemscott web-site was also used in an attempt to fill any gaps in the
data (www.hemscott.com/equities/compindx.htm).
In previous surveys, many questionnaires have been returned unopened because
they were mailed to the wrong or inconect address, or because the addressee no
longer worked for the company (Yammarino, Skinner and Childers, 1991). For this
reason, the integrity of the mailing list was assessed. The contact details obtained
from Sequencer, for 35 companies, were checked against information provided in
the 1999 Stock Exchange Yearbook.
Out of the 35 companies checked, six discrepancies (between the two sources) were
identified in the finance director's name, three discrepancies in address and four in
telephone number. Although Sequencer appeared to provide details of the most
recently appointed finance director (in some cases it provided the previous finance
director which matched the yearbook), details were further checked against
individual company web-sites. There were fewer discrepancies found between the
details provided on Sequencer and those disclosed on web-sites, restoring, at least,
some confidence. However the existence of some discrepancies, the absence of a
number of finance director's names, and the possibility that some finance directors
might operate at locations other than the company address, prompted further action.
Each company was contacted by telephone in May 2000 prior to commencing the
mailing. This was an extremely laborious and time-consuming task. It also required
sensitive handling. Some companies refuse point blank to disclose details over the
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telephone, however the majority were willing to offer confirmation and even correct
details already held on file. The telephoning process further identified companies
that had de-listed, merged, were in the process of being taken-over or were in
administration or receivership, and could thus be removed from the mailing list. The
final list comprised 1246 companies, after 20 companies had been randomly
selected and removed for use in pilot testing. The telephoning process provided
corrections, ranging in scale from one incorrect digit in the post-code to complete
names and addresses, for 42% of the 1246 companies. On this basis, the necessity of
telephone contact to ensure the integrity of the mailing list was confirmed.
In order to maximise the number of completed returns, the questionnaire needed to
reach as many of these finance directors as possible. However, a sample of finance
directors was also required as recipients of the lease accounting reform
questionnaire. It was recognised that sending two questionnaires from the same
source in the same time period would be likely to adversely affect response rate.
Therefore, it was decided that each of the 1246 companies would receive one of the
two questionnaires. The lease accounting reform questionnaire was shorter in
length, considered extremely topical, and thought likely to achieve a better
response. On this basis, it was decided that a third of the mailing list would receive
it, leaving two thirds to receive the financing decision-making questionnaire.
Consequently, systematic random sampling was used to obtain the final sample of
831 companies.
4.4: Survey instrument
4.4.1 Content development
The content of the questionnaire was derived after an extensive review of existing
theory and empirical evidence.
In relation to capital structure determinants, the static trade-off theory, agency
theory, pecking-order theory, stakeholder theory, corporate strategy and control
considerations formed a framework. A company management perspective was
adopted because it is their decision-making that is under investigation. From their
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perspective, the advantages and disadvantages of issuing debt arising from the
above theories were identified, along with the environments in which these
advantages or disadvantages were mitigated or enhanced. Previous empirical
evidence, based on both the regression type studies of company management's past
actions and surveys of their intentions/perceptions, was allocated according to these
advantages, disadvantages and environments. The process for analysing leasing
decisions was essentially the same. In this case, benefits to company management
were grouped in terms of tax saving, borrowing capacity and repayment, risk
sharing and other financialltransactional reasons to form a framework. This
complete analysis formed the basis of what the questionnaire needed to address.
Having established the information required from the questionnaire, it was
necessary to consider the vehicle to obtain it - the questions. Mangione (1995) notes
that it is a significant task to produce a series of questions from scratch, and
recommends that prior work provides a 'tremendous boost'. On this basis, previous
surveys of capital structure and leasing policy were systematically analysed in detail
to determine exactly what questions were asked and the reasons/purpose for asking
the questions. This process was undertaken for four US surveys on capital structure
(Scott and Johnson, 1982; Pinegar and Wilbricht, 1989; Norton, 1989; Graham and
Harvey, 2001) and an Australian, Japanese and UK survey on debt capacity (Allen,
1991). In addition four UK leasing surveys were analysed (Fawthrop and Terry,
1975; Hull and Hubbard, 1980; Mayes and Nicholas, 1988, Drury and Braund,
1990) along with three US studies (O'Brien and Nunnally, 1983; Mukheijee, 1991;
Bathala and Mukherjee, 1995) and one based in India (Narayanaswamy, 1992).
Based on the relevance to the present study, all the questions asked in each of these
previous surveys were classified into one of three categories: 'include', 'don't
include' and 'open for discussion'. Those classified as 'include' were directly
related to the information sought in the present study, whereas those classified as
'don't include' were not in any way related. The questions classified as 'open for
discussion' were indirectly related or the answers to them were considered of
supplementary relevance. The questions classified as 'don't include' were
disregarded at this stage. Those classified as 'open for discussion' were considered
further by balancing the benefit to obtaining additional information against the risk
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of impinging response rate with an increasingly lengthy questionnaire. They were
thus re-classified as either 'include' or 'don't include'.
In some cases, there were several questions classified as 'include', which essentially
provided the same piece of information. Therefore, these questions were further
classified as 'directly include' or 'indirectly include' on the basis of what was
thought to be the most appropriate wording. Those classified as 'directly include'
formed the basis of the first draft of the questionnaire, along with a few questions
constructed to obtain information not previously addressed. The questionnaire then
underwent several re-drafting stages in which the wording of questions was
modified and the ordering of questions considered.
4.4.2 Pilot testing
It is advocated that the use of more than one pre-test enhances the final version of a
questionnaire (Mangione, 1995). After progressing through several draft forms, the
questionnaire used in the present study was informally tested at The Department of
Accounting, Finance and Law's annual research day in February 2000. An outline
of the questionnaire development process along with the intended administrative
procedures was presented, and an early draft of the questionnaire circulated. Any
criticisms and suggestions for improvement were requested. Unfortunately the
feedback received was limited.
A later draft of the questionnaire was formally tested in the pilot study. It was
mailed to the finance directors of 10 randomly selected UK quoted industrial
companies in May 2000 g . Contacts at the Association of Corporate Treasurers and
The Finance and Leasing Association were also mailed, along with two professors
of finance in The Department of Accounting, Finance and Law.
The questionnaire was accompanied by a covering letter (Appendix 1) and a set of
pilot testing questions (Appendix 2). The letter requested assistance to 'pilot test a
questionnaire which has been designed to provide insight into the corporate
Many researchers suggest trying out all survey procedures on a small scale initially (Sletto, 1940)
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financing decision-making processes of UK companies'. Participants were advised
that they had been selected as part of a small group to complete the questionnaire
and provide feedback concerning the clarity, ambiguity and relevance of questions.
They were assured confidentiality and provided with a stamped self-addressed
envelope to return the questionnaire, irrespective of their ability/willingness to
participate.
The pilot testing questions investigated initial reaction to the subject matter, the
format/layout, and the length of the questionnaire. Participants were also asked to
indicate how much time it had taken to complete it. They were asked which
questions seemed most relevant/least relevant, and whether any were unclear,
ambiguous or difficult to answer. Opinions on the ordering of questions and the
instructions for completion were also sought. Approximately 10 days after the pilot
mailing, non-respondents were contacted by telephone to establish if they would be
participating.
The response to the pilot testing is summarised in Table 4.1. Two out of the ten
finance directors completed the questionnaire and answered the pilot questions. The
two professors of finance also completed the pilot questions, as did the contact at
the Association of Corporate Treasurers. The feedback from these five sources is
summarised in Table 4.2. Aside from the general comments, participants indicated
that a few specific questions lacked clarity. The wording of these questions was
subsequently addressed and modified appropriately.
The comments concerning the length of the questionnaire and the time taken to
complete it were cause for concern. As a result, each question was carefully
scrutinised, with the aim of finding questions it might be possible to disregard
without seriously reducing the information obtained. However, there didn't appear
to be any questions 'that could be classified as irrelevant. Consequently, a decision
was taken to maintain the questionnaire length and concentrate on increasing
response rate by other means. It was also thought that the size of the questionnaire
would become impractical if the typeface was increased, as suggested by one
participant.
157
Table 4.1: A summary of the response to pilot testing
Persons mailed	 Company/Organisation 	 Nature of response
Departmant of Accounting, Finance
Professor of Finance 	 & Law	 Completed pilot questions
Departmant of Accounting, Finance
Professor of Finance 	 & Law	 Completed pilot questions
The Association of Corporate
Technical Officer
	
Treasurers	 Completed questionnaire and pilot questions
Head of Asset Finance	 The Finance and Leasing	 No suggestions for any draft changes
Finance Directors 	 UK quoted industrial companies	 Two companies:
Completed questionnaire and pilot questions
Two companies:
Unable to contact by telephone so no
confirmation of non-participation
Six companies:
Non-participation on the basis of:
-Finance director does not take part in surveys
-Unable to assist
-On holiday-unsure of participation
-Will not be participating
-Company policy not to participate in research
surveys
-Too busy to participate
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Table 4.2: A summary of the general feedback from pilot testing questions
Question Area	 Comments received
Subject matter	 "Not of great relevance to our company"
One which has received little attention from our group"
"Very interesting"
"Fine"
"Useful topic of research"
Length	 15 minutes to complete - too long
"Too long"
"15-20 minutes to read through. Some of the multisection questions have too many
parts- do not want recipient to lose interestimotivation/momentum"
"Too long - about 45 minutes"
"20 minutes - maybe too long for some respondents"
FormatlLayout	 "Like most questionnaires, large parts seem irrelevant to our company"
"OK"
Very tidy and easy to use
"Type face to small and too similar statements in succession requiring re-reading
Instructions for
	 "No view"
completion	 "OK"
"Change front cover from 'unwilling to answer any questions' to 'do not wish to
answer"
"Alright"
"OK"
Ordering of questions
	
"No view'
•	 "As the UK corporate debt market is small relative to other non-equity financing
instruments would you want to begin with questions concerning a hierarchy of
financing sources and the importance of factors in choosing amounts of debt, rather
than target capital structure questions"
"Most questions are irrelevant to us as we are conservatively financed, having no
General observations	 debt or leasing"
'It would be helpful to have official sponsorship for the questionnaire"
'Too technical. All questions seemed relevant. Most assumed a structured approach
to the subject. Also non-financing motivators need to be considered"
"We would be very interested in seeing the results of your survey"
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In respect of the completion instructions, altering the slightly antagonistic statement
'if you are unwilling to answer any questions' to 'if you do not wish to answer any
questions' was considered sound advice.
Respondents are more likely to respond to surveys that they consider important or
prestigious (Mangione, 1995 and references therein). On this basis, the suggestion
of official sponsorship by a recognised body had already been considered. A
research proposal was submitted to the Institute of Chartered Accountants for
England and Wales (ICAEW). However, their acceptance of the project and award
of funds did not coincide with the time of mailing. Therefore, it was not possible to
benefit by communicating ICAEW sponsorship to possible respondents.
Perhaps the most useful feedback from pilot testing was that one participant thought
that most questions were irrelevant if a company had no debt or leasing. Although
this was the case for some questions, it was by no means for all. For example,
respondents might still maintain target proportions of debt and equity even if the
target proportion of debt is zero. To avoid any further misunderstandings, the
questionnaire was modified to include definitions of key terms up front, prior to
their use in actual questions.
4.4.3 Final version
The final version of the questionnaire comprised 13 pages of questions divided into
four sections (Appendix 3). Back to back printing was used to give a lighter
appearance and it was professionally produced in a booklet form. The outer cover
was coloured blue with the University of Stirling crest reproduced on the front in
order to attract respondents' attention 4. The front cover was also used to give notes
about the questionnaire and contact details. Respondents were asked not to let their
responses to any questions be affected by other questions which they either did not
wish to, or were unable to answer. They were also asked to follow instructions, as
not all questions applied to all respondents. The confidentiality of answers was
Bourque and Fielder (1995) suggest colour and varied print as an eye-catching technique. A few
studies show that the colour of the questionnaire cover affects response rates, with colour being more
effective than white (Gullahorn and Gullahorn, 1963; Pressley and Tullar, 1977; Purcel et al., 1971)
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stressed as respondents were assured that any information provided would not be
publicly associated with their company identity at any stage.
The vast majority of questions used were close-ended requiring (i) yes/no or
multiple choice answers; (ii) ranking of a group of alternatives in order of
preference; or (iii) choosing from a rating scale. Five point rating scales were
adopted, with categories presented in ascending order (for example: ranging from 1-
not important to 5-very important or 1-strongly disagree to 5-strongly agree). The
use of longer narrative type open-ended questions was more or less avoided,
because of the difficulty involved in processing the information obtained from them.
They were, however, included at the end of sections in the form of 'anything else?'
in order to be polite and possibly obtain any additional information (Mangione,
1995). A 'don't know' response category was included in certain questions where it
was thought that respondents might need to express it. However, it was not
universally included on the basis that if 'don't know' categories are provided, more
respondents will use them (Mangione, 1995).
Attention was drawn to definitions of the key terms used in questions on the content
page. Respondents were specifically asked to interpret capital structure as the mix of
debt finance and equity finance. Debt finance was defined as long-term debt, short-
term debt and leasing; and equity finance was defined as internal reserves (e.g.
retained profit) as well as ordinary and preference share capital. Target capital
structure was described as a policy of using approximately constant proportions of
debt and equity finance including a policy of using zero debt finance.
Section A contained 21 questions requesting information about the individual
company's capital structure decision-making processes. A summary of the questions
asked is shown in Table 4.3. The area of investigation and source of the questions
is shown in Table 4.4. Questions 1 to 4 related to target capital structure. They
required information concerning the existence of targets, an indication of the target
amount of debt, who/what influences targets and the frequency with which they are
reviewed. Question 5 investigated how flexible capital structure decisions are in
relation to investment and dividend decisions. Question 6 investigated whether
companies follow a hierarchy of financing sources and which were considered the
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vestment, divi
roflow a hiera
:ing total debt
believe in a debt limit?
rany measure financial
Qu 13: Does company have a spare borrowing
capacity?
Qu 14: i-las company consicerea issi
foreign countries/currencies?
Qu 15: What is company's competiti
Table 4.3: Summary of capital structure questions in section A
I Qu 1: Does company have target capital structure?
NO
IYES
10: How is the maximum defined?
11: Are lease payments included in financial gearing measures?
12: Are book or market values used in debt to ecluit y ratios
Qu 2: What is target amount of debt?
Qu 3: Influences on setting target capital
structure
Qu 4: Frequency target capital structure
is reviewed
5:
7: Factors i
8: How are
9: Does coi
10: Does yoi
structure decisions?
If YES, rank alternatives
If YES, how defined
If YES, % of existing total
borrowing maintained
Nature & Source
Reason for policy
If YES, what factors influc
decision
NO
Qu 16: How is company managed?
Qu 17: Expansion of company's business 	 If YES, what strategy
Qu 18: Does company offer management incentive
schemes?	 If YES, what forms do schemes take
Ou 19: Estimate %.of time company securities priced fairl y by market
21: Any additional information on how	 structure is determined
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Table 4.4: Area of investigation and source of questions in sections A & B
Question	 Area of investigation	 Source
Section A	 Researchers'	 Question
1	 Static trade-off theory	 P & W	 1
	
G&H	 II
2	 Static trade-off theory	 Own
3	 Static trade-off theory 	 S & J	 12
(modified)
4	 Static trade-off theory	 Own
5	 Static trade-off theory versus Pecking order theory
	 P & W	 5
6	 Pecking order theory
	 P & W
(modified)
7	 (a) Interest tax shield benefit of debt
	 P & W	 6
(li)	 and
(c) G&H	 12
(d) Financial distress potential of debt
	 P & W, G & H
	 6, 12
(e) P&W	 3
(f) G&H	 12
(g) Agency cost of debt 	 P & W	 6
(h) Corporate control/Pecking order 	 P & W	 6
(i) Financial distress potential 	 P & W	 6
(j) Agencybenefitof debt
	 G&H	 12
(k) Corporate control	 G & H
	 12
(I) Environment considerations 	 N; G & H	 1, 5
(m) Pecking-order/financial distress
	 0 & H	 12
8	 Finance director's influence in decision making
	 Own
9	 Debt capacity	 S & J	 12 & 13
(developed)
10	 Financial gearing	 S & J	 3
Ii	 S&J	 4
12	 S&J	 5
13	 Debt capacity	 A
14	 Environment considerations	 G & H	 8
15	 Strategic environment	 J, L & T
16	 B
17	 B
18	 Personal stake of managers	 M,T & Y
19	 Asymmetric information/market efficiency
	 P & W	 4
20	 Duration of debt finance	 0 & H	 5
(modified)
Section B
I	 (a) Interest tax shield benefit of debt 	 N	 20-22
(b) Interest tax shield benefit of debt 	 N	 20-22
(c) Static trade-off theory	 N
(d) Stakeholder theory
	 N
(e) Stakeholder theory/ financial distress potential
	 N	 25
(f) Agency cost and benefit of debt
	 N	 8
(g) Asymmetric information and signalling	 N	 7
(h) Agency cost and benefit of debt
	 N	 10
(i) Asynuneiric information and signalling
	 N; P & W	 1, 6
Ci) Asymmetric information and signalling	 N	 3
(k) Asymmetric information and signalling
	 N; 0 & H	 4, 10
(I) Asymmetric information and signalling
	 N	 9
(m) Asymmetric information and signalling
	 G & H
	 12
(n) Corporate control	 0 & H	 10
(o) Pecking order theory	 G & H
	 13
(p) Asymmetric information and signalling	 N
(q) Transaction costs	 0 & H	 13
'P & W: Pinegar and Wilbricht (l989); G & H: Graham and Harvey (2001); S & J: Scott and Johnson (1982)
N: Norton (1989); A: Allen (1991); J, L & T: Jordon, Lowe and Taylor (1998); B: Belkaoui (1999);
M, T & Y: Mehran, Taggart and Yermack (1999)
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most/least favourable. The relative importance of different factors in choosing the
amount of total debt was addressed in question 7. Question 8 asked how financing
decisions are made and question 9 investigated the existence of a debt limit and how
it is defined. Questions 10 to 12 asked about measuring financial gearing, is it
measured and if so how? Question 13 investigated the existence, scope, nature,
source and reason for maintaining spare borrowing capacity. The issue of debt in
foreign countries/currencies was considered in question 14. Questions 15 to 18 were
concerned with company policy or strategy in relation to competition, management,
expansion and incentive schemes. Respondents views on market efficiency were
investigated in question 19, and the choice between short and long term debt in
question 20. Finally, question 21 asked for any additional information on how
respondents' capital structure is determined.
Section B contained one large multiple sectioned question designed to gauge
respondents' attitudes to general statements regarding the determinants of capital
structure.
Section C contained 10 questions requesting information about the individual
company's leasing policy. A summary of the questions asked is shown in Table 4.5,
and the areas of investigation and source of questions in Table 4.6. Question 1
investigated the past, current and future use of leasing. Respondents who had no
experience of, or inclination to use leasing, were exempt the next seven questions.
Question 1 went on to further investigate the use of both finance and operating
leases over different time horizons for different types of asset. Questions 2 and 3
investigated the basis on which leasing decisions are made and to which alternative
sources of finance is leasing compared. Question 4 considered how leasing fits in
with overall financing decisions. Question 5 covered the relative importance of
factors in the decision to lease both land and buildings and other assets 5 . Questions
6 and 7 investigated the use of lease agreements with contingent elements and
agreements with an interest in residual values. All respondents were asked to
complete the final three questions. Question 8 investigated respondents' perceptions
of the relationship between both operating leases and finance leases and borrowing.
An explanation as to why the decisions to lease land and buildings and other assets were
investigated separately can be found in chapter 5.
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Table 4.5: Summary of leasing questions in section C
1: Past use, current use, future use of
YES
	
NO
Qu 1: Past, current, future use of operating leases and finance
leases for different asset types
Qu2: How is leasing decision made?
Qu3: With which alternative sources of finance is leasing
comnared?
Qu4: How does leasing fit in with oera11 financing decision
Qu5: The relative importance of factors in decision to lease
land and buildings and other assets
Qu6: Popularity of lease agreements with contingent elements
Qu7: Popularity of lease agreements with an interest in residual
values
Qu 8: Relationship between leasing and borrowing 	 I
Qu9: The relative importance of factors in decision not to lease land
and buildings and other assets
comments?
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Table 4.6: Area of investigation and source of questions in section C
Question	 Area of investigation	 Source
Researchers' 	 Question
Use of leasing	 F & T	 1
H&H	 1
M&N	 1&2
_______ _______________________ B&M
	 1
2	 Is leasing an investment/financing decision 	 F & T	 14
O&N	 2
D&B	 7
M	 4
_______ _______________________ B&M	 4
3	 Choice of funds other than leasing 	 D & B	 8
4	 - How leasing fits with overall financing decision	 Own	 _____________
5	 (a) Borrowing capacity and repayment reasons 	 M & N	 4
(b) Cash flow considerations	 M & N	 4
(c) Cost	 Own
(d) Cost	 H & H; D & B	 2, 1
(e) Other financial/transactional reasons	 D & B	 1
(I) Other financial/transactional reasons 	 1) & B	 1
(g) Borrowing capacity and repayment reasons 	 D & B	 1
(h) Borrowing capacity and repayment reasons 	 D & B	 1
(i) Cost	 Own
U) Borrowing capacity and repayment reasons 	 B & M	 5
(k) Borrowing capacity and repayment reasons	 Own
(1) Borrowing capacity and repayment reasons 	 F & T	 8
(m) Borrowing capacity and repayment reasons 	 M	 6
(n) Cash flow considerations 	 H & H	 2
(o) Tax saving reasons	 Own
(p) Risk sharing reasons	 Own
(q) Risk sharing reasons	 Own
(r) Risk sharing reasons	 Own
(s) Risk sharing reasons	 Own
(t) Risk sharing reasons	 Own
(u) Borrowing capacity and repayment reasons 	 Own
(v) Other financial/transactional reasons	 Own
(w) Tax saving reasons	 Own
(x) Tax saving reasons 	 Own
(y) Tax saving reasons 	 Own
6	 Use of contingent rentals 	 Own
7	 Interest in residual value	 Own
8	 Lease-Debt substitutability 	 F & T	 9
H&H	 2
M	 5
_______________________ B&M	 4
9	 (a)Cost	 D&B	 2
F&T	 18
M&N	 5
(b) Company preference 	 M & N	 5
(c) Individual preference 	 D & B	 2
(d) Perception of leasing	 D & B	 2
(e) Borrowing capacity and repayment reasons 	 D & B	 2
(I) Risk reasons	 Own
(g) Tax reasons	 D & B	 2
(h) Risk reasons	 Own
(i) Risk reasons	 Own
'F & T: Fawthrop and Terry (1975); H & H: Hull and Hubbard (1980); M & N: Mayes and
Nicholas (1988); B & M: Bathala and Mukherjee (1995); 0 & N: O'Brien and Nunnally (1983);
D & B: Drury and Braund (1990); M: Mukherjee (1991).
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Question 9 investigated the relative importance of factors in decisions not to lease
land and buildings and other assets, and question 10 asked for any other general
comments.
Section D of the questionnaire requested general information from respondents.
They were asked if they would be willing to participate in an interview to enable the
issues raised in the questionnaire to be explored in more detail. If they were willing,
they were asked to indicate the preferred form of communication, i.e. face-to-face,
telephone or e-mail. Respondents were also asked to provide their name and
position in order to assess if they were potentially knowledgeable about financing
decisions, in order to attach some credibility to responses.
Respondents were asked if they would like to receive a summary of the results for
this study, across all companies and for their individual industry sectors. It was
anticipated that respondents might find it interesting and valuable to make
comparisons between themselves and others. This incentive provided the
opportunity to say 'thank you' for respondents' time and also to possibly act as an
encouragement to respond (Dommeyer, 1985; Hubbard and Little, 1988). Finally,
respondents were notified of the other survey, to investigate finance directors' views
on lease accounting reform, and invited to participate.
4.5: Survey administration
4.5.1 Time period
The questionnaire was originally mailed to the sample of 831 finance directors on
3rd of July 2000. Although it was recognised that this time period could coincide
with the start of summer vacations, it was not logistically possible to mail both
questionnaires at exactly the same time 6. However, as the majority of companies
mailed were based in England, where traditional holiday periods span mid July to
the end of August to coincide with schooling, the timing was not considered to be
problematic. In addition, total mailings (i.e. initial plus two follow-ups) covered a
6 The lease accounting reform questionnaire progressed more quickly through post pilot
modifications and printing, and was thus dispatched first in June 2000.
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four-week duration, and even if potential respondents were on vacation, it was
unlikely to be for the entire period.
4.5.2 Initial package
The initial package contained the questionnaire, a covering letter and a return
envelope. For identification purposes, the questionnaires were sequentially
numbered, by hand, on the top right hand corner after printing. Identification was
considered necessary for further analysis using accounting data (collected separately
from the questionnaire), and desirable for identifying non-respondents.
Identification via the request for respondents' personal details in Section D of the
questionnaire was not anticipated to be reliable.
Identification numbers were also printed on the covering letters, outward address
labels and return address labels. All four components were matched when compiling
the package. This process eliminated the risk of sending a letter addressed to one
potential respondent in an envelope addressed to another. It also prevented an
incorrect identification of who completed the questionnaire. Identification numbers
were printed on return address labels for efficiency purposes. It allowed respondents
to be identified quickly, without having to open return envelopes, when preparing
further mailings to non-respondents.
Covering letter
The covering letter was professionally produced using The Department of
Accounting, Finance and Law's official letterhead, depicting The University of
Stirling crest. 7 Bourque and Fielder (1995) note that many covering letters create
the impression of bulk mailing because they are not dated, or if they are dated, the
date bears no connection with the mailing as a result of poor administrative
procedures. In the present study, the covering letter was dated to coincide exactly
with mailing in oMer to add to the impression that the views of potential
respondents were important and specifically sought.
Mangione (1995) notes that is essential to make it abundantly clear who is administering a survey.
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The letter was addressed to each finance director personally, as this has previously
been suggested to substantially improve response rate (Mayer-Sommer, 1979). It
had not been possible to distinguish gender in the mailing list construction process,
so to avoid any possible offence, titles were omitted, and the letter was addressed
'Dear Sir/Madam'. All letters were further personalised by the actual signature of
the three researchers involved, in the hope that potential respondents would
recognise the commitment to this project, and would be subsequently encouraged to
respond. The academic and professional qualifications and status of the researchers
were also provided, to enable potential respondents to gauge who they were dealing
with.
A copy of the content of the covering letter is included in Appendix 4. An
'attention-grabbing' first sentence is said to be essential to encourage potential
respondents to read on (Mangione, 1995). On this basis, the timing of the present
study was particularly fortunate. It was being conducted in the first year of a new
century. 'The dawn of a new millennium', as widely recognised by marketers, is a
concept that evokes emotion, and of which a vast majority wants to be part.
Consequently, the covering letter contained an initial request for 'assistance to
provide insight into the corporate financing decision-making processes of UK
companies at the beginning of the 21st century'. Mangione (1995) notes that it is
important to identify why potential respondents should co-operate in a survey.
Therefore, it was further stressed that finance directors of UK public limited
companies were in the forefront of such decision making, and it was their
experience and opinions that were of paramount importance.
The specific interest in leasing was highlighted in the covering letter, and it was
noted that this was especially topical given the recent publication of the new
proposals for lease accounting. However, potential respondents were encouraged to
complete the questionnaire irrespective of the degree of leasing undertaken by their
companies, with the aim of obtaining a balanced view. Mangione (1995) stressed
the importance of an explanation of who is being asked to participate in a survey, to
provide the potential respondent with an indication of how their name and address
was obtained. In the present study, potential respondents were advised that they had
been selected from the population of UK quoted companies. A brief explanation
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that the present study was part of an ongoing project of research, and that the
findings to date had been published in academic/professional journals, was used to
promote credibility and status (Mangione, 1995).
The covering letter requested that all potential respondents return the questionnaire
in the envelope provided. Those who decided not to participate were asked to return
it blank, noting the reason for non-completion. This request was based on the
suggestion that respondents might be more encouraged to complete a questionnaire
rather than offer a reason of why they had declined to do so (Mayer-Sommer, 1979).
It was also expected to increase the efficiency of the reminder process. It is a waste
of resources to remind potential respondents who have no intention of completing a
questionnaire, and would be willing to provide awareness of the fact by returning it
uncompeted. Also, reasons provided for non-completion might be useful
considerations for future survey research.
Return envelope
A4 envelopes were used, based on the suggestion that respondents should not have
to fold questionnaires in order to return them (Mangione, 1995). The return
envelope was labelled with the name and address of the survey instigator, and was
pre-paid using postage stamps. It has been suggested that placing a stamp on an
envelope exerts subtle pressure on potential respondents to return the questionnaire,
so the 'stamp will not go to waste' (Mangione, 1995 and references therein). First
class stamps were used, as second class would not exert as much pressure. Also,
first class stamps facilitated faster returns.
4.5.3 Reminder process
It is suggested that, at minimum, one reminder letter should be sent to non-
respondents at apprbximately 10 to 14 days after an initial mailing (Bourque and
Fielder, 1995). In the present study, a first reminder letter was sent on 17th July 2000
(14 days after the initial mailing) to all non-respondents at that date. The letter
(Appendix 5) noted that a response had not as yet been received, and reiterated the
importance of respondents contribution to the survey. Contact details were provided
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to request another copy of the questionnaire if required (Bourque and Fielder,
1995).
Various researchers recommend subsequent follow-ups at further two-week
intervals (Bourque and Fielder, 1995; Mangione, 1995). In the present study, the
second and final reminder was mailed on August 2000. This mailing mirrored the
initial package. It contained another copy of the questionnaire, a stamped return
envelope and accompanying letter (Appendix 6). The letter again noted a response
had not as yet been received, and reiterated the information provided earlier.
4.6: Questionnaire returns
On the day it was received in the mail, each return envelope was date stamped. This
process identifies early and late participants, whose responses can be compared in
order to gauge non-response bias (Herbert and Wallace, 1996). Also the timing of
responses provides a useful indication of the effectiveness of each mailing for use in
future survey research.
The information obtained from completed questionnaires was input into an Excel
spreadsheet. This was a relatively simple process because the majority of questions
had either numerical values attached to each answer (rating scales and orders of
preference) or involved ticking sequentially labelled options. Any narrative
provided by respondents was input as comments in the spreadsheet cells against
respective question numbers. A list of all the comments, made by all respondents,
was obtained for analysis purposes.
Simple summary statistics were obtained using spreadsheet functions. However,
more complex tests were performed by transferring the data to the Minitab statistics
package.
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Chapter 5: Results from the corporate financing and leasing
decisions fluestionnaire
5.1: Response profile, sample representativeness and non-response bias
The Leasing and Corporate Financing Decisions questionnaire was completed by
198 respondents; 192 from the 831 mailed (approximately 23% response rate) and 6
companies who received the Lease Accounting Reform questionnaire.
Of the remaining 639, 225 returned the questionnaire uncompleted, whilst 414
failed to acknowledge receipt. A summary of the reasons given for non-completion
is shown in Table 5.1. The most popular reason appeared to be time constraints,
followed by a company policy not to participate in questionnaire surveys. Only one
questionnaire was returned marked 'wrongly addressed', indicating that the process
of verifying finance directors' names and addresses by telephone appeared to be
successful.
The response is relatively favourable considering previous surveys conducted in the
UK, at a time when the business pressures on corporate personnel, were, perhaps,
less acute. For example, in leasing surveys addressed to UK quoted companies,
Taylor and Turley also obtained 198 responses (response rate 39.6%) over 1982 to
1983, and Drury and Braund (1990) obtained 273 responses (response rate 28%). In
relation to previous capital structure surveys in the US of the Fortune 500/1000
firms, a notable decrease in response rate can be observed over time. For example,
Scott and Johnson (1982) achieved 39.6% and Pinegar and Wilbricht (1989)
achieved 35.2% compared to 12% by Trahan and Gitman (1995) and 8.5% by
Graham and Harvey (2001). In comparison with Graham and Harvey's latest US
capital structure survey, the response rate to this questionnaire is fairly impressive.
In an attempt to establish the authority of the information provided the company
status of persons completing the questionnaire was requested. Of respondents who
provided personal details, approximately 63% indicated they held the position of
finance director I group finance director, for whom the questionnaire was intended
(Table 5.2). The remainder appeared to hold other senior corporate positions.
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Table 5.1: Reasons provided for non-completion
Reason for non-completion	 Number of companies Percentage of companies
No time/too busy	 75	 33.33
Company policy	 43	 19.11
Returned uncompleted with no reason
	 24	 10.67
Regrets	 15	 6.67
No leasing/borrowing	 10	 4.44
Questionnaire N/A
	 9	 4.00
Finance Directors left company
	 6	 2.67
Too many questionnaires received
	 6	 2.67
Finance Director's policy 	 5	 2.22
Questionnaire too long/detailed 	 5	 2.22
No resources to complete
	 4	 1.78
Shell company	 4	 1.78
CompanyT/O	 3	 1.33
Finance Director away on business 	 3	 1.33
Involved in merger 	 2	 0.89
No Finance Director	 2	 0.89
Shortly delisted	 2	 0.89
Company involved in acquisition 	 1	 0.44
Company under acquisition 	 1	 0.44
Disposing of UK operations	 1	 0.44
Finance Director new to post	 1	 0.44
Nothing useful to say	 1	 0.44
Require charity donation 	 1	 0.44
Wrongly addressed	 1	 0.44
Total	 225	 100
Table 5.2: Respondents' corporate positions
125 respondents failed to provide their name and company position on the questionnaire
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Approximately 125 respondents failed to provide their name and company position
on the questionnaire. However this might be because the respondent was the
original addressee, i.e. finance director. If this were not the case and respondents
were not informed in leasing and corporate financing decision making, the validity
of responses could be questioned.
To investigate whether the sample of responding companies is representative of the
entire population of UK quoted industrial companies, a comparison was made on
the basis of industry profile and company size (Moore and Reichert, 1983).
The FT industry classification of the entire population compared to that of the
sample of respondents is shown in Table 5.3. The support service industry is most
prominent in both the population and responding sample, although it is represented
in a slightly higher proportion in the sample. The majority of other industry
classifications appear to have similar representation in the sample and population.
The telecommunication services industry, diversified industries and gas distribution
industries are not represented in the responding sample. However these industries
are not heavily represented in the population as a whole. A chi-square test indicated
that there was no statistically significant difference between the industry profile of
the population and that of the sample of respondents.
Summary statistics of total assets, as an indication of company size, for the
population and responding sample are shown in Table 5.4. The mean total assets for
the sample is 136.9% of the population's mean total assets. Therefore, the average
size of companies in the sample is slightly higher than that in the population. In
addition, the minimum total assets for companies in the population is £5k, compared
to £701k in the responding sample. Therefore the responding sample appears to
contain a slightly higher proportion of larger companies. A formal t-test confirmed
that the mean total assets for the population and responding sample were not
statistically significantly different. Also, a Mann-Whitney confidence interval and
test confirmed that the median total assets for the population and respondents were
not significantly different. In summary, the responding sample, in terms of industry
profile and company size, appears to be fairly representative of the UKQI
population as a whole.
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Table 5.3:Industry classification for population and respondents
_____________________________ 	 Po ulation	 Respondents
Number	 of	 Number of
Industry	 Companies Percentage Companies Percentage
Support services	 105	 8.43	 19	 9.60
Construction & Building Materials 	 99	 7.95	 13	 6.57
Software & Computer Services	 94	 7.54	 15	 7.58
Media & Photography	 91	 7.30	 10	 5.05
General Retailers	 79	 6.34	 12	 6.06
Household Goods & Textiles	 77	 6.18	 12	 6.06
Engineering & Machinery 	 76	 6.10	 12	 6.06
Leisure, Entertainment & Hotels 	 76	 6.10	 11	 5.56
Distributors	 65	 5.22	 6	 3.03
Electronic & Electrical Equipment	 49	 3.93	 3	 1.52
Restaurants, Pubs & Breweries 	 44	 3.53	 8	 4.04
Food Producers & Processors	 43	 3.45	 8	 4.04
Transport	 43	 3.45	 6	 3.03
Pharmaceuticals	 37	 2.97	 9	 4.55
Health	 34	 2.73	 8	 4.04
Oil & Gas	 32	 2.57	 8	 4.04
Chemicals	 25	 2.01	 4	 2.02
Information Technology Hardware	 24	 1.93	 3	 1.52
Food & Drug Retailer 	 21	 1.69	 6	 3.03
Mining	 15	 1.20	 5	 2.53
Aerospace & Defence 	 14	 1.12	 3	 1.52
Packaging	 14	 1.12	 3	 1.52
Telecommunication Services 	 14	 1.12	 0	 0.00
Water	 13	 1.04	 3	 1.52
Automobiles	 12	 0.96	 3	 1.52
Beverages	 10	 0.80	 2	 1.01
Electricity	 9	 0.72	 2	 1.01
Personal Care & Household Products 	 9	 0.72	 1	 0.51
Steel & Other Metals 	 7	 0.56	 1	 0.51
Dversified Industries	 5	 0.40	 0	 0.00
Forrestry & Paper 	 4	 0.32	 1	 0.51
Gas Distribution	 3	 0.24	 0	 0.00
Tobacco	 3	 0.24	 1	 0.51
TOTAL	 1246	 100.00	 198	 100.00
Utu-square=7.o9 p=U.4ti4
Table 5.4: Total assets profile for population and respondents
	UKQI	 Sample of Test	 p
Population	 Respondents Statistic
N	 1246	 198
Mean (m)
	 637	 872	 -1.25	 0.21
Median (i'm)
	 52	 71
Standard Deviation (i'm)
	
2590	 2427
Minimum ('000)
	 5	 701
Maximum (fm)
	
55394	 17288
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The existence of non-response bias was investigated in two ways. Firstly, by
comparing the responses given to key questions by early and late respondents, using
late respondents as a proxy for non-respondents (Roberts, 1999). Secondly,
respondents with significant leasing activity might be expected to be more
motivated to respond to a 'Leasing and Corporate Financing Decisions'
questionnaire, than respondents without. Therefore, the responses to key questions
were further compared based on the degree of operating lease use. The use of
operating leases was selected on the basis that previous research has documented
their predominant and prolific use (Beattie et al., 1998). Also, obtaining a
combination of both finance and operating lease use would require the collection of
a significant amount of data in order to follow an operating lease capitalisation
process.
Early versus late respondents
Questionnaires were returned in the time period from July to 29th September
2000. Respondents were classified into one of three groups, 'early', 'middle' and
'late' respondents, according to the date their completed questionnaire was received.
Those received between 5 July to 11th July were classed as 'early', those between
July to 3' August were classed as 'middle' and those between 4th August to
29th September as 'late'.
The responses to key questions relating to debt levels and leasing policy were
analysed by early and late respondents. A comparison was made on the basis of the
existence of a target capital structure, following a hierarchy of financial sources, the
maintenance of spare borrowing capacity and the relative importance of factors in
choosing the appropriate amount of total debt. The use of leasing, the relative
importance of factors in the decisions to lease and not to lease were also compared
(Appendix 7).
The differences in response to these key questions were not found to be statistically
significant, with two exceptions. Firstly, late respondents placed more importance
on a positive outcome to quantitative analysis in the decision to lease both land and
buildings and other assets, compared to early respondents (row 4, Panel F & Panel
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G). Secondly, late respondents thought that the ability of leasing to reduce/eliminate
the risk of ownership was more important (row 14, Panel F and row 11, Panel 0).
High operating lease users versus low operating lease users
Respondents were classified into one of three equal groups according to their degree
of operating lease use. Operating lease use was measured by the ratio of operating
lease rental expensed in the profit and loss account 1 to total sales 2 . Ratios for 'low'
users ranged from 0 to 0.0089, for 'medium' users 0.0090 to 0.0238, and for 'high'
users 0.0243 to 0.6486.
The responses to the same key questions were analysed by operating lease use
(Appendix 8). The differences in response to maintaining a target capital structure,
following a hierarchy of financial sources, and maintaining spare borrowing
capacity were not found to be statistically significant (Panels A, B & C). A greater
proportion of respondents classified as high operating lease users responded
positively to past, present or future use of leasing (Panel D) 4. The differences in
response to the relative importance of factors in choosing the appropriate amount of
total debt were also not statistically significant (Panel E). However, high operating
lease users placed more importance on the avoidance of large capital outlay in the
decision to lease land and buildings (row 1, Panel F), and less importance on the
rate of interest implicit in a lease agreement compared to the cost of borrowing to
purchase (row 3, Panel F). The latter was also the case in the decision to lease other
assets (row 1, Panel 0).
'Obtained by displaying the Extel card for each company in Sequencer as item not available in
Datastream.
2 Datastream item 104
One company had £24K total operating lease rental in relation to £37K sales. With the exception of
this company, the highest ratio was 0.1845.
Surprisingly, 17% of respondents (10 companies) classified as middle and high operating lease
users failed to acknowledge past, present or future use of leasing. However, leasing was not
explicitly previously defined to include both finance leases and operating leases.
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The provision of total financing of an asset was considered more important, by high
operating lease users, in the decision to lease other assets (row 8, Panel G). High
operating lease users also placed less importance on the expense of leasing and
company preference for legal ownership in the decision not to lease land and
buildings (rows 1, 2 & 5, Panel H). However, respondents did provide some
indication that certain properties are only available to lease, in which case the
expense involved and preference for legal ownership would not be of issue.
In summary, the significant differences in the responses given by early and late
respondents and low and high operating lease users are relatively minor. Also, there
was no indication of any strongly opposing views. Therefore, the responses reported
should not be unduly affected by non-response bias.
5.2: The Determinants of Capital Structure
5.2.1 General issues regarding the corporate management of capital structures
The personal influence of the finance director over company financing decisions is
evident from the questionnaire responses. In approximately 77% of companies,
financing decisions by the board of directors are based on the finance director's own
decisions or on his/her recommendations or information (Table 5.5).
The existence of a maximum amount of debt financing that should not be surpassed
was acknowledged by 69% of companies. Nearly all of respondents indicated that
this maximum is defined with reference to a limit placed on balance sheet and/or
income statement gearing ratios (Table 5.6).
Financial gearing is measured by 75% of respondents. The relative importance of
various gearing measures is shown, in descending order of importance, in Table 5.7,
Panel B. For all measures, the average tesponse was statistically significantly
different from 1, i.e. not being used. Therefore, these findings appear to suggest the
use of multiple measures of financial gearing by respondents. The two measures of
primary importance among respondents were an income statement measure, interest
cover, measured as earnings before interest and taxes divided by total interest
expense (mean=4.09, row 1), and the net debt to equity ratio (mean=3.96, row 2).
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Table 5.5: How financing decisions are made
Row
	
	
Percentage of
By agreement between board of directors based on:
1 Recommendations provided by fmance director 	 52
2 General discussion based on individual opinions 	 22
3 The board of directors supports decisions made by	 14
finance director
4 Information provided by finance director 	 11
1 Decision making processes are shown in descending order of frequency
Table 5.6: Existence and definition of maximum amount of debt financing
_________________________________________________ 
Percentage of respondents (n=194)
Is there some maximum amount of debt financing that
should not be surpassed?
Yes	 69
No	 31
Row How is the maximum defined?	 Percentage of respondents (n=130)1
1	 By limit of balance sheet gearing ratio 	 35
2 By limit of income statement gearing ratio 	 34
3 By limit of both balance sheet and income statement	
22gearing ratios
4 By maintaining a bond rating
	 4
5 Other	 5
1 Deflnitions of maximum debt financing are shown in descending order of frequency
179
Table 5.7: Financial gearing measurements
Panel A:
	 Yes	 No
Does your company measure financial gearing? (n= 188)
	 75%	 25%
Panel B:
If so what is the relative importance on the following measures?
Question asked	 Response category'
(abbreviated)	 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 DK	 n	 Mean2 Standard Rank3
_____________________________ Percentage of respondents	 ________ ________ Deviation
1 Interest cover, measured as
earnings before interest and taxes
- divided by total interest expense
	 6	 4 10 36 44 0	 140	 4.09	 1.11	 1
2 Net debt divided by equity	 6	 6 11 36 39 0	 140	 3.96	 1.16	 ______
3 Long-term debt divided by equity	 5 24 21 14 6	 0	 127	 2.34	 1.26	 2
4 Long-term debt divided by total
debt plus equity	 35 30 17 13	 5	 0	 127	 2.21	 1.19	 2
5 Interest cover, measured as
earnings before interest and taxes
divided by total interest expense
plus the before tax equivalent of
- preference dividend payments	 53 17 11 11	 8	 0	 123	 2.05	 1.35	 3
I 11UL UO4.I	 IILI1 LLIIJ!.JL LCt1¼&, J-Jan U ILII}JUI W.IIL •TUIt}JSJi Lain., J V.sflJ UiipUi Lain.
2 All mean responses significantly different from not important at all (ie. 1) at 1% level (one-tailed test)
3 Ranking based on statistical difference between adjacent mean ranks at 5% (Mann-Whitney confidence interval
and test procedure in Minitab)
Panel C:
Are fixed lease payments
recognised in financial gearing
measures? (n'149)
Do not
Yes	 No	 lease
61%	 21%	 18%
Panel D:
Book	 Market
Values	 Values	 Both
How is debt to equity ratio measured?
	
83%	 12%
	
5%
(n= 138)
180
Long-term debt divided by either equity or total debt plus equity were considered of
secondary importance (mean=2.34 and 2.21, rows 3 and 4). The measure interest
cover including the before tax equivalent of preference dividends was considered
the least important (mean=2.05, row 5).
Among respondents who measure gearing and are engaged in leasing,
approximately 75% recognise fixed finance and operating lease payments in
financial gearing measures (Table 5.7, Panel C). These findings appear to suggest
that the majority of company managers view lease and debt finance as substitutes.
The majority of respondents measuring debt to equity ratios use book values (83%,
Table 5.7, Panel D). These findings appear to support the use of book values in
empirical regression studies when analysing company managements' past actions.
A policy for maintaining spare borrowing capacity was acknowledged by 59% of
companies (Table 5.8). Among respondents who were able to quantify their
borrowing capacity (n=64), on average, 29% of existing long-term borrowing was
maintained as spare. Respondents were asked the nature and source of their spare
borrowing capacity. An overdraft facility was the most common source, being
applicable to 73% of respondents. Unsecured loans, secured loans and leasing/hire
purchase also featured as significant across companies. However, mortgage lending
and debentures as sources of spare borrowing capacity appear to be quite rare (only
applicable to 4% and 2% of respondents, respectively). The most frequently quoted
'other' source of borrowing capacity was committed facilities.
The major reason for maintaining spare borrowing capacity appears to be for
unplanned opportunities, as indicated by 68% of respondents. However, another
reason given by the majority of respondents was for the purpose of acquisitions
(54%). A reserve for times of crisis and for special projects also featured as reasons
for maintaining spare debt capacity (applioable to 44% and 31% of respondents,
respectively). The most frequently quoted 'other' reason for maintaining spare
borrowing capacity was volatility/high seasonal variation in cash flows.
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Table 5.8: Spare borrowing capacity
Panel A:	 Yes	 No
Does your company have a policy for maintaining
spare borrowing capacity? (n=193)
	 59%
	 41%
Panel B:
Mean	 Standard
Deviatj0
Percentage of existing total long-term borrowing
maintained as spare (n=64) 	 29	 22
Panel C:
Of the 114 companies who maintain spare borrowing capacity:
Percentage of
Row Nature and source of spare borrowing capacity:	 Respondents' (11=114)2
1	 Overdraft facility	 73
2 Unsecured Loans	 32
3	 Leasing/hire purchase	 21
4 Secured Loans	 20
5 Mortgage lending	 4
6 Debentures	 2
7	 Other	 12
.-'- .	 •
r i uLac LALcU I VU 70 a I CUUULUL WLI L O.I'JI.I LU U¼d. an appuLauIc ULIUU
2Nature and source of spare borrowing capacity are shown in descending order of frequency
Panel D:
Percentage of
Row Reasons for spare borrowing capacity 	 Respondents1 (11=114)2
1	 Unplanned opportunities 	 68
2	 For acquisitions	 54
3	 Reserve for crisis 	 44
4	 For Special Projects	 31
5	 Other	 8
1 Percentages exceed 100% as respondents were asked to tick all applicable options
2Reasons for spare borrowing capacity are shown in descending order of frequency
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5.2.2 The degree of capital structure flexibility
In the static trade-off theory of capital structure, companies are said to operate with
a target debtlequity ratio at which the costs and benefits of issuing debt are
balanced. Respondents were, therefore, asked the extent to which their company
sought to maintain a target capital structure. Although 51% indicated that they did
maintain a target, 37% claimed it to be flexible with only 14% being reasonably
strict (Table 5.9).
The mean target amount of debt for this 51% of companies, expressed as a
proportion of debt plus equity, was approximately 45%. Although target amounts of
debt ranged from 0% to 300%, 80% of respondents indicated an amount of 50% or
less.
The adoption of a flexible target amount of debt is consistent with actual
fluctuations in debt levels being observed over time. However, the costs and
benefits of issuing debt are unlikely to remain static. Therefore, actual fluctuations
in debt over time could also arise from changes in the target. Respondents were
asked if their target was reviewed on a regular basis, for example every three years.
Two-thirds (67%) indicated this to be the case. When capital structure targets were
not reviewed regularly, respondents were asked, in an open-ended question, to
specify what would trigger a review. The two most frequently quoted responses
were that there was a continuous review of capital structure targets, or that reviews
coincided with substantial acquisition, merger and investment activities.
Respondents were asked who or what influences target capital structure ratios. The
responses, ranked in descending order of importance, are shown in Table 5.10. On
average, company senior management were ranked the most important (mean=1.65,
row 1). Moderate importance was attached to both existing shareholders and
commercial banks. There was a high variation in responses for all parties except
company senior management (ranked top) and major trade creditors (ranked
bottom). Although the mean ranking provides some indication of the relative
importance of the suggested influences on target capital structure ratios, the Mann-
Whitney confidence interval and test procedure in Minitab was used to determine
statistical differences.
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Table 5.9: Existence of target capital structure
of Res
48
37
14
target
dble target
Lsonably strict target
Mean target amount of debt (n=85)
Standard Deviation
Distribution of target debt amounts:
0-25%
26-50%
51-75%
76-100%
Over 100%
44.69%
40.18%
0.00%
300.00%
n
	 %
25
	
29.00
43
	
51.00
11
	
13.00
3
	
3.50
3
	
3.50
Yes	 No
Regular review of targets (n=103)	 67%	 33%
Table 5.10: Influences upon target capital structure ratios
Standard
Row Who/what influences capital structure?	 Mean1 (n=83) Deviation Grouping2
1 Company senior management 	 1.65	 1.54	 1
2 Existing shareholders 	 4.10	 2.23	 2
3 Commercial bankers	 4.77	 2.45	 2 3
4 Investment bankers	 5.06	 2.61	 4 3
5 Debt Covenants	 5.29	 2.67	 4 3
6 Outside investment analysts 	 5.70	 2.41	 4
7 Potential shareholders	 5.72	 2.20	 4
8 Comparison with ratios of industry competitors 	 6.37	 2.23	 5
9 Major trade creditors 	 7.86	 1.72	 6
'1 being the most important, 9 being least important
2	 based on statistical difference between rankings at 5%, two-tailed test (Mann-Whitney
confidence interval and test procedure in Minitab)
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To establish groupings of influences of similar importance, the responses to each
influence in Table 5.10 were tested to see if they were statistically different (at the
5% level) from the responses to the adjacent influence. For example, were the
responses in relation to the importance of 'company senior management'
significantly different from those in relation to 'existing shareholders' (rows 1 and
2). In this case, the test was statistically significant, and therefore, a difference in
importance can be attached to 'company senior management', grouping 1 in the
final column of Table 5.10, and 'existing shareholders', grouping 2. The difference
between the importance placed on 'existing shareholders' and 'commercial bankers'
was not statistically significant, so grouping 2 can be extended to include
'commercial bankers'. The difference between 'commercial bankers' and
'investment bankers' was also not significant. However grouping 2 cannot be
extended to include 'investment bankers', when the difference between 'existing
shareholders' and 'investment bankers' was statistically significant. Therefore,
'commercial bankers', as well as belonging to grouping 2, also belongs to grouping
3, to signify the similar importance between 'commercial bankers' and 'investment
bankers'. There was no statistical difference between either 'investment bankers' or
'commercial bankers' and 'debt covenants', so grouping 3 can be extended to
include 'debt covenants'. Grouping 4 indicates there is no different in importance
between 'investment bankers', 'debt covenants', 'outside investment analysts' and
'potential shareholders'. However these influences are significantly more important
than 'comparisons with ratios of industry competitors' (grouping 5), which in turn is
more important than 'major trade creditors' (grouping 6), the least important
influence.
In the pecking order theory of capital structure, companies are said to relate profit
and growth opportunities to their long-term target dividend payout ratios in order to
minimise the needs for external funds. Investment opportunities and dividend pay-
out, therefore, dictate the amount of external financing. The flexibility of the
financing decision in relation to investment and dividend decisions was investigated
in the questionnaire. Given an attractive new growth opportunity that could not be
taken without departing from existing capital structure, cutting dividend or selling
off other assets, respondents were asked what action their company would most
likely take. Their responses are shown in Table 5.11. Deviating from existing
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capital structure was favoured by 86% of respondents. Only 5% indicated that they
would forgo the growth opportunity and 2% of the respondents would cut
dividends.
Table 5.11: Most likely action given attractive new growth opportunity
5.2.3 Hierarchy of financing sources
In the pecking order theory of capital structure, a hierarchy of finance sources is
followed, with internal funds then debt being preferable to external equity. A
hierarchy of finance sources is followed by 60% of respondents. Their rankings of
long-term finance sources, from the most favoured to the least favoured, are shown
in Table 5.12, Panel B. Leasing and hire purchase options were included in order to
determine, for the first time, how leasing is favoured in relation to other sources of
debt and equity5.
Fawthrop & Terry (1975) investigated the preference for leasing and hire purchase in relation to
other sources of debt but didn't include equity and didn't consider a hierarchy of financing sources.
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Table 5.12: Hierarchy of financing sources
Panel A:	 Yes	 No
Does your company follow a hierarchy of finance sources? (n =190)	 60%	 40%
Panel B:
Ranking of long term finance sources (n=112)
Row Long-term finance source
1 Internaireserves	 1.67 1.08	 1
2 Straight debt
	 2.64 1.29	 2
3 Finance leases	 4.31 1.94	 3
4 Operating leases
	 4.47 1.98	 3
5 Ordinary shares	 4.57 2.21	 3
6 Convertible debt
	 5.98 1.78	 4
7 Straight preferred shares	 7.02 1.02	 5
8 Convertible preferred shares	 7.62 0.74 - 6
1 1-most favoured, 8-least favoured
2 Ranking based on statistical difference between adjacent mean ranks
at 5% (Mann-Whitney confidence interval and test procedure in Minitab)
Table 5.13: The relative importance of factors in choosing appropriate amount of total debt
Question asked
	
Response category1
(abbreviated)	 1 I 2	 3 I	 I 5 I DK Mean2 Standard Grouping3
Row ____________________________ Percentage of respondents
	 ______ Deviation
1	 Ensuringlongtermsurvivability 	 2	 2	 9	 28	 58	 1	 4.41	 0.88	 1
2	 Projected cash flow! earnings 	 2	 1	 14 41 42	 1	 4.21	 0.84	 2
3	 Volatility of earnings and cash
flow	 3	 8 28 34 25	 1	 3.72	 1.02	 3
4	 Ensuring customers !suppliers
aren't worried about company
survival	 3	 11 27 37 21	 1	 3.62	 1.04	 3 4
5	 Restrictive covenants	 5	 11 25 38	 20	 2	 3.58	 1.10	 3 4
6	 Level of interest rates 	 2	 10 34 41	 13	 1	 3.52	 0.91	 5	 4
7	 Tax advantage of interest
deductions	 6 20 28 25 20	 1	 3.34	 1.18	 5 6
8	 Avoiding issue of equity to dilute
existing shareholder's claims	 4 22 34 25	 15	 1	 3.25	 1.09	 6 7
9	 Potential costs of
bankruptcy/financial distress 	 28 17 11 19	 24	 2	 2.95	 1.58	 8	 7
10 Level of other non-taxable
deductions	 8 28 32 28	 4	 1	 2.93	 1.02	 8
11 Preventing company becoming a
take-over target
	 20 35 19 18	 6	 2	 2.54	 1.17	 9
12 Committing cash flow to interest
payments as a disciplinary control
- on management	 18 35 29 13	 3	 4	 2.46	 1.03	 9
13	 Personal tax cost facing investors
_________________________ 32 42 17 8
	 1	 1	 2.02	 0.93	 10
L 1.'JL •.LLW.LLiL aL alt, £J I IILLIL. IIII}JtJI LaII¼.¼, J - taIL 17 IlUpWI Lana, TflhhlJW1 taint, JVCI 7 IIII1JIJI taint, 1.JLUWIi L P.11W VT
2 All mean responses significantly different from not important at all (ie. I) at 1% level (one-tailed test)
Grouping based on statistical difference between ranks at 5%, two tailed test
(Mann-Whitney confidence interval and test procedure in Minitab)
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As theory predicts, internal reserves were most favoured by respondents, followed
by straight debt. Interestingly, leasing was favoured over ordinary shares, with
finance leases being slightly more favoured to operating leases. However, a high
variation in the ranking of leases and Ordinary shares was evident, and the
difference in average ranking between these three sources was not found to be
statistically significant. The insignificant difference between finance and operating
leases is surprising considering the predominant and prolific use of operating leases
in recent years (Beattie et al., 1998). Convertible debt and preference shares
(straight and convertible) are considered less favourable to ordinary shares and thus
appear lower in the respondents' pecking order. Convertible preference shares were
the least favoured source of finance. The standard deviation in rankings of this
source was considerably lower compared to other sources (standard deviation=O.74,
row 8), which suggests the majority of respondents were of the same opinion.
5.2.4 The relative importance of factors in choosing the appropriate amount of total
debt
The various capital structure theories identify benefits and costs of issuing debt.
Respondents were asked the relative importance of thirteen of these factors in
choosing an appropriate amount of total debt for their company. Their responses are
shown in Table 5.13 in order of importance. The mean response to all factors was
significantly different from 1, i.e. not important at all. Therefore, findings appear to
suggest that some degree of importance is placed on all of them.
The most importance was placed on ensuring long term survivability of the
company (mean=4.41, row 1). This was closely followed by the projected cash
flow/earnings from the assets financed (mean=4.21, row 2). Although there was a
relatively low variation in response to the importance of both of these two factors
(standard deviation=O.88 and 0.84, rows 1 and 2), the difference in response was
found to be statistically significant. More respondents appeared to class ensuring
long-term survivability as very important.
The volatility of the company's earnings and cash flow was considered third in
importance (mean=3.72, row 3). Despite the importance placed on cash flow in
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choosing the appropriate amount of debt, the potential costs of bankruptcy/financial
distress were considered much less important (mean=2.95, row 9). However, the
variation in response to the importance of this factor was relatively high (standard
deviation=1.58, row 9). Committing cash flow to interest payments as a disciplinary
control on managers was considered even less of a concern (mean=2.46, row 12).
Ensuring customers/suppliers aren't worried about company survival (mean=3.62,
row 4), the restrictive covenants imposed by debt holders (mean=3.58, row 5), and
the level of interest rates (mean=3.52, row 6) were all considered important factors.
However, the significant difference between the importance placed on ensuring
long-term survivability (row 1) and ensuring customers/suppliers aren't worried
about company survival (row 4) might suggest that the risk of not being able to
meet interest payments is of prime concern.
The tax advantage of interest payments was also considered fairly important
(mean=3.34, row 7), but the level of other non-taxable deductions was given less
consideration (mean=2.93, row 10). Avoiding the issue of equity to dilute existing
shareholders claims was also considered fairly important (mean=3.25, row 8),
whereas preventing the company from becoming a take-over target was much less
important (mean=2.54, row 11). Least importance was placed on the personal tax
cost investors face when they receive interest income (mean=2.02, row 13).
5.2.5 The choice between long-term and short-term debt
Capital structure decisions involve more than choosing an appropriate amount of
debt. The period of time to repayment is also a consideration. Respondents were
asked the extent of their agreement regarding the choice between short-term and
long-term debt. Their responses are shown in Table 5.14, in order of agreement. On
average, 51% of respondents acknowledged that they borrowed long-term in order
to minimise the risk of having to re-finance in 'bad times' (mean=3.25, row 1).
Matching the maturity of debt with expected asset life was also undertaken by 43%
of respondents, (mean3. 19, row 2).
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Table 5.14: The choice between short-term and long-term debt
Response category'
1	 2 3
	 4 I 5 I DK Mean Standard
Row Agreement with the following:
	 Percentage of respondents 	 ________ Deviation
1	 Borrow long-term to minimise risk of
having to re-finance in bad times
	 9	 16 23 42 9
	
2 3.25***	 1.12
2	 Maturity of debt matched with expected
assetlife	 8	 21 27 31	 12	 1	 3.19**	 1.14
3	 Borrow short-term when short-term
interest rates are low compared to long-
termrates	 14 31 32 17
	 5	 1	 2.69***	 1.08
4	 Borrow short-term when waiting for
long-term market interest rates to
	 12 37 31 16 3
	 1 2.61 * * *	 1.00
5	 Borrow short-term to enable returns
from new projects to be captured more
fully by shareholders	 17 34 33 14	 2	 1 2.52***	 1.01
6	 Borrow short-term when waiting for
- credit rating to improve
	 36 37 22 4	 0	 1 1.95***	 0.87
7	 Borrowing short-term reduces chances
- of wanting to take on risky projects
	 37 42 16 4	 1	 1 1.90***	 0.87
'1-strongly disagree, 2-disagree, 3-neutral, 4-agree, 5-strongly agree, DK-don't know.
'K significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% (two -tailed test of whether mean is significantly
different from neutral (ie. 3))
Table 5.15: Perception of market efficiency
- % of time company's ordinary shares 	 Percentage of
	 -
Row fairly priced by market: 	 Respondents	 n
1	 0%	 14	 26
2	 1-25%	 34	 63
3	 26-75%	 39	 73
4	 76-99%	 13	 24
5	 100%	 1	 2
___ TOTAL	 100	 188
190
On average, respondents did not appear to borrow short-term when short-term
interest rates were low compared to long-term rates (mean=2.69, row 3), or when
waiting for long-term rates to decline (mean=2.61, row 4). Respondents, also, did
not appear to borrow short-term to enable returns from new projects to be captured
more fully by shareholders (mean=2.52, row 5). Respondents strongly refuted that
they borrowed short-term when waiting for credit ratings to improve (mean=1 .95,
row 6) or to reduce the chance of wanting to take on risky projects (mean=1.90, row
7). In relation to short-term finance, these findings appear to suggest that it is
essentially chosen for the purpose of financing short-term assets over any other
consideration.
5.2.6 Pespondents' views of market efficiency
The choice between debt and equity could depend on whether managers perceive
their company shares are fairly priced by the market. If they believe the share price
is too low, they could be reluctant to issue equity and transfer value from existing
shareholders. Only 1% of respondents estimated that their company's ordinary
shares are fairly priced by the market 100% of the time, i.e. that the market is totally
efficient (Table 5.15). Approximately 87% of respondents estimated that their
company shares are fairly priced 75% or less of the time. In fact, 14% estimated that
their shares are never fairly priced by the market. Findings appear to suggest that
respondents generally disagree with the notion of semi-strong form market
efficiency.
5.2.7 The issue of debt in foreign countries/currencies
In response to the suggestion of an increase in globalisation of capital markets
(Grinblatt and Titman, 1998), the issue of debt in foreign countries/currencies was
investigated in the questionnaire. Surprisingly, only 32% of responding companies
had seriously considered it (Panel A, Table 5.16). Respondents who had were asked
what influences the decision to issue debt in foreign countries/currencies. Their
responses, in order of agreement, are shown in Panel B, Table 5.16. By far, the most
important influence on the decision was to provide a natural hedge. For example, if
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Table 5.16: Issuing debt in foreign countries/currencies
Panel A:	 Yes	 No
Has your company seriously considered issuing
debt in foreign countries/currencies? (n=194)
	 32%	 68%
Panel B:
what influences the decision?
esponse category
1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I DK Mean Standard
Row__________________________________________ Percentage of respondents - _______ Deviatior
1 Providing a natural hedge	 2	 7	 2 23	 67	 0 4.46***	 0.95
2 Locating 'source' close to 'use' of funds
	
10 15 15 20	 40	 0 3 . 65***	 1.40
3 Favourable tax treatment 	 9	 21 36 21	 11	 2	 3.04	 1.12
4 Foreign interest rates lower than domestic 	 17 17 34 20	 12	 0	 2.93	 1.24
5 Foreign regulation requiring debt to be issued abroad 40 35 20 4 	 0	 2 1.87***	 0.87
1 1-strongly disagree, 2-disagree, 3-neutral, 4-agree, 5-strongly agree, DK-don't know.
''K significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% (two -tailed test of whether mean is significantly
different from neutral (ie. 3))
Table 5.17: Corporate strategies and management incentive schemes adopted
Panel A: Corporate Strategies	 ________________________
Percentage of
________________________________________ 	 Respondents	 n
CompetitiveStrategy	 _______________________
1	 Product differentiation	 76	 139
2	 Unique product-no direct competition 	 14	 25
3	 Lower cost
	
8	 15
4	 Other	 2	 4
- TOTAL	 100	 183
ManagementStrategy
	 ________________________
1	 By product/service	 44	 82
2	 Centrally	 38	 71
3	 By geographical area 	 18	 33
- TOTAL	 100	 186
ExpansionStrategy	 ______________________
1	 Related diversification 	 80	 150
2 None	 13	 25
3	 Integration	 6	 11
4	 Unrelated diversification 	 1	 1
TOTAL	 100	 187
Panel B:	 Yes	 No
Management incentive schemes (n=195) 	 96%	 4%
Percentage of
____________________________________________ Respondents (n188)
	 ii
1	 Share option schemes	 90	 170
2	 Bonus linked to profitability	 85	 160
3	 Bonus linked to shareholder value 	 31	 59
4	 Other	 6	 12
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foreign currency devalues, there is no obligation to pay interest in £ sterling
(mean=4.46, row 1). Locating the 'source' close to the 'use' of funds was influential
in the decision made by 60% of respondents (mean=3.65, row 2). However, the
variation in responses received was relatively high (standard deviation=1.40, row
2). The average response to favourable tax treatment (mean=3.04, row 3) and
foreign interest rates lower than domestic rates (2.93, row 4) were not statistically
significantly different from neutral. Respondents strongly refuted that foreign
regulation required debt to be issued abroad (mean=1.87, row 5). The responses
given by UK finance directors in this survey mirrored those recently obtained in the
US (Graham & Harvey, 2001).
5.2.8 Corporate Strategy
Recent capital structure research has related the mix of debt and equity to corporate
strategy in terms of growth, competition and managementicontrol.
Competition
The competitive strategy adopted is said to determine the nature of assets employed
by a company, which in turn influences debt levels (Jordon, Lowe and Taylor,
1998). In companies that take a cost leadership approach, competition is in terms of
offering widely available products/services at low cost. If products/services are
widely available or standardised, the assets required to produce or sell them are
likely to be tangible and flexible. In companies that take a product innovation
approach, competition is in terms of offering unique products/services with less
emphasis on price. The development, production and sale of unique
products/services might involve significant research and is likely to be available on
a smaller scale. Therefore, the assets required are likely to be firm specific, more
intangible and less easily redeployed. Competition in terms of product
differentiation is a strategy in between the other two. Products/services offered are
differentiated from similar alternatives.
It is suggested that companies with intangible, inflexible assets have an increased
potential for financial distress and a decrease in their ability to borrow due to lack of
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collateral. Therefore, companies with a product innovation competitive strategy
should have the lowest proportion of debt, followed by companies adopting product
differentiation strategies. Companies with cost leadership strategies should have the
highest proportion of debt.
Respondents were asked to classify themselves in terms of alternative competitive
strategies. Their responses are shown in Panel A of Table 5.17. Product
differentiation was the most popular competitive strategy among respondents, being
adopted by 76%. Approximately 14% of respondents claimed to experience no
direct competition as a result of the unique nature of their products, and 8%
compete by professing to offer products at a lower cost than their competitors.
A comparison of respondents' gearing ratios according to the competitive strategy
adopted is shown in Appendix 9. On average, respondents with cost leadership
strategies appear to have the highest total gearing ratios and long-term gearing ratios
(means = 1.108, Panel A and 0.39, Panel B respectively); and respondents with
unique product strategies the lowest (means = 0.346, Panel A for total gearing and
0.145, Panel B for long-term gearing). The differences in mean total gearing ratios
according to the competitive strategy adopted were found to be statistically
significant. The variation in total gearing is very high for respondents with cost
leadership strategies as a result of one company having extremely large short-term
borrowings. However, even when this company was removed from the sample, the
mean total gearing for those adopting cost leadership (mean = 0.745, Panel C) was
still higher than those competing in terms of product differentiation or uniqueness.
These differences remained statistically significant at the 10% confidence level.
Management/control
The management or corporate control strategy adopted by companies is said to be
related to debt levels (Belkaoui, 1999). There is said to be more opportunity for
management to procure personal benefits at a cost to the company when control is
centralised. Consequently, the agency costs from conflicts of interest between
shareholders and management would be higher, increasing the cost of debt. One of
the aims of decentralisation is to reduce opportunism and thus the agency costs and
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subsequently the cost of debt would be less. On this basis, centrally controlled
companies should have lower debt levels than divisionalised companies. If the aim
is to reduce opportunism by divisionalisation, then as well as benefiting from lower
agency costs of debt, debt also provides the benefit of limiting the availability of
free cash flow, which further reduces opportunism.
Respondents were asked to classify themselves in terms of alternative management
strategies (Panel A, Table 5.17). Approximately 62% of respondents indicated they
were divisionalised, with 18% managed on the basis of geographical area and 44%
by product/service. The remaining 38% indicated they were managed centrally.
Against expectations, respondents managed centrally appeared, on average, to have
higher total gearing ratios and long-term gearing ratios than respondents whose
companies are divisionalised (Appendix 9, Panel A and Panel B). However, the
difference between the two groups was not found to be statistically significant.
Moreover, when the respondent with extremely large short-term borrowings was
removed from the sample, the mean total gearing for respondents managed
divisionally was fractionally higher than for respondents managed centrally. Again,
the difference was not statistically significant.
Growth/expansion strategy
The growth/expansion strategy adopted is said to impact on the operating risk of a
company, which in turn influences debt levels (Belkaoui, 1999). If a company
expands by spreading its business activities across different markets, when adopting
a strategy of unrelated diversification, operating risk is reduced. The company has
the potential to increase activity in one market to compensate for a decline in
another. A company is also likely to hold a wider spectrum of re-deployable assets
if it expands through unrelated diversificatidn.
If a company concentrates on its existing business activity, or expands by
integrating the activities of direct suppliers/customers, a decline in the market could
have serious impact. When adopting these strategies, companies are said to 'have all
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their eggs in one basket and are merely widening the basket in which they are kept'.
In which case, operating risk would be high.
Expansion in terms of related diversification (i.e. spreading business across a range
of related markets) is said to be somewhere in between. Thus, in terms of changes to
market demand, the highest operating risk is said to be associated with no expansion
strategy, followed by vertical integration, then related diversification, with unrelated
diversification being associated with the lowest operating risk.
However it is pertinent to note that integration or related diversification strategies
could be considered less risky in terms of individual market share, as an element of
current expertise and knowledge would apply. Further, there is an element of risk
diversifying into an unrelated market of which a company has no experience. Under
these terms, unrelated diversification might be said to be associated with the highest
operating risk.
On balance, the operating risk associated with changes in market demand are
probably more severe, as companies have the potential to purchase expertise and
knowledge in the unrelated areas they wish to diversify into. In terms of relative
debt levels, it is suggested that the lower the operating risk and the more re-
deployable the assets, the lower the potential for financial distress and thus the
higher the potential for debt. On this basis, companies experiencing unrelated
diversification would be expected to have higher debt levels than those experiencing
no expansion or expansion through integration.
However, the expansion strategy adopted is also thought to influence debt levels
through the need to co-ordinate and process information. It is suggested that
integrating the activities of suppliers/customers, or related divisions, requires more
co-ordination and information processing, which in turn requires more financing.
Unrelated diversification requires less coordination of divisions and thus less
financing (Belkaoui, 1999). On this basis, companies experiencing unrelated
diversification would be expected to have lower debt levels than those experiencing
expansion through integration.
Although there is some previous empirical evidence to suggest that the highest
levels of debt are associated with the highest levels of diversification (Barton and
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Gordon, 1988; Lowe, Naughton and Taylor, 1994), expectations on the basis of the
above theoretical arguments are somewhat conflicting.
Respondents were asked if their companies had previously experienced, were
currently experiencing or were expected to experience a program of business
expansion. Approximately 13% of responding companies had no expectation or
experience of expansion. The vast majority (80%) indicated an expansion strategy
based on related diversification. Only 6% indicated a strategy of integration and 1%
of unrelated diversification.
As the vast majority of respondents adopted the same expansion strategy, analysis
on the basis of individual strategy was precluded. However, a comparison was
attempted between respondents experiencing no expansion or expansion through
integration, and those experiencing diversification. A comparison of gearing ratios
is included in Appendix 9.
On average, respondents adopting a no expansion/integration strategy appear to
have higher total and long-term gearing ratios compared to respondents adopting a
diversification strategy (Panel A and Panel B). The difference in mean long-term
gearing ratios was found to be statistically significant at the 10% confidence level.
The difference between mean total gearing ratios was also found to be statistically
significant, at the 5% confidence level, when the outlying respondent company was
removed from the sample.
In summary, high levels of gearing appear to be associated with the adoption of a
low cost competitive strategy and a no expansion/integration strategy. Low levels of
gearing appear to be associated with the adoption of a unique product competitive
strategy and a diversification strategy. The level of gearing does not appear to be
associated according to whether a company is managed centrally or divisionally.
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5.2.9 Personal incentives
Financing decisions made by company management affect profitability and share
price. A personal stake by managers could affect the decisions they take.
Respondents were, therefore, asked if their company operated management
incentive schemes. The vast majority of companies (96%) do so, with share option
schemes being the most popular, in operation in 90% of responding companies.
Bonus schemes linked to profitability were also popular being operated by 85%.
The intention was to make a comparison between those companies operating
management incentive schemes and those not, in order to establish if there is a link
between financing decisions and management's personal stake. As the majority of
companies in the responding sample operate such schemes, further analysis on the
basis of questionnaire responses was not possible.
5.2.10 Capital structure determinants in UK listed companies
Respondents were asked the extent of their agreement with general statements based
on various capital structure theories, in the context of UK listed companies. Their
views, in descending order of agreement, are shown in Table 5.18.
In making debt and equity decisions, 88% of respondents acknowledged that a
company considers the market response to new issues of debt and equity
(mean=4.20, row 1). Approximately, 61% indicated that they thought the use of
debt would decrease relative to equity if bond interest were no longer tax deductible
(mean=3.79, row 2), and 64% confirmed that companies would issue debt when
equity was undervalued by the market (mean=3.70, row 3).
Approximately 63% of respondents indicated that a company would increase its
debt financing if unsecured debt could be issued for the same after-issue, after-tax
cost of secured debt (mean3.66, row 4). In addition, 48% of respondents indicated
that the debt/equity ratios would be lower for companies heavily reliant on research
and development, and consequently with fewer assets to provide security
(mean=3.33, row 5).
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Table 5.18: General statements regarding capital structure determinants
Response category1	 f
Row Agreement with the following 	 1 I 2 3 I 4	 5 I DKj Mean2 Standard
statements:	 Percentage of respondents 	 I ________ Deviation
1 Market response considered in new
issues of debt and equity	 1	 1	 8 54 34 2 4.20***	 0.73
2 Use of debt decrease relative to equity if
bond interest no longer tax deductible 	 2	 8 20 38 23 10 3•79***	 0.98
3 Debt issued when equity is undervalued 	 3	 9 22 46 18 3 3•7Ø***	 0.97
4 Increase in debt financing if long term
unsecured debt could be issued for the
same after-issue, after-tax cost of secured
debt	 2	 11 18 51 12	 6 3.66***	 0.91
5 Lower debt to equity ratios for
companies dependent on research and
development	 7	 15 18 38 10 11 3.33***	 1.13
6 Private placements offer information
exchange without publicising it in full	 3 15 31 36 6	 9 3 . 30***	 0.94
7 Issuing long-term debt sends favourable
signals concerning future long-term
prospects	 4	 18 38 33	 1	 6	 3.10	 0.86
8 Restrictive covenants might be suggested
to convince lender to grant loan	 9 21 29 31 4	 5	 2.99	 1.05
9 Shares issued when prices are high, even
though no present need to build up long-
term fund cushion	 8 29 34 22 5	 3	 2.89	 1.02
10 Issuing debt is delayed because of
transaction costs & fees, retiring debt is
delayed because of recapitalisation costs
& fees	 5 22 42 19 2 10	 2.89	 0.87
11 Decision to issue debt/equity is affected
by existence of tax loss carry forwards	 6 27 35 20 3	 7	 2.86**	 0.96
12 Finance Directors would fmd comparable
positions if bankruptcy occurrs
	
________________________________ 15 32 26 18 3 6 2.58***	 1.06
13 Debt issued when recent profits are not
sufficient to fund activities	 16 34 26 19 2	 3 2 .56***	 1.04
14 Share price usually declines when debt is
issued	 13 40 25	 8	 3	 10 2.40***	 0.95
15 Present value of interest tax shields is
balanced with present value of possible
bankruptcy costs	 13 34 24 3	 1	 25 2.26***	 0.83
16 Shares issued to dilute holdings of certain
shareholders	 29 37 19 10	 2	 3 2.18***	 1.05
17 Issuing shares sends unfavourable signals
concerning future long-term prospects 	 25 50 17 3	 3	 2 2.07***	 0.90
'1-strongly disagree, 2-disagree,3-neutral,4-agree,5-strongly agree, DK-don't know.
2*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% (two -tailed test of whether mean is significantly
different from neutral (ie. 3))
199
Although, on average, private placements were thought to offer a satisfactory
exchange of information without publicising it in full (mean=3.30, row 6), the need
for information was not acknowledged. The suggestion that issuing shares sends
unfavourable signals concerning future long-term prospects was strongly refuted by
respondents (mean=2.07, row 17).
Respondents, on average, refuted six other statements. In particular, the statement
that shares are issued to dilute the holdings of certain shareholders (mean=2.18, row
16), and balancing the present value of interest tax shields with possible bankruptcy
costs (mean=2.26, row 15) were strongly refuted. However, respondents
acknowledged the adverse consequences of bankruptcy, from a personal
perspective. On average, they believe that finance directors would not find a
comparable position of employment in the event of bankruptcy (mean=2.58, row
12).
On average, a negative response was also received to share price declining when
debt is issued (mean=2.4, row 14), and to debt being issued when recent profits are
insufficient to fund activities (mean=2.56, row 13). Nor did respondents agree that
capital structure decisions are affected by tax loss carry forwards (mean=2.86, row
11).
The responses to a further four statements were, on average, not statistically
significantly different from neutral (i.e. 3). No clear consensus was received as to
whether issuing debt sends favourable signals concerning future prospects
(mean=3.1O, row 7), or if transaction costs delay its issue or repayment (mean=2.89,
row 10). There was also no clear opinion as to whether restrictive covenants might
be suggested in order to convince lenders to grant loans (mean=2.99, row 8). On
average, the issue of shares when prices are high, despite no present need to build
up a long term fund cushion, also received a neutral response (mean=2.89, row 9).
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5.3: The determinants of capital structure: Surve y evidence in relation to
theory
5.3.1 Static-trade off theory of capital structure
The basis of the static trade-off theory arises from the proposition that firm value
can be increased with the use of debt because of interest payments being tax
deductible. At the extreme, therefore, firms should be all debt financed (Modigliani
and Miller, 1958). However, the commitment to make interest payments exposes
companies to the risk of financial distress or bankruptcy should their business
performance or the general economy change. Therefore, the optimal amount of debt
for a firm should be determined by balancing the present value of the interest tax
shield with the present value of the costs of financial distress (Brealey and Myers,
1996).
When asked about the relative importance of factors in choosing the appropriate
amount of total debt, the tax advantage of interest payments was ranked seventh by
respondents (mean=3.34, row 7, Table 5.13). Although the average response to the
potential costs of bankruptcy/financial distress being important ranked only ninth
(mean2.93, row 9, Table 5.13), the increased financial risk of issuing debt is likely
to be a concern when ensuring long term survivability was considered the most
important factor in choosing the appropriate amount of debt (mean=4.41, row 1,
Table 5.13). It was closely followed by projected cash flow/earnings (mean=4.21,
row 2). The volatility of earnings and cash flow was ranked third in importance
(mean=3.72, row 3).
According to Miller (1977), there is no benefit to increasing firm value through the
interest tax shield of debt at the expense of adversely effecting investors through
their personal tax position. Therefore, the optimal benefit obtained from the interest
tax shield is said to irise at the point when the personal income tax paid by marginal
investors is offset by the corporate tax saving. There is no evidence from
respondents to suggest that the optimal benefit from the interest tax shield is
considered in this way. In fact, the importance of the personal tax cost facing
investors in choosing the appropriate amount of debt was ranked bottom by
respondents (mean=2.02, row 13, Table 5.13).
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There is, however, further evidence to suggest the importance placed on interest tax
shields as 62% of respondents indicated that, in general, they thought the use of debt
would decrease relative to equity if bond interest were no longer tax deductible
(mean=3.79, row 2, Table 5.18). The benefit of interest tax shields would also be
reduced if companies were able to shield their income from tax in alternative ways
(DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980), or if their current tax paying position were reduced
by previous tax losses. The level of other non-taxable deductions being important in
choosing the appropriate amount of total debt was ranked tenth (mean=2.93, row
10, Table 5.13). In addition, the average response to the general statement that the
decision to issue debt or equity is affected by the existence of tax loss carry
forwards was negative (mean=2.86, rowli, Table 5.18).
Despite evidence to suggest that the interest tax shield and the ability to fulfil debt
obligations are influential factors in the debt decision, responses do not provide any
direct evidence of a trade-off. Only 4% agreed that corporate capital structure is
determined by balancing the present value of interest tax shields with the present
value of possible bankruptcy costs (mean=2.26, rowl5, Table 5.18). However, with
25% responding 'don't-know', and 24% adopting a neutral stance, the trade-off
theory of capital structure was not entirely refuted.
Stake holder theory: Enhancing / mitigating financial distress
In the stakeholder theory of capital structure, Titman and Wessels (1988) suggest
that the behaviour of various firm stakeholders is affected by financial distress
potential, and certain firm specific characteristics accentuate financial distress.
When asked about the relative importance of factors in choosing the appropriate
amount of debt, ensuring customers/suppliers aren't worried about company
survival was ranked forth in importance (mean = 3.62, row 4, Table 5.13). In
relation to circumstances enhancing financial distress, on average firms responded
positively to the general statement that firms with a high dependence on research
and development would exhibit low debt to equity ratios (mean=3.33, row 5, Table
5.18). If those making capital structure decisions are concerned with retaining their
current position of employment, they may be concerned with minimising the
potential of financial distress and consequently more risk adverse. On average,
respondents were found to disagree with the general statement that finance directors
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would find comparable employment positions elsewhere if bankruptcy occurs
(mean 2.58, row 12, Table 5.18).
Extended static trade-off theory
The traditional trade-off theory between the benefits from interest tax shields and
the costs of financial distress can be extended to include additional agency costs and
benefits of issuing debt. It is suggested that the use of debt has the benefit of
mitigating conflicts of interest between shareholders and company managers
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Debt commits the firm to payout cash in interest
payments. Therefore, the amount of 'free cash' available to managers is reduced,
providing less opportunity to transfer firm resources to their personal benefit.
However, on average, respondents disagreed that committing cash flow to interest
payments as a disciplinary control on management was an important factor in
choosing the appropriate amount of total debt (mean=2.46, row 12, Table 5.13).
Graham and Harvey (1999) obtained a similar response in their US survey.
However, this is a sensitive issue which finance directors could be reluctant to admit
to.
An additional cost of debt arises as a result of conflicts of interest between debt
holders and equity holders. Debt holders anticipate sub-optimal investment
behaviour at their expense and introduce restrictions on lending. For example, debt
contracts might include interest coverage requirements and prohibitions against
investing in new unrelated lines of business. Debt covenants were ranked fifth out
of nine in importance by respondents when considering who/what influences target
capital structure ratios (Table 5.10). Respondents agreed that restrictive covenants
were important in choosing the amount of total debt (mean=3.58, row 5, Table
5.13). However, the' mean response to suggesting restrictive covenants in order to
convince lenders to grant loans was not statistically significantly different from
neutral (mean=2.99, row 8, Table 5.18). This might suggest that companies
recognise that the costs of issuing debt with restrictive covenants might outweigh
any benefits.
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In summary, there is little evidence to suggest respondents adhere to a strict target
of capital structure. Approximately half of respondents operate without a target
amount of debt in relation to equity, and the majority of those that do appear to be
flexible. Respondents provided no indication that they undertake an explicit trade-
off between the benefit of interest tax shields and the costs of financial distress.
However, company survivability and sufficient earnings/cash flows to meet the
interest payments of debt are of prime importance. Corporate tax savings and
restrictive covenants are also of moderate importance.
5.3.2 Pecking order theory of capital structure
The pecking order is said to arise as a result of asymmetric information (Myers,
1984). Managers are reluctant to issue equity and transfer value from existing to
new shareholders when they believe share price is too low. Therefore, equity issue
would only be preferred over debt at times when shares were believed to be fairly or
overpriced. However, investors are aware of this and could associate a decision to
issue equity with a signal of bad news. Various researchers (Asquith and Mullins,
1983; Masulis and Korwar, 1986; Mikkelson and Partch, 1986) have reported a
decline in share price in reaction to the announcement of new equity issues.
Consideration of the market reaction to new issues of debt and equity was
considered by respondents to be the most important (of seventeen) capital structure
determinant (mean=4.20, row 1, Table 5.18). Although, on average, respondents
disagreed that debt would be issued when recent profits were insufficient to fund
activities (mean=2.56, row 13, Table 5.18), 64% agreed it would be issued when
equity was undervalued (mean=3.7, row3, Table 5.18). Approximately 75% of
respondents refuted that issuing shares sends unfavourable signals concerning future
long-term prospects (row 17, Table 5.18). The average response to issuing shares
when prices are high even though there was no present need, in order to build up a
long-term fund cushion, was not statistically significantly different from neutral
(mean=2.89, row9, Table 5.18). These findings could suggest that should additional
finance be required, companies might not be deterred from issuing equity when
share prices are high, However, share issue purely in response to high prices might
be unlikely. Previous UK and US evidence (Marsh, 1982; Taggart, 1977) also
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suggests that firms are more likely to issue equity over debt when share prices have
risen.
Although the average response to debt issues sending favourable signals to the
market was not statistically significantly different from neutral (mean=3.10, row 7,
Table 5.18), 53% of respondents refuted the idea that share price usually declines
when debt is issued (mean2.4, rowl4, Table 5.18). These findings provide some
support for previous research which has reported a virtually neutral reaction to
straight debt issues (Eckbo, 1986), and a positive reaction to bank debt roll-over
agreements (Lummer & McConnell, 1989).
In summary, survey responses provide some evidence in support of the pecking
order theory of capital structure. Approximately 78% of respondents favoured
deviating from existing capital structure compared to forgoing growth opportunities
and cutting dividends. These findings suggest that investment opportunities and
dividend payout appear to dictate the amount of external financing. In addition, 60%
admitted to following a hierarchy of financial sources favouring internal reserves,
straight debt then ordinary shares. Respondents placed considerable importance on
the market reaction to new issues of debt and equity. However, despite respondents
indicating that debt would be issued when equity was undervalued, there is less
evidence to suggest shares would only be issued as a final resort, when respondents
failed to acknowledge that issuing shares conveys an unfavourable market signal.
5.3.3 Corporate control considerations
Capital structure has corporate control considerations, when equity carries voting
rights and debt does not. Avoiding the need to issue equity to prevent the dilution of
existing shareholder claims or voting proportions was ranked seventh (mean = 3.25,
row 8, Table 5.13) in importance when choosing the appropriate amount of debt.
Preventing take-overs was considered less important (mean = 2.54, row 11, Table
5.13). On average, respondents were found to disagree with the general statement
that shares are issued to dilute the holdings of certain shareholders (mean = 2.18,
row 16, Table 5.18).
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On balance, findings do not appear to either support or refute the use of debt to
prevent take-over. However, debt may be favoured in order to maintain existing
shareholder's claims and voting rights.
5.4: The determinants of capital structure: Further analysis
In chapter 3, it was documented that certain firm characteristics/environments
promote high/low levels of debt (Table 3.1). However, it is not clear if these
characteristics/environments are also associated with the process of determining
debt levels. It is not clear whether firms appear to follow the static trade-off theory
or the pecking order theory in accordance with the characteristics they exhibit or the
environments in which they operate. Thus, the responses to certain questions
relating to the static trade-off and the pecking order theories, and factors influencing
the choice of debt were further analysed by firm characteristics/environmenis.
Measures of size and industry classifications were used to encapsulate general firm
characteristics. The competitive, management and expansion/growth strategies
adopted were used to characterise operating environments. Responses were also
analysed according to the degree of gearing currently adopted. The scope of this
further analysis is summarised in Table 5.19.
5.4.1 Further analysis by firm size
It is suggested that large firms are more diversified and, therefore, less likely to
suffer financial distress. Small firms are restricted from using long-term debt and
equity because of large proportions of fixed issuing costs, and tend to finance by
short-term bank loans (Marsh, 1982). Also, small firms may be subject to increased
agency costs because they are more flexible and better able to increase the risk of
investment projects. Lenders will thus be less willing to provide debt finance to
small firms (Grinblatt and Titman, 1998).
Large firms might, therefore, be expected to place less importance on the financial
distress and agency costs of issuing debt, compared to small firms. The tax benefits
to issuing debt may be more significant to large firms, if they are reduced to a lessor
extent by the cost of financial distress. Also, small firms may only experience
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corporation tax at the small company rate of 20%, and avoid the main rate of 30%6.
Ownership may be more concentrated in a small firm, especially if it is restricted
from obtaining additional equity through issue costs. Therefore, the importance of
control considerations in choosing an appropriate level of debt may be less
significant to small firms. If issue costs restrict the use of both long-term debt and
equity by small firms, it may be necessary to finance their activities in anyway they
can, rather than maintain a target level of debt to equity, or following a hierarchy of
sources. Moreover, small firms may not have the ability to maintain spare
borrowing capacity if lenders are reluctant to lend in the first instance.
Measures of both total assets (Datastream item 392) and sales (Datastream item
104) were used to proxy firm size. The sample of respondents was ordered first by
assets, and then divided into three equal groups: small, medium sized and large
firms. The medium sized firms were disregarded and comparisons were made
between large and small firms. The process was repeated using sales. Summary
statistics for the total sample and the sub-samples of large and small firms are
shown in Panel A of Appendix 10. Large firms have mean total assets of
approximately £2532 million and sales of £2423 million, compared to mean total
assets of £11 million and sales of £9 million for small firms.
The responses from large and small firms in relation to adopting a target capital
structure, following a hierarchy of financial sources and maintaining spare
borrowing capacity are shown in Panel B, Panel C and Panel D respectively.
Responses appear fairly consistent irrespective of the measure of firm size used.
There appears to be a definite difference in the adoption of a target capital structure
between small and large firms. Small firms appear more likely not to adopt a target,
whereas large firms appear more likely to adopt a flexible or reasonably strict target
(Panel B). Although firm size does not appear to influence whether a hierarchy of
financial sources is followed (Panel C), large firms appear more likely to maintain
spare borrowing capacity (Panel D) compared to small firms.
6 The rate of 20% applies to companies with taxable profits between £50001 - £300000 for the
financial year 2001 to 2002. Although profit levels determine the application of the small company
rate, there is generally an association between absolute assets in place, sales turnover achieved and
profitability.
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A comparison of the relative importance of factors, to large and small firms, in
choosing the appropriate amount of debt is shown in Panel E of Appendix 10. For
the majority of factors, there was no significant difference found between the
importance attached. Against expectations, large firms were not found to attach less
importance to financial distress costs (row 9) or agency costs (row 6). However
differences in the importance attached to both tax benefits and control
considerations are apparent. The tax advantage of interest deductions appears to be
much more important to large firms compared to small firms (row 3). Small firms
also appear much less concerned with preventing becoming a take-over target (row
11) and avoiding the issue of equity to dilute existing shareholder's claims (row 5).
5.4.2 Further analysis by industry classification
The industry in which a firm operates has been found to influence capital structure
(see section 3.3.1). This is not surprising when the characteristics identified as
promoting high/low levels of debt are typical of certain industries. In section 5.1 of
this chapter, the FT industry classification was obtained for each respondent when
establishing the sample was representative of the population. Respondents were
classified into 1 of 33 industries. For the purpose of further analysis, the FT
classifications were aggregated into Datastream's level 3 classifications, as shown
below.
Level 3 classification	 FT classification
Basic Industries	 Construction & Building Materials
Chemicals
Steel & Other Metals
Forestry & Paper
Cyclical Consumer Goods	 Household Goods & Textiles
Cyclical Consumer Goods	 Automobiles
Cyclical Services 	 Support Services
Media & photography
General Retailers
Leisure, Entertainment & Hotels
Distributors
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Restaurants, Pubs & Breweries
Transport
Information Technology 	 Software & Computer Services
Information Technology Hardware
General Industries	 Engineering & Machinery
Electronic and Electrical Equipment
Aerospace and Defence
Diversified Industries
Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods	 Food Producers & Processors
Pharmaceuticals
Health
Packaging
Beverages
Personal Care & Household Products
Tobacco
Non-Cyclical Services
	 Food & Drug Retailer
Telecommunication Services
Resources	 Oil & Gas
Mining
Utilities	 'Water
Electricity
Gas
Industries in which firms are more susceptible to financial distress are characterised
by higher operating risk. Firms operating in the cyclical consumer goods or service
industries may be more likely to be affected by changes in consumer taste compared
to firms operating in non-cyclical consumer goods or service industries. Firms
operating in information technology are likely to be susceptible to financial distress
through the employment of firm-specific intangible assets. Operating risk is also
enhanced for these firms by continuous change in technology, rendering recently
developed hardware and software obsolete. Firms in the information technology
industry may also experience high agency costs through restrictions imposed by
lenders, in response to the extensive growth/investment opportunities in this area.
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Firms in industries characterised by a higher financial distress potential may be
more concerned with their levels of debt in relation to equity, and thus more likely
to maintain target ratios. Firms in industries charactensed by fewer
growthlinvestment opportunities may have the option to maintain spare borrowing
capacity, whereas agency costs might prohibit the option in high growth/investment
industries. At the same time, firms in industries with few investment opportunities
could be viewed as having little need to maintain spare borrowing capacity, whereas
firms with investment opportunities may maintain spare borrowing capacity in order
to fund the opportunities as they arise.
The responses, by industry classification, in relation to adopting a target capital
structure, following a hierarchy of financial sources and maintaining spare
borrowing capacity are shown in Panel B, Panel C and Panel D of Appendix 11
respectively. The number of responses for non-cyclical services, resources and
utilities were relatively small (Panel A), and it was therefore necessary to group
them together in order to perform the chi-square test.
Industry classification does not appear to influence whether a firm adopts a target
capital structure (Panel A) or follow a hierarchy of financial sources (Panel B).
However, it does appear to influence the maintenance of spare borrowing capacity.
Firms operating in non-cyclical consumer goods appear less likely to maintain spare
borrowing capacity. A large proportion of these firms are involved in food
production, pharmaceuticals and health (Table 5.3). Firms operating in cyclical
consumer goods, general industries and information technology appear most likely
to maintain spare borrowing capacity. As the investment opportunities facing these
three industries differ, a link on the basis of investment opportunities and
maintaining spare borrowing capacity is notapparent. Therefore, firms operating in
non-cyclical goods must fail to maintain spare borrowing capacity for some other
reason out with their investment opportunities.
A comparison of the relative importance of factors, to firms in different industries,
in choosing the appropriate amount of debt is shown in Panel E of Appendix 11. For
the majority of factors, there was no significant difference found between the
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importance attached. Against expectations, there didn't appear to be any significant
difference in the importance placed on financial distress (row 9) and agency costs
(row 6) across industries. However, industry classification was found to influence
the importance attached to both projected cash flow/earnings and ensuring that
customers/suppliers are not worried about company survival. Projected cash
flow/earnings appears less important to firms in the information technology and
cyclical consumer goods industries and most important to utility firms. Ensuring
customers/suppliers aren't worried about company survival appears most important
to information technology firms. However this is hardly surprising when the sale of
products is dependent on the provision of after sales customer support, and the
products themselves are at risk of technological obsolescence. Firms in basic
industries appear least concerned with customers/suppliers worries about company
survivaF. However, in this case the quality of products is easily observed and by
nature, an after-sale servicing is not required.
5.4.3 Further analysis by level of gearing
The interest tax shield benefit to debt and the financial distress potential might be
expected to be of more significance in firms with high levels of gearing. Firms
paying substantial interest payments are likely to be more concerned with the
cashlincome flows required to meet such payments. Restrictive covenants are more
likely to be present in highly geared firms, although restrictive covenants may cause
growth firms to exhibit low levels of gearing.
Firms characterised by a high financial distress potential as a result of high levels of
gearing might be more concerned with their levels of debt in relation to equity, and
thus more likely to maintain target ratios. Firms with high levels of gearing may be
viewed as having consumed the majority of their debt capacity, thus reducing their
ability to maintain spare borrowing capacity. However, if firms with low levels of
gearing also have a low capacity for debt, they might be in the same situation. Thus
the relationship between the level of gearing and maintaining spare borrowing
capacity is not clear. Firms with low levels of gearing may be more willing to issue
equity, and thus less likely to follow a hierarchy of financial sources in which debt
takes preference.
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Measures of both total gearing and long-term gearing were used. Total gearing was
represented by the ratio of total loan capital (Datastream item 321) plus borrowings
repayable in less than one year (Datastream item 309) to the market value of equity
(Datastream item HIIvIV). In the long-term gearing measure, borrowings repayable
in less than one year were excluded. The sample of respondents was ordered first by
total gearing, and then divided into three equal groups: low, medium and high.
Firms with medium levels of total gearing were disregarded and comparisons were
made between high and low geared firms. The process was repeated using long-term
gearing. Summary statistics for the total sample, and the sub-sample of high and
low geared firms are shown in Panel A of Appendix 12. High geared firms have a
mean total gearing ratio of 1.065 and long-term gearing ratio of 0.60 1, compared to
mean total gearing ratio of 0.026 and mean long-term gearing ratio of 0.005 for low
geared firms. There is a large variation in total gearing for the sample of high-
geared firms as a result of one firm having extremely large short-term borrowings.
However, in this instance, the measure of total gearing was only used to characterise
a firm with high or low levels of gearing, and thus the removal of this outlier from
the further analysis was not necessary.
The responses from high and low geared firms in relation to adopting a target
capital structure, following a hierarchy of sources and maintaining spare borrowing
capacity are shown in Panel B, Panel C and Panel D respectively. Responses appear
fairly consistent irrespective of the measure of gearing used. Firms with low levels
of gearing appear more likely not to adopt a target capital structure, whereas firms
with high levels of gearing appear more likely to adopt a flexible target. Firms with
high levels of gearing appear more likely to maintain spare borrowing capacity and
follow a hierarchy of sources, although the latter was only statistically significant
when the measure of total gearing was used.
A comparison of the relative importance of factors, to high and low geared firms, in
choosing the appropriate amount of debt is shown in Panel E of Appendix 12. For
the majority of factors, there was no significant difference found between the
importance attached. Against expectations, high-geared firms were not found to
attach more importance on the tax advantage of interest deductions, although they
did appear to attach more importance on the level of other non-taxable deductions,
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in comparison to low-geared firms. The potential costs of bankruptcy/financial
distress do not appear more important to high-geared firms, however they do appear
to attach more importance to projected cash flow/earnings. In line with expectations,
firms with high levels of gearing appear to attach more importance to restrictive
covenants.
5.4.4 Further analysis by strategy
In section 5.2.8 of this chapter, the relationships between gearing and competitive,
management, and growth/expansion strategy were investigated. In the present
section, an analysis of the responses to questions according to the different
strategies adopted is presented.
Competitive strategy
On average, firms adopting unique product strategies were found to exhibit the
lowest gearing ratios, whilst firms with cost leadership strategies were found to
exhibit the highest. Findings, thus, appeared to confirm the suggestion that firms
using intangible, inflexible assets in pursuit of unique product strategies have an
increased potential for financial distress and a decrease in their ability to borrow due
to a lack in collateral. Firms adopting unique product strategies, in light of their
increased financial distress potential, may be more concerned with their levels of
debt in relation to equity, and thus more likely to maintain target ratios. However,
firms adopting cost leadership strategies and subsequently high levels of gearing,
may also be concerned with their significant levels of debt in relation to equity and
consequently also focus on target ratios. Firms adopting a unique product strategy
may have less ability to maintain spare borrowing capacity, if their capacity for debt
is limited due to a lack of collateral.
The responses, according to competitive strategy, in relation to maintaining a target
capital structure, following a hierarchy of sources and maintaining spare borrowing
capacity are shown in Panel B, Panel C and Panel D of Appendix 13 respectively.
There appears to be a difference in the maintenance of a target capital structure
according to the competitive strategy adopted. Firms competing in terms of cost
leadership or product uniqueness both appear more likely not to adopt a target
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capital structure. However, when they do, cost leadership firms appear more likely
to adopt a flexible target in comparison to a reasonably strict target by firms
adopting product uniqueness. Firms adopting a product differentiation strategy
appear more likely to adopt some kind of target rather than no target. Firms
adopting a unique product strategy appear much less likely to maintain spare
borrowing capacity, perhaps purporting suggestions that they are less able to do so.
A comparison of the relative importance of factors, to firms adopting alternative
competitive strategies, in choosing the appropriate amount of debt is shown in Panel
E of Appendix 13. Significant differences were found to exist in the importance
attached to three factors. Firstly, firms competing in terms of cost leadership and
product differentiation appear more concerned with the level of interest rates in
comparison to firms competing in terms of unique products (row 6). This is hardly
surprising when firms adopting the former strategies are dependent on the cost of
their products in relation to the cost of identical or differentiated products offered by
competitors. Unique products are less price, and thus cost sensitive. Secondly, the
tax advantage of interest deductions is more important to firms competing in terms
of cost leadership (row 10). Thirdly, firms competing in terms of cost leadership
appear to attach more importance to the use of debt to prevent becoming a take-over
target (row 9). However, this is not surprising when they produce exactly the same
products as their competitors and the only difference being offered is in terms of
price. Taking over a direct competitor provides the opportunity to increase market
share without embarking on a price war. Firms competing in terms of product
differentiation appear to attach the least importance to the use of debt to prevent
take-overs.
Management strategy
The difference between the gearing ratios , of firms managed centrally and firms
managed divisionally were not found to be statistically significant. It was expected
that centrally managed firms would have lower debt ratios because the agency costs
arising from conflict of interests between shareholders and managers would be
higher, thus increasing the cost of debt. Divisionalisation is said to reduce
opportunism, agency costs and the subsequent cost of debt. Divisionalisation may
also require a high level of co-ordination of information, and additional debt may be
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required to finance it. The increased use of debt by divisionalised firms is said to
further reduce opportunism by committing cash flow to interest payments.
Divisionalised firms might, therefore, be expected to attach more importance to
committing cash flow to interest payments as a disciplinary control on management
when choosing the appropriate amount of debt.
The responses, according to management strategy, in relation to maintaining a target
capital structure, following a hierarchy of sources and maintaining spare borrowing
capacity are shown in Panel B, Panel C and Panel D of Appendix 14 respectively.
The management strategy adopted does not appear to influence the maintenance of a
target capital structure or whether a firm follows a hierarchy of sources. However,
management strategy does appear to influence the maintenance of spare borrowing
capacity. Divisionalised firms appear more likely to maintain spare borrowing
capacity than centrally managed firms do. Firms were classed as divisionalised if
they were managed in terms of products or geographical regions. Divisionalised
firms are thus likely to spread operating risk across multiple product/geographical
markets, thus lowering their potential for financial distress. Consequently, through a
lower financial distress potential, divisionalised firms may obtain a greater capacity
for debt and thus are better able to maintain spare capacity.
A comparison of the relative importance of factors, to centralised and divisionalised
firms, in choosing the appropriate amount of debt is shown in Panel B of Appendix
14. The differences in the importance attached to the majority of factors were not
found to be statistically significant. Against expectations, divisionalised firms were
not found to attach more importance to committing cash flow to interest payments
as a disciplinary control on management. However, divisionalised firms were found
to attach more importance to the tax advantage of interest deductions in comparison
to centralised firms.
Growth/expansion strategy
On average, firms adopting a no expansion/integration strategy were found to
exhibit higher gearing ratios in comparison to firms adopting a diversification
strategy. Findings appear to contradict the suggestion that diversification lowers
financial distress potential and increases the capacity for debt. However, an
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integration strategy might require more co-ordination and information processing
than unrelated diversification, which in turn requires more financing. In addition,
firms experiencing no growth/expansion are less likely to experience the agency
costs of debt arising from conflicts of interest between lenders and management
over risky investments.
The responses to questions analysed according to the growth/expansion strategy
adopted are shown in Appendix 15. Analysis on the basis of individual expansion
strategy was precluded as the vast majority of firms adopted a related diversification
strategy. Therefore, the comparison was made on the basis of no expansion!
integration versus direct and indirect diversification. The differences between the
two sets of responses were not found to be statistically significant. However, it is
not clear if this is the product of aggregating the four alternative growth/expansion
strategies into two, or because growth/expansion strategy bears no influence.
5.5: The determinants of capital structure: results summary
Evidence in relation to the determinants of capital structure was obtained in two
ways. Firstly, by analysing the questionnaire responses for the entire sample of
respondents, and secondly, by using additional data to analyse responses on the
basis of certain firm characteristics.
The evidence from the responses for the entire sample of respondents in relation to
capital structure theory is summarised in Table 5.20. In order to establish the
relative importance of theoretical issues, responses were classified based on the
degree of evidence provided. The degree of evidence was established as the
percentage of respondents who indicated that they took a particular action, or who
indicated that an issue was fairly to very important to them, or that they were in
agreement/strong agreement with a particular suggestion. If the percentage of
respondents ranged between 0 to 20%, the evidence was taken to be strongly against
a particular issue. A percentage between 21 to 40% was taken to be against, 4 1-60%
was taken to be neutral, 61-80% was taken to be in favour, and 81-100% strongly in
favour of a particular issue. The theoretical issues are grouped according to the
static trade-off theory (including the stakeholder theory), extended trade-off theory,
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Table 5.20: Survey evidence in relation to capital structure theory
QuTheory	 ________ Degree of Evidence1 ________ _________
Strongly	 In	 Strongly
______________________________________________ Against Against Neutral Favour In Favour
Static Trade-Off
Existence of:
A1(b) Flexible target capital siructure
Al(c) Strict target capital structure
A4	 Static targets (ie. not regularly reviewed)
A5	 Reluctance to deviate from existing capital structure
Interest tax shield
Specific imnortanceof:
A7(a) Tax advantage of interest deductions
A7(b) Personal tax cost facing investors
A 7(c) Level ofother non-taxable deductions
General importance ofa:
Tax. antjie of interest deductions
B 1(13) Level of other non-taxable deductions
Financial distress
Specific importance ofa:
A7(d) Potential costs of bankruptcy/financial distress
A7(e) Ensuring long-tenn survivability
A7(m) Volatility of cash flow/earnings
A7(i) Projected cash flow/earnings
Stakeholder theory enhancing/mitigating financial
distress
Specific importanceofa:
A7(t' Ensuthg customersIsuppliers aren't worried about
company survival
General importance ofa:
B 1(e) Circumstance e.ahancing financial distress
(e.g. high dependence on research and development)
B 1(d) Ease with which FD would find a comparable position
of employment if bankruptcy occurred
B 1(c) Existence of trade-off between PV of interest tax shield
and PV of possible financial distress
'Degree of evidence based on peraentage of respondents who indicated they took particular action,
they indicated something was fairly to very important (3,4 or 5), or they agreed or strongly agreed with something (4 or 5)
0-20 % = strongly against, 21-40% = against, 41-60% = neutral, 61-80% = in favour, 81-100% = strongly in favour
2ltem of specific importance to responding companies.
tm ltem of general important to UK quoted companies.
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Table 5.20 continued
Qu Theory	 ________ Degree of Evidence'
	 _________
Strongly	 In	 Strongly
- ______________________________________________ Against Against Neutral Favour In Favour
Extended Static Trade-Off: Agency
theory
Agency costs
A7(g) Specific importanceof:
Restrictive covenants imposed by debt holders
A3	 Specific influence of debt covenants on target capital
structures
General importance o!:
B 1(h) Companies would increase debt if it could issue
unsecured long term debt at same after issue, after tax
cost of secured debt.
Agency benefits
Specific importanceof:
A7(j) Ensuring a large proportion of cash flow is committed to
interest payments as a disciplinary contol on management
General importance of:
B 1 (1) Suggesting restrictive covenants to convince lenders
to grant loans
Corporate control considerations
pçflc importanceof:
A7(h) Avoiding the need to issue equity to prevent the
dilution of existing shareholders claims or voting
proportions
A7(k) Preventing against becoming a take-over target
General importance of:
B 1(11) Issuing shares to dilute the holdings of certain
shareholders
i)egree 01 evidence based on percentage of respondents who indicated they took particular action,
they indicated something was fairly to very important (3,4 or 5), or they agreed or strongly agreed with something (4 or 5)
0-20 % = strongly against, 21-40% = against, 41-60% = neutral, 61-80% = in favour, 81-100% = strongly in favour
2ltem of specific importance to responding companies.
3 ltem of general important to UK quoted companies.
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Table 5.20 continued
Qu Theory	
________ Degree of Evidence'
	 __________
Strongly	 In	 Strongly
______________________________________________ Against Against Neutral Favour In Favour
Pecking Order vs Static Trade-Off
j3 Existence of spare debt capacity
Pecking Order Theory
A5	 Flexibility in deviating from existing capital structure
A6	 Following of a hierarchy of financial sources
A6	 Internal reserves is most favoured source2
A6	 Debt is favoured more than equity3
Specific importance of4:
A7(h) Issuing debt to avoid need to issue equity
A7(m) Volatility of company's eamings/cashflows in choosing
appropriate amount of total debt
General importance of4:
B 1(o) Issuing debt when recent profits insufficient to fund
activities
Asymmetrical Information
General importance of4:
B 1(i) Consideration of market response to new issues of debt
and equity
B 1(g) Consideration of private placements to offer satisfactory
exchange of information
B1) Decision to issue debt sends favourable signals
B 1(k) Decision to issue shares sends unfavourable signals
B 1(1) Belief that share price declines when debt is issued
B 1(m) Issuing debt when equity is undervalued by the market
B 1(p) Issuing shares when prices high even though no present
need, in order to build up fund cushion
A19 Belief in market inefficiency6
uegree 01 eviaence oasea on percentage 01 respondents who indicated they took particular action,
they indicated something was fairly to very important (3, 4 or 5), or they agreed or strongly agreed with something (4 or 5)
0-20% = strongly against, 21-40% = against, 41-60% = neutral, 61-80% in favour, 81-100% = strongly in favour
2Ranked I by respondents
3Straight debt ranked higher than ordinary shares
4 ltem of specific importance to responding companies.
5 ltem of general important to UK quoted companies.
6Company shares believed to be unfairly priced 25% or more of the time
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corporate control considerations and the pecking order theory. Issues relating to
capital structure and corporate strategy were not addressed in the questionnaire,
respondents were merely asked to classify themselves according to corporate
strategies adopted.
The theoretical issues are not necessarily in conflict. The static trade-off and
pecking order theory only appear to be mutually exclusive at the outset. Firms either
adopt a level of optimum debt finance (static trade-off theory), or they adopt a level
of dividend payout and investment which consequently dictates the level of finance.
In the static trade-off theory, the various costs and benefits of issuing debt are
balanced, in the pecking order, equity issues are avoided by issuing debt for as long
as possible. The existence of a target amount of debt in relation to equity is,
therefore, more characteristic of the static trade-off theory, although targets might
be expected to deviate over time as costs and benefits of issuing debt change. From
Table 5.20, it is apparent that the evidence was against the existence of strict target
capital structures and of a trade-off between the tax benefit and financial distress
cost to debt.
In the pecking order, debt to equity ratios are said to merely reflect the firm's
requirement for external finance. Thus firms might be expected to deviate from
existing debt to equity ratios in response to changes in investment opportunities
over time. In the pecking order, firms follow a hierarchy of sources, from internal
reserves, through debt to equity, whereas in the static trade-off theory firms issue
debt and equity with the intention of maintaining target proportions of both. It is
apparent that the evidence was strongly in favour of firms being flexible in
deviating from their existing capital structures. The evidence was neutral in relation
to firms following a hierarchy of sources, in which internal reserves is favourable to
debt, which in turn is favourable to equity. However, the evidence was strongly in
favour of the impdrtance of the volatility of company's earnings/cash flows in
choosing an appropriate amount of debt. This might infer that debt requirement is
influenced by internally generated funds, although internal reserves may not always
be favourable to debt. However, concern for earnings/cash flows may also stem
from the ability to meet interest payments.
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A policy of maintaining spare debt capacity to meet investment opportunities is thus
likely to be characteristic of the pecking order theory. However, high levels of
investment could result in a firm's capacity for debt being fully consumed. In the
static trade-off theory, firms are assumed to be operating at their optimal level of
debt. The evidence obtained in relation to maintaining spare debt capacity was
neutral.
In the pecking order, equity issues are avoided in order to prevent the signalling of
information to investors, resulting in a decrease in firm value. Unless debt holders
restrict a firm's access to additional debt finance, equity is issued only when issuing
debt would result in a greater decrease in firm value. To arrive at this decision,
balancing the benefits and costs of additional debt appears to be necessarily.
Therefore, the benefits and costs to debt, out with the signalling of information, are
not necessarily exclusive to the static trade-off theory.
The evidence was in favour of the tax advantage of interest deductions being
important in choosing the appropriate amount of debt. The evidence was also in
favour of the specific importance of the level of other non-taxable deductions to
responding firms. However, the evidence was against the importance of the level of
other non-taxable deductions in general. Respondents thus appear to view the level
of non-taxable deductions important to them but not important to other UK quoted
firms. The evidence was against the importance of the personal tax cost facing
investors in choosing the appropriate level of debt. Although, the evidence was
neutral in relation to the specific importance placed on the potential costs of
bankruptcy/financial distress, evidence was strongly in favour of the importance of
ensuring long-term survivability, projected cash flow/earnings and the volatility of
such cash flow/earnings. In support of the stakeholder theory, the evidence was
strongly in favour of the importance attached to ensuring customers/suppliers aren't
worried about company survival.
In relation to agency costs, the evidence was strongly in favour of the importance of
restrictive covenants imposed by debt holders in choosing the appropriate levels of
debt. In general, the evidence is strongly in favour of firms expanding their use of
debt in the absence of restrictive covenants. The evidence in relation to the use of
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debt to minimise conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers was
neutral. The evidence is in favour of using debt to avoid the need to issue equity to
prevent the dilution of existing shareholders claims or voting proportions. However,
the evidence was neutral in respect to using debt to prevent take-overs.
In relation to the pecking order theory, the evidence is strongly in favour of the
general importance attached to the market response to new issues of debt and
equity. The evidence is also strongly in favour of a belief of market inefficiency and
strongly in favour of the issue of debt when equity is undervalued by the market
place. The evidence further suggests that debt is viewed as sending favourable
signals to the market place and does not cause share price to decline. However,
contrary to the pecking order theory, the evidence suggests that the issue of equity is
not thought to send unfavourable market signals, and would occur if share prices
were high.
In summary, financing decisions do not appear to strictly follow either the static
trade-off theory or the pecking order theory of capital structure. In reality, there is
evidence in relation to both. At the outset, investment opportunities and dividend
payout appear more likely to influence the level of debt finance, than an optimum
level of debt finance being selected. However, the level of debt is not necessarily
the product of progressing through a hierarchy of sources. Although the issue of
debt is favourable when equity is undervalued, equity does not appear to be only
issued as a last resort. In determining an appropriate level of debt, ensuring long-
term survivability, projected cash flow/earnings, the volatility of cash flow/earnings,
and restrictive covenants are of paramount importance. Importance is also attached
to the interest tax benefits to debt and preventing the dilution of existing
shareholders claims and voting proportions.
In relation to capital structure and corporate strategy, high levels of debt appear to
be associated with the adoption of a cost leadership competitive strategy and a no
expansion / integration growth strategy. Low levels of debt appear to be associated
with the adoption of a unique product competitive strategy and diversification
growth strategy. Findings thus support theoretical suggestions that firms adopting a
cost leadership strategy provide standardised products/services using tangible and
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flexible assets and consequently have a lower potential for financial distress. The
opposite is true for firms competing on a unique product basis. Findings contradict
previous evidence, which suggests that the highest levels of debt are associated with
the highest levels of diversification. (Barton and Gordon, 1988; Lowe, Naughton
and Taylor, 1994). Diversification spreads operating risk and thus reduces the
potential for financial distress. However, findings might be indicative of the
increased co-ordination and information processing associated with integration,
which in turn requires to be financed. Also, integration could be considered less
risky as an element of current experience and knowledge would apply.
The findings, obtained from the further analysis of responses to certain questions on
the basis of size, industry, gearing and corporate strategy, are summarised in Table
5.21.
Small firms appear less likely to adopt a target capital structure whereas large firms
appear more likely to adopt a flexible/reasonably strict target. Large firms also
appear more likely to maintain spare borrowing capacity. Large firms appear to
attach more importance to the tax advantage of interest deductions, whereas small
firms appear much less concerned with preventing the firm from becoming a take-
over target and avoiding the issue of equity to dilute existing shareholders claims.
Firms operating in non-cyclical consumer goods appear less likely to maintain spare
borrowing capacity, whereas firms in cyclical consumer goods, general industries
and information technology appear more likely. Projected cash fowl earnings
appears to be less of a concern to firms in information technology and cyclical
consumer goods, and more important to firms in utilities. Ensuring that
customers/suppliers are not worried about company survival appears most important
to firms in information technology and less of a concern for firms in basic
industries. Highly geared firms appear more likely to adopt a flexible capital
structure target, whereas low gearing firms appear less likely to adopt a target.
Firms with high levels of gearing appear more likely to maintain spare borrowing
capacity and follow a hierarchy of financing sources. Highly geared firms also
appear to attach more importance to projected cash flow/earnings and restrictive
covenants.
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In terms of corporate strategy, firms adopting cost leadership and unique product
strategies appear less likely to adopt a target capital structure, whereas firms
competing in terms of product differentiation do. Firms adopting a unique product
strategy appear less likely to maintain spare debt capacity. Firms competing in
terms of cost leadership and product differentiation appear more concerned with the
level of interest rates in comparison to firms competing in terms of unique products.
The tax advantage of interest deductions and preventing take-over appear more
important to firms adopting cost leadership strategies. Firms adopting product
differentiation appear less concerned with preventing take-over. Firms managed in
divisions appear more likely to maintain spare debt capacity and attach more
importance to the tax advantages of interest deductions, in comparison to centrally
managed firms.
5.6: Corporate leasing policy
5.6.1 The use of leasing
The popularity of leasing as a source of company finance is evident from the
questionnaire responses. Approximately 84% indicated that their companies
currently used, had previously used or would consider using leasing.
The use of both finance and operating leases to acquire different business asset
types is shown in Table 5.22. The use of operating leases to acquire vehicles
appears to be the most popular among respondents (row 5). Operating leases are
also predominantly used/considered, over finance leases, to acquire land and
buildings and office equipment (rows 1 and 3 respectively). The use/consideration
of both finance and operating leases to obtain computer equipment appears to be
approximately equal (row 4). Only in the acquisition of plant and machinery are
finance leases predominantly considered/used (row 2).
On balance, responses are consistent with previous empirical research (Beattie et al.,
1998) reporting the predominant and prolific use of operating leases in recent years.
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Table 5.22: Use of leasing
Panel A:
of Resuondents (n= 1
Yes	 No
Does your company use, has it used, would it
	 84	 16
consider using leasing?
Panel B:
- ________________________________________ 	 Percentage of respondents (n= 196)1
Decision Horizon
	
Last 2-3 years	 Currently	 Would consider
Row Asset Category
	 FL2	 OL	 FL	 OL	 FL	 OL
1 Land and buildings	 12	 37	 11	 43	 16	 33
2 Plant andmachinery	 35	 23	 32	 26	 32	 27
3 Office equipment	 15	 24	 14	 29	 17	 23
4 Computer equipment	 18	 20	 22	 23	 19	 24
5 Vehicles	 23	 38	 23	 49	 20	 38
'Respondents were asked to tick all applicable options
2FL=finance lease, OLoperating lease
Table 5.23: Company's approach to leasing decision
Percentage of respondents (n=156)
Row
1 Quantitatively analyse a leasing alternative only if
asset would have been profitable on purchase basis
	 51
2 Quantitatively analyse potential of leasing asset
even if asset purchase would not be considered
	 18
profitable
Do not perform any type of quantitative analysis
because simply prefer to lease some asset types
	 15
2F Do not perform any type of quantitative analysis
but rely on judgement and experience
	 15
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5.6.2 General approach to the leasing decision
The questionnaire investigated whether a quantitative approach is adopted in the
decision to lease, and whether leasing is considered an investment decision, i.e.
considered even if the purchase of an asset would be unprofitable, or purely on a
financing basis once the decision to acquire the asset had been made.
Approximately 30% of respondents indicated that their company approached the
leasing decision non-quantitatively, by preferring to lease certain asset types or by
relying on judgement and experience (rows 3 and 4, Table 5.23). In addition, 35%
of respondents indicated that only specific assets were leased (row 3, Table 5.24),
and only 23% indicated that the leasing alternative was considered in all asset
financing decisions (row 5, Table 5.24).
Approximately 70% indicated that the decision to lease was the product of a process
of quantitative analysis (rows 1 & 2, Table 5.23). However, 51% indicated that
leasing was considered only if an asset would have been profitable on a purchase
basis (row 1, Table 5.23), i.e. after an investment decision had been made.
Therefore, the majority of companies appear to evaluate the leasing decision purely
on a financing basis.
Bank borrowing appeared to be the most popular source of finance to which leasing
is compared (row 1, Table 5.25). Also, comparisons between leasing and both
internal profits and hire purchase were acknowledged by 35% and 30% of
respondents respectively (rows 2 and 3, Table 5.25). Therefore, leasing appears to
be treated as an alternative to debt in the capital structure decision.
Slightly more than half of all respondents indicated that leasing decisions were
taken centrally (row 1, Table 5.24). Despite the popularity of leasing among
respondents, only an extreme minority admitted to preferring to lease assets
whenever possible or adopting a target proportion of assets to be financed by
leasing (rows 8 and 9, Table 5.24).
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Table 5.24: How leasing fits in with overall company financing decisions
Row________________________________________ Percentage of Respondents (n196)1 -
1 Leasing decisions taken centrally
	 52
2 Leasing policies are set centrally
	 44
3 Only specific assets leased	 35
4 Take advantage of good leasing deals if7when
they arise	 35
5 Leasing alternative considered in all asset
financing decisions
	 23
6 Use leasing to solve specific financing problems
	 23
7 Do not have general leasing policies
	 14
8 Generally, prefer to lease assets whenever
possible	 8
9 Target proportion of assets to be financed
by leasing	 3
Percentages exceed 100% as respondents were asked to tick all applicable options
Table 5.25: Comparison between leasing and other sources of finance
Percentages exceed 100% as respondents were asked to tick all applicable options
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Approximately 35% of respondents indicated that they take advantage of "good
leasing deals" if/when they arise (row 4, Table 5.24). This appears to suggest that
the providers of lease finance exert a significant influence on the decision to lease.
In summary, these findings appear to suggest that, more often than not, the decision
to lease arises as a result of favourable comparisons with alternative sources of
finance.
5.6.3 The relative importance of factors in the decision to lease
The decision to lease land and buildings and other assets were investigated
separately in the questionnaire for several reasons. First, the relative importance of
factors 'in the decision to lease significant business assets, such as land and
buildings, could differ from those in the decision to lease, perhaps less significant,
other assets. Second, some respondents might have responded with either leasing
property or leasing other assets specifically in mind, distorting the overall view.
Finally, the proposed new approach to lease accounting would have major impact
on property leases which, at present, are generally treated as off-balance sheet
operating leases. If the current off-balance sheet nature of operating leases is an
important factor in the decision to lease, then the proposed new treatment could
impact on future use.
The relative importance of factors in the decisions to lease land and buildings and
other assets are shown in descending order of importance in Tables 5.26 and 5.27
respectively. A comparison of the significant differences between the two is shown
in Table 5.28. In all cases, the mean responses were found to be significantly greater
than 1, i.e. not important at all. This suggests that some degree of importance was
placed on all the factors suggested.
On average, the most important factor in the decision to lease land and buildings
was to avoid large capital outlays (mean=3.68, row 1, Table 5.26). Conservation of
cash flow (mean=3.51, row 2, Table 5.26) and the rate of interest implicit in the
lease compared to the cost of borrowing to purchase (mean=3.42, row 3, Table
5.26) were also considered very important. The latter was considered the most
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Table 5.26: The relative importance of factors in decision to lease land and buildings
Response category'
1 I 2 3 4 5 IDK Mean2 Standard Grouping3
Ro' Factor	 Percentage of respondents - Deviation ___________
1 Avoiding large capital outlay	 6 8 19 41 23 2 3.68
	 1.12 1
2 Conservation of cash flow 	 8 8 26 38 18 1 3.51
	 1.13 1 2
3 Rate of interest implicit in lease compared to cost of
borrowing to purchase 	 6 12 29 37 14 1 3.42
	 1.06	 2 3
4 Positive outcome to quantitative analysis
	 12 14 23 32 9
	 9 3.14	 1.21	 3 4
5 Incentives to lease given by lessor (e.g. rent-free periods
orreversepremiums)	 13 17 28 30 9 4 3.04	 1.18	 5	 4
6 Lease rentals are tax deductible but capital allowances
are not available on assets purchased
	 12 20 35 20 8 5 2.92	 1.13 5 6 4
7 Leasing can be obtained on any scale
	 19 21 22 29 7 1 2.82
	 1.24 5 6 7
8 Leasing permits the total financing of an asset (apart
from advance rental deposit) 	 18 28 21 25 5 4 2.70	 1.19	 6 7
9 Lease covenants are generally less restrictive than debt
covenants	 18 27 24 21 2 8 2.59	 1.11 8	 7
10 Operating leases not accounted for on the balance sheet
and have no impact on financial accounting ratios
	 24 26 24 16 8 2 2.58
	 1.26	 8 9 7
11 Leasing has the ability to offer a complete package 	 20 30 19 21 4 6 2.55	 1.17 8 9 7
12 Expanding overall debt-type capacity	 24 29 21 17 2 7 2.40	 1.13	 8 9 10
13 Leasing has minimal impact on measures used in current
debt covenants	 22 32 28 11 2 5 2.36	 1.04 8 9 10
Leasing can reduce/eliminate the risk of ownership
	 22 39 22 11 2 4 2.31
	 1.02 11 9 10
15 Lease agreements flexible, sharing asset risk and
economic benefitbetween parties as required
	 25 25 31 7 3 9 2.30
	 1.06 11 9 10 12
16 Leasing is conveniently offered at asset point of sale
	 38 22 19 14 3 4 2.19
	 1.20 11 13 10 12
17 Leasing is easier to arrange from an administrative point
of view	 26 40 18 9 2 4 2.18
	 1.01	 11 13 10 12
j Higher disposal value of leased property 	 28 37 20 8 2 6 2.13
	 0.98 11 13 10 12
19 Legal consequences of default are less severe for leasing
	
33 32 20 8 2 7 2.07
	 1.02 11 13	 12
20 Contingent lease rentals can reduce company exposure
to economic or business downturns 	 32 30 20 3 2 11 2.05
	 1.01	 13	 12
21 Leasing can be arranged so rental payments increase
over agreement, or final payment is a balloon rental,
enabling low rentals to be charged early on
	 35 39 15 5 1 4 1.95	 0.94	 13
22 Operating lease expenditure avoids capital expenditure
controls	 55 34 6 2 1
	
2	 1.57	 0.78 14
1 = not important at all, 2=of little importance, 3=fairly important, 4=important and 5=very important)
2 All mean responses significantly different from not important at all (ie. 1) at 1% level (one-tailed test)
'Grouping based on statistical difference between at 5% two tailed test
(Mann-Whitney confidence interval and test procedure in Minitab)
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Table 5.27: The relative importance of factors in decision to lease other assets
-	 Response category'
1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I DK Mean2 Standard Grouping3
Row Factor	 Percenta eof repondents	 Deviation ___________
1 Rate of interest implicit in lease compared to cost of
borrowing to purchase 	 3 8 28 44 15 1
	 3.60	 0.96 1
2 Conservation of cash flow
	 4 11 26 43 16 1
	 3.57	 1.00 1
3 Avoiding large capital outlay
	 8 11 26 41 12 1
	 3.39	 1.11	 1 2
4 Positive outcome to quantitative analysis
	 13 14 20 34 11 8
	 3.18	 1.24	 2 3
5 Leasing has the ability to offer a complete package
	 11 20 25 30 12 3
	 3.11	 1.20	 3
6 Leasingcanbeobtainedonanyscale 	 13 19 24 35 9
	 1	 3.08	 1.19	 3
7 Transfer of capital tax allowances to leasing company
reflectedinlowerleaserentalcost 	 9 17 33 32 5	 3	 3.08	 1.05	 3
8 Leasing permits the total financing of an asset (apart from
advance rental deposit)
	 12 24 25 31 7 2 2.97
	 1.15	 3 4
9 Lease rentals are tax deductible but capital allowances are
not available on assets purchased
	 12 25 36 17 7
	 4 2.83	 1.10 5	 4
10 Operating leases not accounted for on the balance sheet
and have no impact on financial accounting ratios
	 22 23 28 18 7 1 2.64	 1.23 5 6
11 Leasing can reduce/eliminate the risk of ownership
	 15 38 24 17 2 4 2.51	 1.02	 6 7
12 Lease agreements flexible, sharing asset risk and
economic benefit between parties as required
	 19 25 32 11 4 9 2.51	 1.07	 6 7
13 Leasing is easier to arrange from an administrative point - - - -
	 _______ ___________
of view	 22 32 21 18 3
	 3	 2.47	 1.14	 6 7 8
14 Lease covenants are generally less restrictive than debt
covenants	 24 24 20 22 1
	 8 2.47	 1.16	 6 7 8
15 Expenditure under finance leasing, qualifying for capital
tax allowances is time apportioned in first year
	 17 33 30 12 2 6 2.47
	 1.01	 6 7 8
16 Expanding overall debt-type capacity
	 24	 T T 7 2.42	 1.13	 6 7 8
17 Leasing is conveniently offered at asset point of sale
	 30 22 22 18 4 4 2.42
	 1.24	 6 7 8 9
18 Leasing has minimal impact on measures used in current
debt covenants	 22 33 30 8 3
	 5 2.34	 1.02	 6 7 8 9
19 Expenditure on long-life assets qualifying for capital tax
allowances is restricted to aWDA of 6%
	 21 32 31 7 1 8 2.29
	 0.93	 7 8 9
20 Incentives to lease given by lessor (e.g. rent-free periods
or reverse premiums)	 28 34 19 9 6 4 2.27
	 1.15	 10	 8 9
21 Higher disposal value of leased property
	 24 35 25 10 1 4 2.27
	 1.01	 10	 8 9
22 Leasing can be arranged so rental payments increase over -
	 ________ ___________
agreement, or final payment is a balloon rental, enabling
low rentals tobe charged early on
	 33 34 21 8 3 2 2.12	 1.05 10
	 9
23 Legal consequences of default are less severe for leasing
______________________________________________ 28 36 18 8 1 8 2.11
	 0.99 10	 9
24 Contingent lease rentals can reduce company exposure to
- economic or business downturns
	 30 35 18 5 1 11 2.01	 0.93 10
25 Operating lease expenditure avoids capital expenditure
controls	 54 34 5 4
	
1	 1	 1.64	 0.89	 11
'1= not important at all, 2=of little importance, 3=fairly important, 4=important and 5=very important)
2 All mean responses significantly different from not important at all (ie. 1) at 1% level (one-tailed test)
3Grouping based on statistical difference between at 5% two tailed test
(Mann-Whitney confidence interval and test procedure in Minitab)
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Table 5.28:Comparison of the significant differences between the importance of factors in
the decision to lease land and buildings and other assets
_______________________________ Land and Buildings Other Assets
	 ________
Mean Standard Mean Standard Difference
Row Factor	 Deviation ________ Deviation in Means'
1 Avoidinglargecapitaloutlay	 3.68	 1.12	 3.38	 1.11	 0.30**
2 Incentives to lease given by lessor (e.g.
rent-free periods or reverse premiums)
	 3.04	 1.18	 2.27	 1.15	 0.77**
3 Leasing has the ability to offer a complete
package	 2.55	 1.17	 3.11	 1.20	 0.56**
4 Leasing is easier to arrange from an
adxninistrativepointof view	 2.18	 1.01	 2.47	 1.14	 0.29**
significant difference at 5% or above (Mann-Whitney confidence interval arid test procedure in
Minitab)
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important factor in the decision to lease other assets (mean=3.60, row 1, Table
5.27). Conservation of cash flow (mean=3.57, row 2, Table 5.27) and avoiding large
capital outlay (mean=3.39, row 3, Table 5.27) were ranked second and third in
importance (thus the same top three). However, the responses to avoiding large
capital outlay being important in the decision to lease land and buildings and other
assets were significantly different (row 1, Table 5.28). Avoiding large capital outlay
appears to be more important in leasing land and buildings which is hardly
surprising considering the purchase of land and buildings would probably involve a
greater capital outlay than the purchase of most other assets.
A positive outcome to quantitative analysis was ranked fourth in importance in the
decision to lease both land and buildings and other assets. Only 12% and 13%
respectively indicated that a positive outcome to quantitative analysis was not
important at all (row 4, Tables 5.26 and 5.27). These findings appear somewhat
inconsistent, considering approximately 30% of respondents previously
acknowledged that they did not undertake quantitative analysis (Table 5.23).
One major difference between the decision to lease land and buildings and the
decision to lease other assets appears to be incentives offered by the lessor, such as
rent-free periods or reverse premiums. This factor was ranked fifth in importance in
the decision to lease land and buildings (mean=3.04, row 5, Table 5.26), but ranked
twentieth in the decision to lease other assets (mean=2.27, row 20, Table 5.27). The
difference was also found to be statistically significant between the two (row 2,
Table 5.28). Perhaps incentives are more readily available and/or more valuable in
lease agreements for land and buildings.
Further differences appear to be in the importance placed on the ability of leasing to
offer a complete package (row 3, Table 5.28), and the ease with which leasing can
be ananged from an administrative point of view (row 4, Table 5.28). These two
factors appear to be more important in the decision to lease other assets. However,
in the case of land and buildings, maintenance contracts etc. could be just as easily
be available on freehold property through appointed property managers at the time
of purchase, as through lease agreements. In relation to administrative
arrangements, a long term property lease, with the exception of additional finance
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arrangements required to purchase, could require as close a scrutiny and involve the
same legal checks as a purchase contract. Further, the administration involved could
be considered increasingly insignificant in relation to the acquisition of an asset as
significant as property.
The relative importance of other factors in the decision to lease both land and
buildings and other assets appear relatively similar. To provide a greater indication
of relative importance, factors in the decision to lease both land and buildings and
other assets were grouped on the basis of statistical differences. For land and
buildings, groupings range from 1, the most important, to 14, the least important.
For other assets 11 was the least important. Due to the large amount of factors in the
decision to lease land and buildings and other assets, the grouping is extremely
complex. A number of factors belong in up to three groupings, and some in up to
four, owing to the statistical differences found between factors within Tables 5.26
and 5.27. However, it is visually useful in that it reduces 22 and 25 factors of
descending importance into 14 and 11 groupings, and indicates that the factors at
the top and bottom of Tables 5.26 and 5.27 are clearly statistically in descending
order of importance.
The reasons for leasing arising from previous research have been grouped into four
categories, namely tax saving reasons, borrowing capacity and repayment reasons,
other financial/transactional reasons and risk sharing reasons.
5.6.4 Tax saving reasons for leasing:
If an asset qualifies for capital tax allowances, lessors could take advantage when
lessees have insufficient use for them, the incentive for lessees being the associated
benefit of paying lower rentals. This could be enhanced if lessors could make use of
tax savings earlier than lessee, and reduced if lessee could obtain greater capital tax
allowances than lessor. Respondents were, therefore, asked the importance of three
additional factors concerning tax implications, which are only applicable to the
decision to lease other assets, as commercial land and buildings do not generally
qualify for capital tax allowances.
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The transfer of capital tax allowances to the lessor being reflected in lower rental
cost was ranked seventh in importance and belonged to grouping 3 (mean=3.08, row
7, Table 5.27). Therefore, this factor, which has often been suggested as a major
contributor to the growth of leasing as a source of finance in the first instance, still
appears to exert some degree of influence. Responses appear to support empirical
research in the US and UK (Graham et al.,1998; Adedeji and Stapleton, 1986;
Lasfer and Levis, 1998) inferring that high levels of leasing are accompanied by a
low tax paying status.
Subsequent curtailments to this tax benefit of leasing in the form of time
apportioning expenditure, qualifying for capital tax allowances, under finance
leasing in the first year, and restricting written down allowances on long-life assets
appear ' less important (means=2.47 and 2.29, rows 15 and 19, Table 5.27
respectively).
If an asset does not qualify for capital tax allowances, only interest payments on any
borrowings to purchase are tax deductible, compared to total lease rental payments.
This factor was ranked sixth in importance, grouping 4/5/6, in the decision to lease
land and buildings (mean=2.92, row 6, Table 5.26) and ninth in importance,
grouping 4/5, in the decision to lease other assets (mean=2.83, row 9, Table 5.27).
5.6.5 Borrowing capacity and repayment reasons for leasing
If lease obligations consume less debt capacity than non-leasing alternatives, leasing
might be favoured in order to expand overall debt capacity. Approximately 53% of
respondents indicated that expanding overall debt-type capacity was of little
importance or not important at all in the decision to lease both land and buildings
(mean=2.40, row 12, Table 5.26) and other assets (mean=2.42, row 16, Table 5.27).
It has been suggested that lease agreements generally contain less restrictive
covenants reducing their impact on obtaining future finance (Smith & Wakeman,
1985; Day, 2000). This factor was considered to be fairly to very important by 47%
of respondents in the decision to lease land and buildings (mean=2.59, row 9, Table
5.26) and 43% in the decision to lease other assets (mean=2.47, row 14, Table 5.27).
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The suggestion that leasing has minimal impact on measures used in current debt
covenants was of little or no importance to 54% in the decision to lease land and
buildings (mean2.36, row 13, Table 5.26), and 55% in the decision to lease other
assets (mean=2.34, row 18, Table 5.27).
Leasing is equally obtainable for the acquisition of individual assets or for smaller
scale operations as it is for larger operations, whereas long-term debt is usually
arranged on a larger scale. This factor was considered to be fairly to very important
by 58% of respondents in the decision to lease land and buildings (mean=2.82, row
7, Table 5.26), and 68% in the decision to lease other assets (mean=3.08, row 6,
Table 5.27).
The fact that leasing permits the total financing of an asset (apart from an advance
rental deposit) was thought to be fairly to very important by approximately 50% in
the decision to lease land and buildings (mean=2.7, row 8, Table 5.26), and 63% in
the decision to lease other assets (mean=2.97, row 8, Table 5.27).
Although conservation of cash flow was ranked second in importance in the
decision to lease both land and buildings (mean=3.51, row 2, Table 5.26) and other
assets (mean=3.57, row 2, Table 5.27), the flexibility of lease repayments to
accommodate future cash flows was considered much less important.
Lease arrangements in which rentals increase over time, or the final payment is a
balloon rental, enabling low rentals to be charged early on, were of little or no
importance to 74% in the decision to lease land and buildings (mean=1.95, row 21,
Table 5.26) and 67% in the decision to lease other assets (mean=2.12, row 22, Table
5.27).
If leasing is classed as revenue expenditure, business assets might be acquired
without following a capital expenditure application procedure. The importance of
this factor was refuted by the vast majority of respondents in the decision to lease
land and buildings (mean=1.57, row 22, Table 5.26) and other assets (mean=1.64,
row 25, Table 5.27).
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5.6.6 Other financial/transactional reasons for leasing
A suggested major contributor to the initial growth in leasing was its off-balance
sheet nature. The current lease accounting standard SSAP21 still permits operating
lease expenditure to remain off-balance sheet, having no impact on financial
accounting ratios. However, this does not appear to be of prime importance among
respondents in their decision to lease both land and buildings or other assets
(mean=2.58, row 10, Table 5.26 and mean=2.64, row 10, Table 5.27). These
findings suggest that the new proposals to bring operating lease expenditure onto
the balance sheet would have no major impact on the decision to lease.
This is surprising considering there is empirical evidence to suggest that operating
leases, if capitalised, would have a significant impact on financial accounting ratios
(Beattie et al., 1998). Although, there is also evidence to suggest that the UK market
does seem to currently adjust for operating leases in its assessment of equity risk
(Beattie et al., 2000), responses did not appear to suggest wide agreement with the
notion of market efficiency (Table 5.15).
It has been suggested that the application process for lease finance is easier
compared to other sources of finance with the involvement of minimum paperwork
(Day, 2000). Approximately 66% of respondents indicated this was of little or no
importance in the decision to lease land and buildings (mean=2.18, row 17, Table
5.26) and 54% in the decision to lease other assets (mean=2.47, row 13, Table 5.27).
These findings are consistent with UK survey evidence of ten years previous (Drury
and Braund, 1990). Thus the importance of the ease with which lease finance can be
arranged does not appeared to have changed over time.
Leasing often has the convenience of being offered at point of sale, with the
possibility of the cost of an asset being reduced by the offer of favourable lease
terms on the part of the manufacturer. This factor was of little or no importance to
60% of respondents in the decision to lease land and buildings (mean=2.19, row 16,
Table 5.26) and 52% in the decision to lease other assets (mean =2.42, row 17,
Table 5.27).
-	 238
5.6.7 Risk sharing reasons for leasing
Lease agreements provide the opportunity to alter the distribution of risk, and
consequently rewards between lessee and lessor. This flexibility was considered to
be of little or no importance by 50% of respondents in the decision to lease land and
buildings (mean=2.3, row 15, Table 5.26), but only by 44% in the decision to lease
other assets (mean=2.51, row 12, Table 5.27).
Contingent rentals
In lease agreements with a contingent element to rental payments, the lessee, in
effect, converts a fixed repayment cost to one which varies with use/operating
performance, thus reducing the risk of financial distress. The lessor, in exchange for
running the risk of lower rental payments in line with poor lessee performance,
would seek a higher return in the first instance. In lease agreements with rentals that
increase in line with market prices, the risk borne by the lessee of prices going up
would be reflected in lower rental payments in the first instance.
On average, respondents did not appear to place a high level of importance on
reducing company exposure to economic or business downturns with the use of
contingent lease rentals. This factor was of little or no importance to 62% of
respondents in the decision to lease land and buildings (mean=2.05, row 20, Table
5.26) and to 65% in the decision to lease other assets (mean=2.01, row 24, Table
5.27).
The use, by respondents, of contingent elements in lease agreements for both land
and buildings and other assets is shown in Tables 5.29 and 5.30, respectively. The
most common contingent element to lease agreements entered into by respondents,
appeared to be rentals which vary in line with prices in respect of leased land and
buildings (mean=2.44, row 1, Table 5.29). However, approximately 50% (72
respondents) did indicate this was never or seldom the case. Of these respondents,
24% were not currently engaged in leasing land and buildings. Therefore, findings
could reflect, to some extent, that respondents indicated that they never or seldom
enter lease agreements for land and buildings with rentals that vary in line with
prices, because they never or seldom enter into lease agreements for land and
buildings. An analysis of respondents currently leasing land and buildings and
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entering agreements with rentals that vary in line with prices is shown in Appendix
16. Of the 90 respondents currently engaged in leasing land and buildings,
approximately 44% usually or always enter agreements with rentals which vary in
line with prices, 15% sometimes do and 41% seldom or never do. This is somewhat
surprising given that property leases in the UK are typically long-term leases in
which rentals are increased to prevailing market prices at regular intervals. Further,
according to the Finance and Leasing Association, property leases without rent rises
are virtually non-existent in the UK.
Although the most popular contingent element in lease agreements for other assets
appeared to be rentals that vary with usage, 69% of respondents indicated that they
never enter such agreements (mean=l.66, row I Table 5.30). Agreements in which
rentals vary with revenue/profits were not entered into by 83% of respondents in
respect of land and buildings (mean=1.26, row 2, Table 5.29) and 87% in respect of
other assets (mean=1.21, row 3, Table 5.30). An analysis of respondents currently
leasing plant and machinery, office equipment, computer equipment and vehicles
and entering lease agreements for other assets with contingent rentals is shown in
Appendix 17. Contingent rentals do not appear to feature in the lease agreements
currently held by respondents in respect of other assets.
In general, lease agreements with contingent elements did not appear common
amongst respondents. However, lease agreements for land and buildings with
rentals increasing in line with prices were more prominent when respondents
currently leasing land and buildings were considered in isolation. As the new
approach to lease accounting would have major impact on property leases
contingent on prevailing market prices, a significant number of lessees could well
be affected.
Residual arrangements
The risks associated with the disposal of an asset, at the end of a lease agreement,
can be appropriated between lessee and lessor via various residual arrangements.
The extent of respondents' interest in the residual value of both their leased land and
buildings and other assets is shown in Tables 5.31 and 5.32, respectively.
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Table 5.31: Lessee interest in the residual value of leased land and buildings
To what extent does your company enter 	 Response category'
lease agreements in which:	 1 I 2	 3	 4 I 5 I DK Mean2 Standard
Row__________________________________ Percentage of respondents 	 ________ Deviation
1 Ownership is transferred to lessee at the
end of the contract 	 75 7	 8	 6	 4	 0	 1.58	 1.14
2 All or a share of the proceeds is received
by lessee on the sale of the leased asset 	 77 10 8	 2	 3	 0	 1.44	 0.95
3 A surplus is received by lessee if the
residual value is above a certain amount 	 79 9 10 1	 1	 0	 1.36	 0.78
4 A guarantee is given by lessee to pay
compensation if the residual value is
below a certain amount	 83 9
	 6	 1	 1	 0	 1.26	 0.67
'l=never, 2=seldom, 3=sometimes, 4=usually, 5=always and DK=dont know)
2A11 mean responses significantly different from never (ie. 1) at 1% level (one-tailed test)
Table 5.32: Lessee interest in the residual value of other leased assets
To what extent does your company enter 	 Response category'
lease agreements in which: 	 1 2 I 3 I 4 I 5	 I DK Mean2 Standard
Row__________________________________ Percentage of respondents 	 ________ Deviation
1 Ownership is transferred to lessee at the
end of the contract	 26 12 36 19 8
	 0	 2.71	 1.26
2 All or a share of the proceeds is received
bylesseeonthesaleoftheleasedasset	 46 14 26 10 4
	 0	 2.13	 1.23
3 A surplus is received by lessee if the
residual value is above a certain amount 49 16 28 6
	 1	 0	 1.96	 1.07
4 A guarantee is given by lessee to pay
compensation if the residual value is
below acertainamount 	 56 21 18 4	 1	 0	 1.74	 0.98
'l=never, 2=seldom, 3=sometimes, 4=usually, 5=always and DK=don't know)
2 mean responses significantly different froni never (ie. 1) at 1% level (one-tailed test)
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The most common form of residual interest appeared to be the transfer of ownership
at the end of lease contracts (row 1, Tables 5.31 and 5.32). However, this transfer of
ownership was far more widespread in the leasing of other assets (mean=2.71)
compared to land and buildings (mean=1.58).
Receiving a share of the sales proceeds of other leased assets (mean=2.13) was
more common than receiving a share of the sale proceeds of leased land and
buildings (mean=1.44). Giving a guarantee to pay compensation for a residual value
below a certain amount appeared least common in the leasing of both land and
buildings and other assets (mean=1.26 and 1.74, row 4, Tables 5.31 and 5.32). In
addition, respondents did not appear to place much importance on the disposal value
of leased property being higher because the lessor has better access to or knowledge
of markets. Approximately, 65% of respondents indicated this was of little or no
importance in the decision to lease land and buildings (mean=2.13, 11/12, row 18,
Table 5.26), and 59% in the decision to lease other assets (mean=2.27, row 21,
Table 5.27).
In summary, any compensation/liability arising from the residual value of leased
assets did not appear widespread among respondents.
5.6.8 Respondents' perceptions of the relationship between leasing and borrowing
Previous UK empirical research (Beattie et al., 2000) has found total leasing and
borrowing to be partial substitutes, with lease obligations consuming less overall
borrowing capacity. On this basis, the decision to lease was investigated in
conjunction with overall capital structure decisions in this questionnaire.
Respondents' perceptions of the relationship between finance leasing and borrowing
and operating leasesand borrowing are shown in Table 5.33. In contrast to previous
findings, the most popular perception amongst respondents appeared to be of a
complementary relationship (49% agreed, row 1, Panel A and Panel B, Table 5.33).
Approximately 35% of respondents indicated that finance leasing is a substitute for
borrowing (Panel A), with only 14% perceiving it to consume less borrowing
capacity (row 3, Panel A). In the case of operating leases, only 16% indicated
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Table 5.33: The relationship between leasing and borrowing
Panel A:
Finance leasing and borrowing
Percentage of respondents (n142)
Row______________________________________
1 Leasing complements borrowing and increases company overall
borrowing capacity	 49
2 Leasing is a substitute for borrowing, consuming the same
borrowing capacity
	 19
3 Leasing is a substitute for borrowing, consuming less borrowing
capacity	 14
4 Dont know	 11
5 Leasing has no bearing on company borrowing
	 6
6 Leasing is a substitute for borrowing, consuming more borrowing
capacity	 2
Total	 100
Panel B:
Operating leasing and borrowing
Percentage of respondents (n= 152)
Row________________________________________
1 Leasing complements borrowing and increases company overall
borrowing capacity
	 49
2 Leasing has no bearing on company borrowing
	 28
3 Leasing is a substitute for borrowing, consuming the same
borrowing capacity	 9
4 Don't know	 7
5 Leasing is a substitute for borrowing, consuming less borrowing
capacity	 6
6 Leasing is a substitute for borrowing, consuming more borrowing
capacity	 1
- Total	 100
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substitutability (Panel B) with 6% perceiving it to consume less debt capacity (row
5, Panel B).
These findings appear somewhat inconsistent when 75% of respondents previously
acknowledged lease-debt substitutability by recognising fixed finance and operating
lease payments in their measures of financial gearing. However, on reflection,
findings might be the product of confusion created in the wording of the question
(row 1, Panel A and Panel B, Table 5.33). It is not clear whether respondents
perceived leasing and borrowing to really be complements In this case, leasing
would have no impact on non-leasing debt and would increase overall debt capacity
by the full amount of lease finance. Alternatively respondents may perceive that
leasing consumes less borrowing capacity than non-leasing debt alternatives and
thus increases overall borrowing capacity by part of the amount of lease finance (i.e.
partial substitution).
5.6.9 The relative importance of factors in the decision not to lease
The relative importance of nine factors in the decision not to lease land and
buildings and other assets are shown in Tables 5.34 and 5.35 respectively. The vast
majority of respondents (84%) indicated that their companies currently used,
previously used, or consider using leasing. Therefore, the decision not to lease is
mainly in the context of not leasing in a particular circumstance, rather than taking
the decision never to lease 7 . All mean responses were found to be statistically
significantly different from 1, i.e. not important at all. This appears to suggest that
all the factors considered appeared to affect the decision not to lease, at least to
some degree.
The most important factor in the decision not to lease both land and buildings and
other assets appeared to be the expense involved compared to other sources of
finance (means=3.36 and 3.68, row 1, Tables 5.34 and 5.35). Company preference
for legal ownership was ranked second in importance (means=2.98 and 2.77, row 2,
With one exception, an analysis of the importance attached to factors in the decision not to lease
failed to highlight any significant difference between actual/potential lessees and non-lessees: Non-
lessees placed more importance on company preference for legal ownership of other assets.
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Table 5.34: The relative importance of factors in decision not to lease land and buildings
Response category'
1 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I DK Mean2 Standard Grouping3
Row Factor	 Percentage of respondents ______ Deviation _______
1 Leasing is more expensive than other sources of finance 	 11 13 22 29 21 3
	 3.36	 1.27	 1
2 Company preference for legal ownership 	 17 26 12 29 15 1	 298	 1.37	 2
3 Control over and hence the ability to use leased property is
limited to duration of lease agreement with extension at	 19 21 29 23 6	 2	 2.77	 1.20	 2
lessor's discretion
4 Loss of grants/taxation allowances if an asset is leased 	 27 28 28 11 3	 4	 2.32	 1.08	 3
5 Company assets are highly specialised or company
specific, making it expensive for a lessor to bear the risk of 37 31 11 12 4
	 5	 2.11	 1.18	 4
obsolescence and the costs of purchase and disposal
6 Assets acquired under lease agreements can be repossessed
if company defaults	 41 35 16 4 1
	
3	 1.87	 0.92	 4 5
7 Some key company executives are opposed to leasing 	 52 29 8 6 1
	
4	 1.71	 0.97	 6	 5
8 Leasing does not provide 100% finance due to the	
1	 3	 1.70	 0.76	 6	 5
requirement of advance rentals
9 Leasing indicates a source of financial weakness 	 53 35 8 2 0	 1	 1.58	 0.73	 6
Table 5.35: The relative importance of factors in decision not to lease other assets
Response category'
1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I	 I DK Mean2 Standard Grouping3
Row Factor	 Percentage of respondents ______ Deviation _______
1 Leasing is more expensive than other sources of fmance
	
4 9 26 32 26 2	 3.68	 1.10	 1
2 Company preference for legal ownership 	 19 28 18 24 10 1
	
2.77	 1.29	 2
3 Control over and hence the ability to use leased property is
limited to duration of lease agreement with extension at 	 20 28 31 14 6
	
1	 2.58	 1.14	 3
lessor's discretion
4 Loss of grants/taxation allowances if an asset is leased 	 25 22 34 13 2	 3	 2.43	 1.09	 3
5 Company assets are highly specialised or company
specific, making it expensive for a lessor to bear the risk of 31 28 14 17 7
	
4	 2.37	 1.29	 3
obsolescence and the costs of purchase and disposal
6 Assets acquired under lease agreements can be repossessed	
4	 2	 1.86	 0.90	 4if company defaults
7 Some key company executives are opposed to leasing
	 50 28 8 9 2	 3	 1.80	 1.05	 4 5
8 Leasing does not provide 100% finance due to the 	
4	 1.68	 0.72	 4 5
requirement of advance rentals
9 Leasing indicates a source of fmancial weakness 	 53 33 10 2 0
	
1	 1.62	 0.77	 5
'1" not important at all, 2=of little importance, 3=fairly important, 4=important and 5=very important)
2A11 mean responses significantly different from not important at all (ie. 1) at 1% level (one-tailed test)
3Grouping based on statistical difference between at 5% two tailed test
(Mann-Whitney confidence interval and test procedure in Minitab)
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Tables 5.34 and 5.35). The least important factor in the decision not to lease both
land and buildings and other assets appeared to be the notion that leasing indicates a
source of financial weakness (means=1.58 and 1.62, row 9, Tables 5.34 and 5.35).
The Mann-Whitney confidence interval and test procedure in Minitab was used to
establish if the differences between the relative importance of factors in the decision
not to lease land and buildings and not to lease other assets were statistically
significant. Only the expense involved in leasing compared to other sources of
finance was found to be statistically more important in the decision not to lease
other assets compared to land and buildings. However, this finding might reflect the
ease with which other assets could be obtained using other sources of finance.
Respondents might not always have the choice between leasing and purchasing land
and buildings. General comments made by respondents provide some indication of
this being the case. (For example, "the alternative to leasing is not always available"
and "the properties we operate from are only available on lease").
Three factors suggested in the decision not to lease (Tables 5.34 and 5.35)
correspond to factors suggested in the decision to lease (Tables 5.26 and 5.27). In
order to test for consistency in the responses provided, a comparison was made and
correlation coefficients obtained.
If leasing being more expensive than other sources of finance was important in the
decision not to lease (row 1, Tables 5.34 and 5.35), the rate of interest implicit in
leasing compared to borrowing (row 3, Table 5.26 and row 1, Table 5.27) might be
expected to be equally important in the decision to lease. The Spearman correlation
coefficient between the two sets of responses is 0.603 (p0.0O0) for land and
buildings and 0.396 (p=0.000) for other assets. Therefore, the importance of the cost
of leasing compared to other sources appears consistent across respondents'
decisions to lease and not to lease.
If the loss of grants/taxation allowances were important in the decision not to lease
other assets (row 4, Table 5.35), this might suggest that respondents derive more
benefit from their own use of such allowances. The opposite would be true if
transferring capital tax allowances to the leasing company reflected in lower lease
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rental cost were important in the decision to lease other assets (row 7, Table 5.27).
The Spearman correlation coefficient between the two sets of responses is 0.234
(pO.Ol 1). If respondents mostly derived benefit from either their own use of tax
allowances or transferring them to the leasing company, a negative correlation
coefficient might have been expected. However, a positive relationship does not
necessarily indicate inconsistency in responses. It might merely reflect that in some
leasing opportunities, the loss of tax allowances brings no additional benefit and is,
therefore, a deciding factor in the decision not to lease. Whereas with other
opportunities, a benefit derived from transferring the tax allowances is a deciding
factor in the decision to lease.
In summary, grants/taxation allowances do appear to be a consideration in the
leasing decision. As more importance appears to be placed on transferring
allowances (mean3.08, row 7, Table 5.27) compared to the loss (mean=2.43, row
4, Table 535)8 leasing appears to offer an advantage.
The repossession of leased assets from lessees in default does not appear to be an
important consideration in the decision not to lease land and buildings and other
assets (means=1.87 and 1.86, row 6, Tables 5.34 and 5.35). This could indicate that
respondents either don't contemplate default or don't consider repossession a
serious consequence. However, the legal consequence of default being less severe
for leasing also does not appear to be an important consideration in the decision to
lease both land and buildings and other assets (mean=1.02 and 2.11, rows 19 and
23, Tables 5.26 and 5.27). The correlation coefficients between the two sets of
responses are 0.406 (p=0.000) for land and buildings and 0.5000 (p=0.000) for other
assets. Therefore, respondents don't appear to contemplate default in the leasing
decision, in which case the less severe consequences of leasing don't appear to be
an advantage.
8 Mann-Whitney confidence interval and test procedure in Minitab confirmed significant difference
at 5% level between two sets of responses.
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5.7: Corporate leasing policy: Further analysis
The use of leasing and the relative importance of factors in the decisions to lease
and not to lease, land and buildings and other assets, were analysed by several firm
characteristics: size, industry classification and financial gearing.
5.7.1 Further analysis by size
Small and medium-sized firms benefit from a 40% first year writing down capital
tax allowance on qualifying asset expenditure 9 . For this reason, small firms may be
less inclined to lease. However, leasing has the advantage of providing finance for
small-scale operations or individual assets. Also, small firms suffer from
diseconomies of scale, and are therefore unlikely to be able to obtain or dispose of
assets as economically as a lessor. Small firms may also have less access to the
long-term debt market in terms of cost or lack of credit status.
The process of establishing the relative size of responding firms (in terms of total
assets and sales) is described in Section 5.4.1.10; large (small) firms are the top
(bottom) third of respondent companies. The response from large and small firms in
relation to using or considering leasing is shown in Panel A of Appendix 18. There
is no apparent difference between responses in relation to use on the basis of size.
A comparison of the relative importance of factors, to large and small firms, in the
decision to lease land and buildings and other assets is shown in Panel A and Panel
B of Appendix 19 respectively. For the majority of factors, there does not appear to
be a significant difference in the importance attached. However, in the decision to
lease both land and buildings and other assets, both avoiding a large capital outlay
(row 2) and the conservation of cash flow (row 14) appear more important to small
firms. As expected, leasing also appears to be favoured by small firms in relation to
availability on any scale (row 21). Large firms appear to place more importance on
a positive outcome to quantitative analysis in the decision to lease land and
A firm is classed as small or medium-sized if it satisfies at least two of the following conditions:
Small firms: annual turnover <£2.8 million, assets <£1.4 million, employees < 50
Medium firms: annual turnover <±1 1.2 million, assets <£5.6 million, employees <250.
The mean total assets for the sample of small firms is £11 million. Therefore, a number of firms
classed as small may not necessarily qualify for 40% writing down allowance.
249
buildings (row 3, Panel A), and the cost of leasing in comparison to borrowing to
purchase other assets (row 4, Panel B).
A comparison of the responses provided by small and large firms in the decision not
to lease land and buildings and other assets is shown in Panel C and Panel D of
Appendix 19 respectively. Against expectations, small firms were not found to
place more importance on the loss of grants/taxation allowances (row 7, Panel D).
Large firms appear more likely to disregard leasing because it is more expensive in
comparison to other sources of finance (row 1, Panel C and Panel D). Large firms
also appear to have a preference for legal ownership in relation to land and
buildings (row 2, Panel C). Further, the use of highly specialised/company specific
assets appears to be a more important factor in large firms when deciding not to
lease (row 9, Panel C and Panel D).
5.7.2 Further analysis by industry classification
The industry in which a firm operates has been found to influence the use of leasing
(see Section 3.7, Chapter 3). This is not surprising given that the characteristics
enhancing or mitigating the use of leasing may be typical of firms operating in
certain industries. The classification of questionnaire responses by industry is
described in Section 5.4.2 of this chapter. The use of leasing across industries is
shown in Panel B of Appendix 18. Firms operating in information technology
appear more likely to use, or to consider the use of, leasing than firms in the other
industry groups. This appears to support the suggestion that reducing the risk of
obsolescence is an important advantage when leasing assets that are subject to rapid
changes. Leasing also appears commonplace in firms operating in the general
industries and cyclical services groups. These industries range from general
retailers, leisure, entertainment and hotels to engineering, aerospace and defence.
The assets used in these industries are fairly standard and capable of being re-
deployed from firm to firm, and thus conducive to being the subject of lease
agreements.
A comparison of the relative importance of factors in the decision to lease land and
buildings and other assets, according to industry classification, is shown in Panel A
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and Panel B of Appendix 20 respectively. The majority of differences in response
were not found to be statistically significant. However, the importance attached to
avoiding large capital outlay, and the interest rate implicit in the lease compared to
borrowing in respect of land and buildings, does appear to differ across industries.
Utility firms appear to place more importance on the use of leasing to avoid large
capital outlays, in comparison, for example, to firms dealing in cyclical consumer
goods (row 2, Panel A). Utility firms also appear to place more importance on the
interest rate implicit in the lease, which is much less of a concern to firms operating,
for example, in cyclical services (row 4, Panel A). Any differences in the relative
importance placed on factors in the decision to lease other assets were not found to
be statistically significant.
A comparison across industries in relation to the importance of factors in the
decision not to lease land and buildings and other assets is shown in Panel C and
Panel D of Appendix 20 respectively. The limited duration of occupancy of land
and buildings under a lease agreement appears more important to firms operating in
non-cyclical services compared to, for example, utility firms. However, the loss of
grants/taxation allowances appears much less important to firms in non-cyclical
services. Information technology firms and firms providing cyclical services don't
appear to consider that the use of specialised or company specific assets makes
leasing an expensive option.
5.7.3 Further analysis by level of gearing
Evidence suggests that leasing and non-leasing debt appear to be at least partial
substitutes (Marston and Harris, 1988; Beattie et. a!., 2000). A firm's capital
structure and its capacity for debt appear to influence the use of leasing. Highly
geared firms might be expected to use leasing because it is perceived to consume
less overall debt capacity or because it isn't accompanied by additional restrictive
covenants. Respondents were classified as high gearing and low gearing firms as
described in Section 5.4.3.
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A comparison of the use of leasing by firms with high and low levels of gearing is
shown in Panel C of Appendix 18. The difference in use on the basis of gearing
does not appear to be statistically significant.
A comparison of the relative importance of factors in the decision to lease land and
buildings and other assets, to high and low geared firms, is shown in Panel A and
Panel B of Appendix 21 respectively. For the majority of factors there does not
appear to be any significant difference. However, the provision of total asset
financing through leasing appears less important to highly geared firms (row 7,
Panel A and Panel B), as does a higher disposal value in relation to leased assets
(row 17, Panel B). Firms with high levels of total gearing appear to attach more
importance to the fact that leasing has minimal impact on measures used in their
current debt covenants (row 11, Panel A and Panel B). This is hardly surprising
when highly geared firms are more likely to be in breach of debt covenants.
A comparison of the relative importance of factors in the decision not to lease is
shown in Panel C and Panel D of Appendix 21 respectively. Highly geared firms
appear to attach more importance on the legal ownership of land and buildings, and
the limitation in terms of control over leased property (row 6, Panel C). Perhaps
highly geared firms use owned property as collateral when raising high levels of
debt. Also, in the event of default, highly geared firms may prefer not to run the risk
of early eviction from leased premises.
5.8: Corporate leasing policy: Results summary
Evidence in relation to corporate leasing policy was obtained in two ways. Firstly,
by analysing the questionnaire responses for the entire sample of respondents, and
secondly, by using additional data to analyse on the basis of certain firm
characteristics.
Leasing appears to be widely used or considered by respondents. Operating leases
take precedence over finance leases for all asset types, with the exception of leased
plant and machinery. Leasing does not appear to feature prominently when making
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decisions to invest in an asset, rather it is considered as a source of finance once an
asset acquisition decision has been made. The evidence from responses for the
entire sample of respondents, in relation to factors influencing the decision to lease
land and buildings and other assets, is summarised in Table 5.36 and Table 5.37
respectively.
In order to establish the relative importance of factors influencing the leasing
decision, responses were classified based on the degree of evidence provided. The
degree of evidence was established as the percentage of respondents who indicated
that a factor was fairly to very important to them, or that they sometimes to always
entered a lease agreement with a certain feature. If the percentage of respondents
ranged between 0 to 20%, the evidence was taken to be strongly against a particular
factor being important. A percentage between 21 to 40% was taken to be against, 41
to 60% was taken to be neutral, 61 to 80% was taken to be in favour, and 81 to
100% strongly in favour of a particular factor being important. The factors are
grouped according to tax saving reasons, borrowing capacity and repayment
reasons, risk sharing reasons, other financial/transactional reasons and other
reasons/perceptions of leasing.
Tax considerations still appear to exert some influence over the leasing decision.
Respondents appear to lease land and buildings because the lease rentals are a tax-
deductible expense, when the asset itself does not qualify for capital tax allowances.
Respondents also claim that other assets are leased because the ability to transfer
capital tax allowances to the lessor is reflected in lower lease rental payments.
Changes to the tax system which include the time apportionment of qualifying
expenditure under finance leases in first year, and written down allowances
restricted to 6% on qualifying expenditure on long-life assets, did not appear to
influence the leasing decision.
In relation to borrowing capacity and repayment reasons, avoiding large capital
outlay and conservation of cash flow appear most influential in the decision to lease
both land and buildings and other assets. Leasing does not appear to be used with
the intention of expanding overall debt type capacity or for flexible repayment
reasons. The situation arising on default also does not appear to feature. The
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Table 5.36: Survey evidence of factors influencing the decision to lease
land and buildings
Qu Importance of factors influencing the decision
	
_______ Degree of Evidence1
Strongly	 In	 Strongly
____________________________________________ Against Against Neutral Favour In Favour
Tax saving reasons
C5(o) Lease rentals tax deductible but capital allowances
not available on assets purchased
C9(g) Loss of grants/tax allowances if asset is leased
Borrowing capacity and repayment
reasons
C5(a) Expanding overall debt-type capacity
C5(b) Avoiding large capital outlay
C5(g) Leasing provides total finance for an asset
C9(e) Leasing does not provide 100% finance
C 5(n) Conservation of cash flow
C5(h) Flexibility of lease repayments
C5(j) Lease covenants generally less restrictive
C5(k) Leasing has minimal impact on measures used in
current debt covenants
C5(m) Leasing avoids capital expenditure controls
C5(t) The legal consequences of default are less severe
C9(h) Leased assets repossessed in event of default
C5(u) Leasing provides finance on any scale 	 _______ _______ ________
Risk sharing reasons
C5(p) Leasing can reduce/eliminate risk of significant cost
of transferring ownership at the end of a contract
C5(q) Higher disposal value of leased property- lessor
has better access to/knowledge of markets
C5(r) Lease rentals contingent on sales/profits can reduce
exposure to economic/business downturns
C5(s) Lease agreements are flexible - drawn up to share
asset risk and economic benefit between parties
(continued) _______ _______ _______ _______ ________
'Degree of evidence based on percentage of respondents who indicated they took particular action,
they indicated something was fairly to very important (3, 4 or 5), or they agreed or strongly agreed with something (4 or 5)
0-20 % = strongly against, 21-40% = against, 41-60% = neutral, 61-80% = in favour, 81-100% = strongly in favour
254
Table 5.36 continued
Qu Importance of factors influencing the decision
	 _______	 Degree_of Evidence'
Strongly	 In	 Strongly
___________________________________________ Against Against Neutral Favour In Favour
Risk sharing reasons continued
C9(i) Company assets specialised/specific making it
expensive for lessor to bear risks of obsolescence
and costs of purchase / disposal
C6	 Use of lease agreements with rentals that vary with:
- Usage
- Revenue/Profits 	 "I
- Prices
C7	 Use of lease agreements with residual interest:
- Ownership transferred when lease contract ends
- Lessee guarantees to pay compensation if residual
value is below a certain amount
- Lessee receives a surplus if residual value is above
a certain amount
- All or a share of disposal proceeds received by
lessee on sale of leased asset
Other financial/transactional
reasons
C5(e) Leasing is easier to arrange from an administrative
point of view
C5(f) Leasing has the ability to offer a complete package
(inc service & maintenance agreements)
C5(v) Leasing is conveniently offered at asset point of sale
C5(d) Rate of interest implicit in lease compared to
borrowing to purchase
C5(i) Incentives to lease given by lessor
C9(a) Leasing is more expensive than other sources -
important when deciding not to lease
- Other reasons / perceptions of
leasing
C5(l) Operating leases not on balance sheet - no impact on
ratios
C9(b) Company preference for legal ownership
C9(c) Key executives opposed to leasing
C9(d) Leasing indicates a source of financial weakness
C9(f) Control over asset is limited to duration of lease
agreement - extension of lessor's discretion
t Degree of evidence based on percentage of respondents who indicated they took particular action,
they indicated something was fairly to very important (3, 4 or 5), or they agreed or strongly agreed with something (4 or 5)
0-20% = strongly against, 21-40% = against, 41-60% = neutral, 61-80% = in favour, 81-100% = strongly in favour
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Table 5.37: Survey evidence of factors influencing the decision to lease other assets
Qu Importance of factors influencing the decision 	 _______	 Degree of Evidence'
Strongly	 In	 Strongly
- ___________________________________________ Against Against Neutral Favour In Favour
Tax saving reasons
C5(o) Lease rentals tax deductible but capital allowances
not available on assets purchased
C5(w) Transfer of capital allowances to lessor reflected in
lower lease rental cost
C5(x) Time apportionment of qualifying expenditure under
finance leases in first year
C5(y) Restriction to 6% WDA on qualifying expenditure
on long-life assets
Loss of grants/tax allowances if asset is leased
Borrowing capacity and repayment
reasons
C5(a) Expanding overall debt-type capacity
C5(b) Avoiding large capital outlay
C5(g) Leasing provides total finance for an asset
C9(e) Leasing does not provide 100% finance
C5(n) Conservation of cash flow
C5(h) Flexibility of lease repayments
C5(j) Lease covenants generally less restrictive
C5(k) Leasing has minimal impact on measures used in
current debt covenants
C5(m) Leasing avoids capital expenditure controls
C5(t) The legal consequences of default are less severe
C9(h) Leased assets repossessed in event of default
C5(u) Leasing provides finance on any scale 	 ________ ________ ________ _______ _________
Risk sharing reasons
C5(p) Leasing can reduce/eliminate risk of significant cost
of transferring ownership at the end of a contract
C5(q) Higher disposal value of leased property- lessor
has better access to/knowledge of markets
C5(r) Lease rentals contingent on sales/profits can reduce
exposure to economic/business downturns
C5(s) Lease agreements are flexible - drawn up to share
asset risk and economic benefit between parties
(continued) _______ _______ _______ _______ ________
'Degree of evidence based on percentage of respondents who indicated they took particular action,
they indicated something was fairly to very important (3, 4 or 5), or they agreed or strongly agreed with something (4 or 5)
0-20 % = strongly against, 21-40% = against, 41-60% = neutral, 61-80% = in favour, 81-100% = strongly in favour
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Table 5.37 continued
Qu Importance of factors influencing the decision 	 _______	 Degree_of Evidence1
Strongly	 In	 Strongly
__________________________________________ Against Against Neutral Favour In Favour
Risk sharing reasons continued
C9(i) Company assets specialised/specific making it
expensive for lessor to bear risks of obsolescence
and costs of purchase I disposal
C6	 Use of lease agreements with rentals that vary with:
- Usage
- Revenue/Profits
- Prices
C7	 Use of lease agreements with residual interest:
- Ownership transferred when lease contract ends
- Lessee guarantees to pay compensation if residual
value is below a certain amount
- Lessee receives a surplus if residual value is above
a certain amount
- All or a share of disposal proceeds received by
lessee on sale of leased asset
Other financial/transactional
reasons
C5(e) Leasing is easier to arrange from an administrative
point of view
C5(f) Leasing has the ability to offer a complete package
(inc service & maintenance agreements)
C5(v) Leasing is conveniently offered at asset point of sale
C5(d) Rate of interest implicit in lease compared to
borrowing to purchase
C5(i) Incentives to lease given by lessor
C9(a) Leasing is more expensive than other sources -
important when deciding not to lease
- Other reasons I perceptions of
leasing
C5(l) Operating leases not on balance sheet - no impact on
ratios
C9(b) Company prefernce for legal ownership
C9(c) Key executives opposed to leasing
C9(d) Leasing indicates a source of financial weakness
C9(f) Control over asset is limited to duration of lease
agreement - extension of lessors discretion
'Degree of evidence based on percentage of respondents who indicated they took particular action,
they indicated something was fairly to very important (3, 4 or 5), or they agreed or strongly agreed with something (4 or 5)
0-20 % = strongly against, 2 1-40% = against, 41-60% = neutral, 6 1-80% = in favour, 81-100% = strongly in favour
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avoidance of capital expenditure controls appears to play no part whatsoever in the
decision to lease. This finding coincides with similar evidence obtained for US
firms (Mukherjee, 1991). The provision of 100% finance and the opportunity to
obtain finance on any scale appear important in the decision to lease other assets.
The flexibility to shift the risks and rewards between parties to a lease agreement
does not apparently feature significantly in the decision to lease. Respondents did
not appear to attach any importance to risk-sharing reasons for leasing. Also, lease
agreements with risk-sharing features did not appear to be widely employed by
respondents. However, with the exception of operating leased land and buildings
with rentals that vary in line with prices, the features investigated may be more
commonly employed in finance lease agreements. As respondents predominantly
use operating leases, the lack of use of such risk-sharing features may not be
surprising.
The cost of leasing in relation to other sources appears to be important in the leasing
decision. It appears more important when deciding to lease other assets than in the
decision to lease land and buildings. However, cost may not be the deciding factor
to lease land and buildings if access to a particular property is not available by any
other means. Incentives given by the lessor in terms of rent-free periods appear
influential in the decision to lease land and buildings, but do not appear to feature in
relation to other assets.
Practical considerations such as administrative anangements and availability at
point of sale do not appear to be of particular importance. It has previously been
thought that leasing might be used as a last resort by firms when all other finance
sources have been exhausted. This appears to be nothing short of a myth in relation
to financing decisions at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Respondents
refuted that leasing is perceived as a source of financial weakness, and key
executives in general do not appear to be opposed to its use.
In summary, avoiding large capital outlay and cash flow considerations appear of
paramount importance in the decision to lease. The importance attached to the
provision of 100% financing in leasing other assets could infer that leasing is
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favoured for avoiding capital outlay to a greater extent than other forms of debt. As
the flexibility of repayment in leasing arrangements does not appear important, cash
flow considerations could be equally applicable to the decision to take on any form
of debt. It appears that leasing will be used if the cost is favourable in relation to
other sources of finance, and rejected if it is not. Other main advantages to leasing
over other sources of finance appear to include:
• Tax deductible rental payments on leased assets not qualifying for capital
allowances
The ability to 'sell' capital allowances on qualifying asset expenditure to the
lessor in exchange for lower rental payments
The ability to obtain finance on any scale
• The opportunity to obtain a complete package, including the service and
maintenance of leased assets
The findings obtained from the further analysis of responses, on the basis of size,
industry, gearing and degree of operating lease use (from section 5.1, non-response
bias test) are summarised in Table 5.38. The size of a firm and the level of gearing it
operates with, do not appear to influence the use of leasing. However, industry
classification is apparently influential. Firms operating in Information Technology,
General Industries and Cyclical Services appear more likely to use or consider
leasing. This perhaps reflects the nature of the assets employed in these industries.
Assets employed in Information Technology are subject to rapid obsolescence, and
assets employed in General Industries / Cyclical Services may be more standardised
and thus conducive to being the subject of lease contracts.
The reasons for leasing do not appear constant across firm size. Small firms appear
more concerned with qualitative factors such as avoiding large capital outlay,
conservation of cash flow and availability on any scale. Large firms appear more
concerned with quaiititative factors - the cost. These findings in relation to firm size
mirror Drury and Braund's (1990) findings of over a decade earlier. There is some
evidence to suggest that cost is also of less importance to highly geared firm. They
appear to be more concerned with the impact leasing has on restrictive covenants,
and prefer legal ownership in relation to land and buildings.
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Table 5.38: Summary of further analysis: Leasing Policy
More likely I Important Less likely / Important
Use of leasing	 Firms operating in:
Information Technology
General Industries
Cyclical Services
Importance of:
Avoiding large capital outlay	 Utility firms
	 Firms operating in
Small firms	 Cyclical Services
High operating lease users
Conservation of cash flow	 Small firms
Availability on any scale	 Small firms
Provision of total asset finance	 Highly geared firms
Positive outcome to quantitative analysis Large firms
Cost of leasing	 Utility firms	 Firms operating in
Large firms	 Cyclical Services
High operating lease users
Legal ownership of land and buildings Large firms
Highly geared firms
Limited duration of occupancy / control Highly geared firms	 Utility firms
over leased land and buildings	 Firms operating in
Non-Cyclical Services
Loss of grants/taxation allowances	 Firms operating in
Non-Cyclical Services
Higher disposal value of leased assets 	 Highly geared firms
Minimum impact on current restrictive Highly-geared firms
covenants
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In summary, certain firm characteristics appear to influence the importance attached
to alternative advantages to leasing. However, this is not surpnsing given that firm
characteristics influence the degree of benefit, which can be derived from these
alternative advantages.
5.9: Follow-up interviews
Respondents were asked in Section D of the corporate financing and leasing
decisions questionnaire if they would be willing to participate in an interview. The
aim was to explore the issues raised in the questionnaire in more detail, and in light
of the responses received. Although it was recognised that evidence from individual
interviews could not be taken to generally apply across UK quoted industrial
companies, it could potentially provide useful insights to assist in the interpretation
of the questionnaire responses.
Of the 198 respondents to the questionnaire, 34 indicated that they would be willing
to participate in an interview. E-mail appeared to be the preferred choice of medium
by the majority of willing participants (Table 5.39).
Table 5.39: Respondents willing to be interviewed
Number of respondents	 Percentage of respondents
Interview by email	 18	 9.09
Interview by telephone	 13	 6.57
Interview by person 	 3	 1.51
No Interview	 164	 82.83
Total	 198	 100
At the stage when follow-up interviews could be considered (after questionnaire
responses had been thoroughly analysed), both time and financial resources were
limited. It was envisaged that interviewing in person and by telephone could be both
problematic and time consuming, owing to the punishing schedules the respondents
appeared to have. This became apparent during the initial mailing of the
questionnaire. The personal assistants of respondents frequently advised that the
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questionnaire would not receive early attention as a consequence of their superiors
'not touching base' for a reasonable period of time in which to complete it. Thus, a
decision was taken to pursue interview opportunities by email, on the assumption
that respondents were likely to access their email, in or out of their office base.
On analysis of the total sample of respondents, several issues requiring further
investigation were identified. The responses of the willing interview participants
were then individually analysed to identify potential participants with whom an
issue could be explored. In this way, the interview questions were personalised
towards an individual's response, and not all participants received the same
interview questions. Developing such tailored interviews in this manner was
relatively time consuming. A decision was taken to conduct five email interviews
initially, and proceed with the remainder on the basis of successful response.
Although, respondents had indicated their willingness to be interviewed on
completing the questionnaire, it was recognised that owing to the time lapse (one
year on), this might not still be the case.
A summary of the interview questions forwarded to each of the five selected
respondents is shown in Table 5.40. The interview questions comprised both capital
structure and leasing policy issues. The questions mainly addressed:
• Why earnings and cash flow were considered important
• How restrictive covenants affected financing decisions
• Whether equity was issued as a last resort
• Why certain sources of finance were considered favourable to others
• Whether target levels of debt were internally or externally determined
• What was the perceived impact of bringing operating leases on balance sheet
• Whether respondents actually enter operating lease agreements for land and
buildings with rentals that that don't vary in line with prices
• What was the perceived relationship between leasing and debt, and whether
leasing has the potential to increase debt capacity
• Why some key executives were opposed to leasing
• Why was there a preference for legal ownership of assets
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Table 5.40: Interview Questions
I	 Questions	 Recipient	 I
- Determinants of Capital Structure	 ___________
1 You indicated that ensuring long-term survivability of your company was a very Respondent 1
important factor in choosing the appropriate amount of total debt. There are different Respondent 2
aspects to survivability e.g. the ability to pay interest and make capital repayments, Respondent 3
the retention of the confidence of equity investors, customers, suppliers, and the 	 Respondent 4
retention of competitive position in product markets. Do you place more importance
on certain aspects of survivability than others and if so which aspects do you
- consider are most important?
	 ____________
2 You indicated that the volatility of your company's earnings and cash flows was a 	 Respondent 1
very important factor in choosing the appropriate amount of debt. Is this because 	 Respondent 2
fluctuations in earnings / cashflows dictate your requirement for debt, or because 	 Respondent 3
fluctuations impact on your ability to pay interest? 	 Respondent 4
Respondent 5
3 You indicated that restrictive covenants imposed by debt providers were a very 	 Respondent 1
important factor in choosing the appropriate amount of debt. However you were 	 Respondent 4
unsure as to whether restrictive covenants might be suggested to a doubtful lender in
the hopes of convincing the lender to grant a loan. Please could you provide further
- explanation of how restrictive covenants affect your financing decisions. 	 ___________
4 You strongly disagreed that issuing shares sends unfavourable signals concerning 	 Respondent 1
future long-term prospects, and you strongly disagreed to issuing shares when prices
are high even though there is no present need in order to build up a long term fund
cushion. You also indicated that your company would exhaust its use of internal
reserves and straight debt before issuing ordinary shares. Does this mean you only
issue shares as a last resort irrespective of the price, or are you not deterred from
issuing shares when prices are high and you need finance, even if you could still take
on debt?
5 You strongly agreed that issuing shares sends unfavourable signals concerning future Respondent 4
long-term prospects. However you adopted a neutral stance in relation to issuing
shares when prices are high even though there is no present need in order to build up
a long term fund cushion. You also indicated that your company would exhaust its
use of internal reserves and straight debt before issuing ordinary shares. Does this
mean you only issue shares as a last resort irrespective of the price, or are you not
deterred from issuing shares when prices are high and you need finance, even if you
- could still take on debt? 	 ____________
6 You indicated that operating leases were equally favoured to internal reserves and 	 Respondent 1
- preferable to all other types of debt. Why is this the case? 	 _____________
7 You indicated that ordinary shares were niore preferable to internal reserves and 	 Respondent 2
- straight debt. Why is this the case? 	 _____________
8 You indicated that operating leases were preferable to finance leases. Why is this the Respondent 4
case?	 _____________
9 You indicated that your use of straight debt would be exhausted before you issued
	 Respondent 1
shares. You also indicated that you have a flexible target of debt in relation to equity. Respondent 3
As you also indicate that you maintain spare borrowing capacity, is this target an
	 (reasonably
amount of debt which your company believes it derives most benefit, rather than an strict target)
- amount above which lenders are reluctant to grant loans? 	 Respondent 4
263
Table 5.40 continued
10 You indicated that your use of straight debt would be exhausted before internal
	 Respondent 3
reserves. Please explain why you consider straight debt to be more favourable to
internal reserves.
11 You indicated that you maintain spare borrowing capacity for unplanned	 Respondent 1
opportunities, however you would forgo an attractive new growth opportunity rather
- than deviate from existing capital structure. Please explain? 	 ___________
12 You indicated that you maintain a reasonably strict capital structure, i.e.
	
Respondent 3
approximately constant proportions of debt and equity. However, you also strongly
agreed, in general, to issuing shares when prices are high even though there is no
present need to build up a long-term fund cushion. If shares were issued in these
circumstances, the proportion of debt in relation to equity would change. Therefore,
would debt also be issued to maintain target capital structure? If so, would there be a
- period of time in which actual capital structure differed from target capital structure?
- Leasing Policy	 ___________
1 You indicated that the off-balance sheet nature of operating leases was not important Respondent 1
in the decision to lease both land and buildings and other assets. Therefore, do you Respondent 4
believe that new proposals to bring operating leases onto the balance sheet will have 	 and
no major impact on your decision to lease? Do you think your operating leases will Respondent 5
have no major impact on your accounting ratios or restrictive covenants? Do you
	
(very
think the UK market currently adequately adjusts for your operating leases in their
	 important
assessment of equity risk?	 thus major
impact)
2 You indicated that you currently use operating leases to obtain access to land and 	 Respondent 1
buildings. However, you indicated that you never enter agreements with rentals that Respondent 5
vary in line with prices. Therefore, do your operating lease agreements for land and
building have fixed rentals for the entire term. If so what is the length and nature of
- such agreements?	 ____________
3 You indicated that 'some key executives are opposed to leasing' was very important Respondent 2
• in the decision not to lease other assets. Why are they opposed, and why was this
- factor not important in the decision to lease land and buildings? 	 ____________
4 You indicated that operating leasing compliments borrowing and increases overall Respondent 3
borrowing capacity. Do you believe that entering operating lease agreements has no Respondent 4
impact on your ability to enter further debt agreements (i.e. no impact on borrowing	 and
capacity) or do you believe that operating leases have less impact compared to other Respondent 5
forms of finance?	 (finance
leases)
5 You indicated that operating leasing has no bearing on company borrowing. Please Respondent 5
- explain why this.is the case. 	 ____________
6 You indicated that company preference for legal ownership was important in the
	 Respondent 3
decision to lease both land and buildings and other assets. Why is ownership
important?	 ___________
7 You indicated that company preference for legal ownership was important in the
	 Respondent 4
decision to lease other assets but of little importance in the decision to lease land and Respondent 5
buildings._Please_explain_why_this_is_the_case. 	 ____________
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The interview questions were forwarded by email, with an accompanying message
(Appendix 22), and a file containing the individual's original questionnaire
responses. The message conveyed a thank-you for participating in the initial
questionnaire, and reminded respondents of their offer to participate in an interview.
Care was taken to stress that interview participation was select, and that the
questions were personalised, with the aim of encouraging co-operation. The
message also indicated that the collating and analysis of the original questionnaire
responses had been a lengthy process, by way of an explanation of the time lapse
between contact.
Unfortunately, a successful response to interview requests was not attained (Table
5.41). Two respondents failed to acknowledge receipt, despite a reminder, and two
respondents declined to participate further.
Table 5.41: Response to follow-up interviews
Respondent Response
1	 "I was more than happy to assist with the first questionnaire. I do
not wish to comment I be involved further"
2	 "Sony - Just can't respond for the time being - you'll just have to
go on ahead without me"
3	 Response to interview questions received
4	 No response - despite reminder
5	 No response - despite reminder
The interview questions along with the responses provided by the remaining
respondent are shown in Table 5.42. The information obtained was not extensive.
However, according to this respondent's suggestions, debt levels may neither be
consciously determined internally according to balancing the costs/benefits of debt,
nor externally imposed by lenders. A firms debt level may be determined according
to the level it perceives as acceptable by the market. In addition, this respondent
viewed operating leases as a substitute for debt, although he admitted that he
thought operating leases have less impact than obligations recorded on-balance
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Table 5.42: Interview responses from respondent 3
Question	 Response
- Determinants of Capital Structure	 ____________________________
1 You indicated that ensuring long-term survivability of your company
	 Not particularly. All important
was a very important factor in choosing the appropriate amount of total
debt. There are different aspects to survivability e.g. the ability to pay
interest and make capital repayments, the retention of the confidence of
equity investors, customers, suppliers, and the retention of competitive
position in product markets. Do you place more importance on certain
aspects of survivability than others and if so which aspects do you
- consider are most important?	 ______________________________
2 You indicated that the volatility of your company's earnings and cash 	 Both"
flows was a very important factor in choosing the appropriate amount of
debt. Is this because fluctuations in earnings I cashflows dictate your
requirement for debt, or because fluctuations impact on your ability to
- pay interest?
9 You indicated that your use of straight debt would be exhausted before "Au issue, as a listed cotipauy, of
you issued shares. You also indicated that you have a flexible target of our perception of acceptable levels
debt in relation to equity. As you also indicate that you maintain spare in city eyes"
borrowing capacity, is this target an amount of debt which your
company believes it derives most benefit, rather than an amount above
- which lenders are reluctant to grant loans?
10 You indicated that your use of straight debt would be exhausted before "Cheaper cost of capital"
internal reserves. Please explain why you consider straight debt to be
- more favourable to internal reserves.
12 You indicated that you maintain a reasonably strict capital structure, i.e. "Not necessarily - not for the sake
approximately constant proportions of debt and equity. However, you of it. Only if economically viable
also strongly agreed, in general, to issuing shares when prices are high expansion opportunities are
even though there is no present need to build up a long-term fund 	 available"
cushion. If shares were issued in these circumstances, the proportion of
debt in relation to equity would change. Therefore, would debt also be
issued to maintain target capital structure? If so, would there be a period
of time in which actual capital structure differed from target capital
structure?
- Leasing Policy	 __________________________
4 You indicated that operating leasing compliments borrowing and	 "Not sure. We don't go the
increases overall borrowing capacity. Do you believe that entering 	 operating lease route as it is not
operating lease agreements has no impact on your ability to enter further appropriate for our business for
debt agreements (i.e. no impact on borrowing capacity) or do you	 operational reasons. Therefore we
believe that operating leases have less impact compared to other forms do not have any direct experience.
of finance?	 However, I percieve that they
would have an impact - but
possibly not as great as on-balance
sheet funding"
6 You indicated that company preference for legal ownership was 	 "Operational flexibility. Security of
important in the decision to lease both land and buildings and other 	 tenure (for land I property)"
- assets. Why is ownership important? 	 ______________________________
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sheet. If this opinion were widespread, the future use of operating leases, in the
event of the introduction of new accounting proposals, might be questioned.
At this stage, a decision was taken to abandon the follow-up interviews. However, it
is recognised that the interview questions highlight the need for further research,
and thus the option to contact other respondents in the future may subsequently be
exercised.
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Chapter 6: Summary and conclusions - Corporate financing and
leasing decisions
The aim of the present study was to investigate the determinants of corporate capital
structure and leasing policy in UK firms, in response to previous conflicting,
limiting and dated evidence.
Leasing is a significant source of finance, especially off-balance sheet operating
leases, and recent evidence appears to suggest it is at least a partial substitute for
other forms of debt (Beattie et al., 2000). However, it is the use of finance leases
that dominates the literature, and then they are generally considered in isolation
from overall financing decisions. The present study redresses the situation by
undertaking a comprehensive investigation combining both the corporate financing
and leasing decision-making processes of UK firms in today's global business
environment.
A questionnaire survey was mailed to the finance directors of 831 UK quoted
industrial companies in the early summer of 2000. A survey approach was adopted
as it provided the scope to address a full spectrum of issues arising from existing
literature, and the opportunity to establish their relative importance. The instrument
comprised 13 pages of questions divided in to four sections. Mainly close-ended
questions were used to request information concerning an individual company's
capital structure decision-making process, leasing policy, and general attitudes to
the determinants of capital structure. The static trade-off, agency, pecking order,
stakeholder, strategy and corporate control theories formed a framework in relation
to capital structure determinants. Information sought in relation to leasing policy
was based on a framework of tax savings, borrowing capacity and repayment, risk
sharing and other financial I transactional reasons for leasing.
The response received was favourable given the length and complexity of the
survey instrument, and the general decline in survey participation by UK companies
in recent years. A response rate of 23% was achieved in relation to completed
questionnaires (198 usable responses), a further 27% declined to participate, while
50% failed to respond. The sample of respondents is fairly representative of the
population of UK quoted industrial companies in terms of size and industry profile.
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A comparison of responses on the basis of timing and leasing use appeared to
suggest that non-response bias was not an issue.
Questionnaire responses were analysed for the entire sample of respondents, and on
the basis of certain key firm characteristics. The main issues under investigation
included whether debt levels are optimised by balancing costs and benefits (static
trade-off), or whether they are the products of investment and dividend needs, by
following a hierarchy of financial sources (pecking order). The relative importance
of factors in the decision to issue debt was considered in addition to how firm
characteristics and circumstances relate to these factors. Factors affecting the
decision to lease, including both features mitigating the costs and enhancing the
benefits in relation to non-leasing debt, and more practical considerations were
considered.
If debt levels are optimised as suggested in the static trade-off theory, the existence
of a target amount of debt in relation to equity might be expected. However, this
target would only be static, if the costs and benefits of issuing debt remained static
over time. In the pecking order theory, debt ratios might be expected to fluctuate, in
response to changes in investment opportunities and dividend needs. However, in
certain firms, investment opportunities and dividend needs might remain fairly
static over time, so even 'pecking order' firms might have static debt ratios.
Irrespective, 'pecking order' firms might be expected to maintain spare borrowing
capacity in order to respond to changes.
Questionnaire responses were strongly against the existence of a strict/static target
capital structure, and of a trade-off between costs and benefits to determine an
optimum level of debt. The evidence in relation to maintaining spare debt capacity
was neutral. The evidence was strongly in favour of firms being flexible in
deviating from existing capital structures, akin with the pecking order theory.
However, in the pecking order firms are expected to follow a hierarchy of sources,
from internal reserves through debt to equity. The issue of equity is avoided for as
long as possible to prevent the signalling of information to investors, resulting in a
decrease in firm value. The questionnaire responses were neutral in relation to firms
progressing through a hierarchy of sources. However, the importance of the
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volatility of a company's earnings I cash flows was clearly evident when choosing
an appropriate amount of debt. This could infer that debt requirements are
influenced by internally generated funds, although internal reserves may not always
be favourable to debt. There was strong evidence to suggest that the market
response to new issues of debt and equity were indeed important. There appears to
be a strong belief in market inefficiency, and in the issue of debt when equity is
undervalued. Debt appears to be viewed as sending favourable signals to the market
place, without causing share prices to decline. However, equity was not thought to
send unfavourable market signals, and would be issued if share prices were high.
At the outset, the process of determining debt levels thus appears to reflect the
pecking order suggestions. Investment opportunities and dividend payout appear
more likely to influence debt levels, than an optimum level of debt finance being
selected. However, the level of debt does not appear to be the result of progressing
through a strict hierarchy of sources, and equity does not appear to be only issued as
a last resort. The level of debt appears more likely to be the product of
circumstances, it depends on the benefits and costs, associated with all sources of
finance, at the time additional finance is required. This leads to the next issue, the
benefits and costs likely to be considered, and their relative importance.
The factors considered most important in the decision to issue debt appear to be
agency costs, the current market value of equity, and the financial distress potential
to debt. Questionnaire responses provided strong evidence in relation to the
importance of restrictive covenants imposed by debt holders. It was apparent that
firms would expand their use of debt in the absence of restrictive covenants. Debt
was more likely to be issued if equity was undervalued by the market, and less
likely if share prices were high. Although the evidence was neutral in relation to the
explicit importance of bankruptcy/financial distress, it appeared to implicitly feature
given the importance attached to ensuring long-term survivability, and the degree
and volatility of projected cash flow / earnings.
There is evidence to suggest that debt is favoured for the tax advantage of interest
deductions, and that the benefit attached to this depends to some extent on whether
other non-taxable deductions are available to individual firms. According to Miller
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(1977), the tax benefit derived from debt depends not only on corporate taxes, but
also on the personal taxes facing investors. However, personal taxes do not appear
to feature in the decision to issue debt. This is perhaps not surprising given that
personal taxes vary across different investors, and thus in reality the optimum tax
benefit from debt could be very difficult to determine. Debt may also be issued to
avoid the dilution of existing shareholders' claims or voting proportions. Equity
does not appear to be favoured over debt with the intention of diluting the holdings
of certain shareholders. However, the likelihood of respondents admitting to what
could be considered a somewhat 'unethical' practice is debatable. The evidence in
relation to the use of debt to ensure a large proportion of cash flow is committed to
interest payments as a disciplinary control on management was neutral. Again,
respondents may have been reluctant to admit to such action. Alternatively, other
controls to promote goal congruence between shareholders and managers might
already be in place. Indeed, 96% of responding firms indicated that they operated
management incentive schemes.
Questionnaire responses were further analysed on the basis of firm size, industry
classification, gearing level and corporate strategy. There is some evidence to
suggest that individual firm characteristics and circumstances influence corporate
financing decisions. Although control considerations featured in the use of debt, the
evidence was neutral in respect of using debt to prevent corporate take-overs.
However, these findings may merely indicate that many respondents were not
unduly threatened by take-overs. This argument is substantiated by the fact that
preventing take-overs was more important to firms adopting a cost leadership
strategy who are likely take-over candidates in a bid to end price wars. It was
considered much less important by firms competing in terms of product
differentiation.
In support of the stakeholder theory, the evidence was strongly in favour of the
importance attached to ensuring customers/suppliers are not worried about company
survival. Firms competing in terms of cost leadership and experiencing no
expansion, or expansion by integration, appear to be conducive to high levels of
debt. For firms competing in terms of unique product strategy or growth by
diversification, the opposite is true. In terms of competitive strategy, findings
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support theoretical suggestions that firms adopting a cost leadership strategy
provide standard products/services using tangible and flexible assets, and
consequently have a lower potential for financial distress. The opposite is true for
finns competing on a unique product basis. However, in relation to
growthlexpansion strategy, findings contradict prior evidence, which suggests that
high levels are associated with the highest levels of diversification (Barton and
Gordon, 1988; Lowe, Naughton and Taylor, 1994). Diversification spreads
operating risk and thus reduces the potential for financial distress. However, the
present findings might be indicative of the increased co-ordination and information
processing associated with integration, which in turn requires to be financed. Also,
integration could be considered less risky, as an element of existing experience and
knowledge would apply.
It is hardly surprising that firms competing in terms of cost leadership appear to
place more importance on the tax advantages of interest deductions and level of
interest rates. Cost is the priority in this competitive approach. Further, it would be
expected that highly geared firms attach more importance to projected cash flow /
earnings and restrictive covenants in the decision to issue additional debt. They are
already committed to a level of interest and repayment, and are more likely to be in
the position when breaching restrictive covenants is an issue. Large firms appear to
attach more importance to the tax advantage of interest deductions, but then they are
likely to be paying substantial amounts of tax. The importance attached to projected
cash flows / earnings, and ensuring customers / suppliers aren't worried about
company survival appears to be related to industry classification. With the exception
of Information Technology, the broad industry classifications used make it difficult
to interpret the findings. Finns operating in Information Technology appear less
concerned with projected cash flow / earnings, which is not surprising given the
significant earnings these types of firms have reported in recent years. However,
ensuring that customers / suppliers are not worried about survival is important given
the after service / maintenance requirements of IT products, and the likelihood of
failure of firms which don't keep abreast of evolving technology.
There is some tentative evidence to suggest that a firm's characteristics or
circumstances might influence the process of determining debt levels, in addition to
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factors affecting the choice of debt. Overall, the evidence was against the existence
of target capital structure, and neutral in respect of following a hierarchy of sources
and maintaining spare debt capacity. However, firm size, industry classification,
corporate strategy and gearing levels appear to influence the maintenance of target
capital structure and spare debt capacity. Highly geared firms also appear more
likely to follow a hierarchy of sources. The true extent to which firms with certain
characteristics maintain a target capital structure, whilst others maintain spare debt
capacity and follow a hierarchy of sources, requires further investigation. Although
beyond the scope of the present study, a detailed analysis / comparison of individual
firms following these alternative processes, could prove insightful.
Questionnaire responses reconfirmed the significance of leasing as a source of
finance. In addition, the majority of respondents appear to recognise fixed finance
and operating lease obligations when measuring financial gearing, further
substantiating the view that lease and debt finance are considered substitutes. For
respondents following a hierarchy of financial sources, internal reserves and straight
debt were ranked in preference to leasing. However, the difference in preference
between finance leases, operating leases and ordinary shares was not found to be
statistically significant. This is surprising given that operating leases appeared to
take precedence over finance leases in the financing of all asset types, with the
exception of leased plant and machinery. The general approach to the leasing
decision was investigated. Findings appear to suggest that, more often than not, the
decision to lease is a result of favourable comparisons with alternative sources of
finance, the most popular being bank borrowing.
The importance of factors in the decision to lease land and buildings and other
assets were investigated separately. The factors considered most important in the
decision to lease land and buildings appear to be avoiding large capital outlay and
conservation of cash flow. Importance also appears to be attached to lease rentals
being tax deductible when capital allowances are not available on the asset
purchased. It appears that leasing may be chosen if it compares favourably to other
sources of borrowing in terms of interest rates, and/or incentives such as rent-free
periods extended by the lessor. There is strong evidence to refute the suggestion that
land and buildings are leased to avoid capital expenditure controls. However, this is
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not surprising given that the acquisition of land and buildings leased or otherwise, is
a high profile decision. Risk sharing reasons do not appear to feature in the leasing
of land and buildings, nor practical considerations such as the application process
and availability. The evidence was neutral in relation to leasing being favoured for
offering a complete package, providing finance on any scale and minimising agency
costs. Comments received by respondents also indicated that land and buildings
might be leased even though legal ownership might be preferred. Access to a
particular property may not be available by any other means. This could be the
typical situation facing large retail firms when obtaining access to outlets in prime
locations.
The conservation of cash flow and cost of leasing in relation to borrowing appear
most important in the decision to lease other assets. Respondents also appear to
lease other assets because the ability to transfer capital tax allowances to the lessor
is reflected in lower rental payments. Avoiding large capital outlay, the provision of
total financing on any scale, as well as the inclusion of service and maintenance
packages, also appear to be important in the leasing of other assets. The evidence
appears to suggest that the consequences of default and flexible repayment are not
important in the decision to lease other assets. The evidence was neutral in relation
to leasing being favoured for minimising agency costs, risk sharing reasons and
practical considerations. However the use of risk sharing features in lease
agreements was not apparently widespread among respondents. Although leasing
appears to be predominant in certain industries which might reflect the nature of
assets employed. Firms operating in Information Technology, General Industries
and Cyclical Services appear more likely to use or consider leasing. The assets
employed in IT are subject to rapid obsolescence, and assets employed in General
Industries and Cyclical Services may be more standardised and thus more
conducive to being the subject of lease contracts.
In summary, avoiding large capital outlay and cash flow considerations appear of
paramount importance in the decision to lease all asset types. As the flexibility of
repayment in leasing arrangements does not appear important, cash flow
considerations could be equally applicable to the decision to take on any form of
debt. It appears that leasing will be used if the cost is favourable in relation to other
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sources of finance, and rejected if it is not. Other advantages to leasing in
comparison to other sources of finance include tax benefits, availability to finance
on any scale and the opportunity to obtain service and maintenance packages. The
importance attached to these advantages likely depends on individual
circumstances, and is not apparently consistent across firm size. Small firms appear
more concerned with qualitative factors such as avoiding large capital outlay,
conservation of cash flow and availability on any scale. Large firms appear more
concerned with cost. These findings are consistent with the earlier findings of Drury
and Braund (1990). The decision to lease land and buildings may not always be
through preference but a necessity in the acquisition of certain property.
The present study contributes a comprehensive analysis of the corporate financing
and leasing decisions of UK quoted industrial companies. It has important
implications for the capital structure debate. Firms do not appear to exhibit the static
trade-off predictions of adopting an optimal capital structure based on balancing the
costs and benefits of issuing debt. However, the pecking order suggestion of
following a strict hierarchy of sources also appears unfounded. Equity does not
appear to be issued as a last resort. Findings are consistent with the conflicts
identified in prior research, by suggesting that neither the static trade-off nor the
pecking order theories exist in its purest form. Prior research has produced
supporting evidence for both of these theories of capital structure. However, this is
hardly surprising given that the alternative theories only appear to be mutually
exclusive at the outset.
Myers (1984) in his reconciliation of capital structure theory and prior evidence
suggests a modified pecking order, in which investment and dividend payout dictate
the need for external finance, and debt is internally rather than externally
constrained. If debt is internally constrained, an assessment of the benefits and costs
of all sources of finance appears necessary. Firms might, therefore, be aware of a
level at which the perceived cost of issuing additional debt outweighs the benefits.
In this context firms might appear to have a maximum level of debt in mind.
However, operating at a target level of debt depends on investment and dividend
requirements. Adopting a target capital structure could infer that investment and
dividend needs cause firms to come close to exceeding their maximum debt levels.
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Firms with less requirement for external finance may take on debt as and when
required, secure in the knowledge that they are in a position when the benefits far
outweigh the costs, akin with following a hierarchy of financial sources.
The findings in the present study can be reconciled to a modified pecking order. It
offers an explanation of why approximately 52% of respondents indicated that they
operate with some degree of target capital structure (strict/flexible), even though
debt levels appear to be the product of investment and dividend needs. Further,
company senior management appear to be the most important influence in setting
target capital structures, inferring that debt levels are indeed internally constrained.
The findings of the present study suggest that it would seem inappropriate for future
capital structure research to focus on proving alternative static trade-off and pecking
order theories. It appears necessary for future research to adopt a modified pecking
order approach. Although beyond the scope of this thesis, the opportunity exists to
analyse the capital structure of responding companies in relation to adopting a target
capital structure and following a hierarchy of sources.
In reality, debt levels, including lease levels, appear to be the product of
circumstances. They are determined in relation to benefits and costs, associated with
all sources of finance, at the time additional finance is required. The benefits and
costs associated with alternative finance sources differ across firms, as does the
relative importance attached to them, and the requirement for funding in terms of
investment, dividend payout and operations. The corporate financing decision is
thus complex and multidimensional. If some or all of these dimensions change, or
decision-makers perceive a change, debt ratios are likely to fluctuate over time, else
they may appear static. This observation has important implications for future
research. It highlights the difficulty in analysing corporate financing and leasing
decisions in general, when they are essentially situation specific. Future research
may thus benefit from studying financing decisions in context, by adopting, for
example, an individual case study or experimental approach.
The present study has identified the costs and benefits that appear most important in
relation to debt and leasing. This provides a focus for future research, in terms of
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establishing the contexts in which these costs and benefits predominantly feature.
The existence of neutral evidence in relation to the agency costs of leasing, and risk
sharing reasons for leasing other assets, provides the opportunity for further
investigation. Lenders may provide useful insight into the use of restrictive
covenants and their impact in relation to leasing. Further, providers of lease finance
are in the best position to assess what firms require from leasing contracts. They are
in business to sell such contracts, it is in their interests to know the features which
best meet specific requirements.
The present study has confirmed the significance of leasing, both off and on-balance
sheet, and its position as part of the overall corporate financing decision. These
findings cast doubt, in relation to both prior capital structure and leasing research, in
which significant leasing obligations have been ignored. The conflicting evidence
arising from prior studies may well be resolved by the future incorporation of
leasing and debt obligations in regression-based studies.
In short, the present study documents the modern day corporate financing and
leasing decisions of UK firms. It provides current and comprehensive coverage in
response to previous limiting and dated evidence. It offers an explanation in relation
to prior conflicting evidence by establishing that corporate financing and leasing is a
complex and multidimensional decision. It provides evidence to suggest that the
static trade-off and pecking order theories are not entirely mutually exclusive.
Future research should focus on a reconciliation of the two. The present study does
not profess to provide an exhaustive account of the determinants of corporate capital
structure and leasing policy in UK firms. However, it provide a clear starting point
on which future research can build, as well as highlighting areas of immediate
focus.
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